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Abstract  
This thesis considers the social effects of unprecedented growth in financial trades and 
speculation. The key claim is that speculative finance capital markets have caused 
widespread economic and social pressures. An argument is advanced that socio-economic 
inequalities are resultant of overleveraged, unregulated finance, and market integration over 
the last three decades. Pressures on civil society have arisen through governments 
transferring state-based funds to bail out private institutions, and stimulate economies. 
Socialisation of debt is used to strengthen the private sector.  
Central to this argument is the consideration that two economies have emerged in parallel 
throughout the developed world. The ―real economy‖ of developed nation states has been 
depleted by protracted global economic crises. The second, ―shadow economy‖, has re-
emerged as a concentrated economic force with speculative daily global financial trades of 
over US$ 4 trillion, including AU$41 billion in trades, every day, in Australia. The majority 
of trades are enabled by sophisticated high frequency trading corridors between Wall Street 
and the City of London. The consequences are felt worldwide.  
Two key questions are addressed in this thesis. First, given the social consequences 
emanating from global financial markets, and the concomitant socialisation of debt in 
developed economies, is the introduction of a financial transaction tax a feasible, progressive 
economic and social reform to partially ameliorate the negative effects of speculative finance 
capital on nation states? Second, could a miniscule tax on trades, recalibrate the relationships 
between governments and markets and provide accountability, oversight and stability? This 
thesis concludes in the affirmative. 
Additionally, this thesis posits an argument that transaction tax revenues in Australia, the 
eighth largest derivatives transaction-trading nation in the world, should be used specifically 
to strengthen national social policy commitments to homelessness, and provide a targeted 
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Chapter 1 
Methods and Introduction 
1.1 Aims 
The social consequences of continuing financial crises on democracy are still in the early 
stages. Many established academics support the claim that democratic processes fail in this 
current phase. Austerity measures, limited resources for services, national reserves depleted 
by transfer of funds to bailouts and economic stimulus, have lead to increasing collusion 
between finance capital players and politics, and have radically changed social and political 
economies.  
The aim of this thesis is to address global debt crises and the enduring effects of the global 
financial crisis by providing evidence to support the introduction of a global financial 
transaction tax (FTT). It will be argued that this progressive economic reform will provide 
the audit mechanisms, accountability controls, and frameworks needed to ameliorate the 
deleterious effects of a dysfunctional market destabilising civil society.  
A global FTT has the capacity to add US$800 billion into economies around the world that 
participate in, or allow markets to operate from sovereign territories. An FTT is supported by 
progressive political players, but blocked by financial market lobbyists. This thesis examines 
global initiatives underway to support proposals. 
In order to achieve this key aim, the thesis also considers the underlying economic 
implications directly related to modelling FTT architecture and how outcomes will be of 
benefit to the wider global civil society.  
The rationale of this dissertation draws on previous works by the author, draws together, and 
examines the volume of recent work by scholars in the field of International Political 
Economy. This work is timely, as many politicians and academics have argued for an FTT.  
Against this there has never been assembled such an intensive lobbying effort to deride and 
discredit the foresight and social morale galvanised by those who believe that the rights of 
secretive and greedy shadow economy players should be placed ahead of community and 
social goods, and that an equitable distribution of wealth is the sustainable way to support 
global goods, equality and fairness.  
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Gathering material to substantiate claims of market dysfunction and building evidence to 
support a financial transaction tax is to be carried out through three specific mechanisms. 
First, data from comparative sources of economic expertise (Keynes, Minsky, Krugman, 
Morris, et al.) is sourced and referenced against the abundance of articles, papers and data in 
reputable carriers such as the Economist, the Guardian, the Financial Times, the New York 
Times and academic papers whose commentary on changing financial market circumstances 
provide pieces to the puzzle as new developments overtake those that are known.  
1.2 Methods 
Gathering material to support an argument for accountability in financial markets has been 
carried out through specific strategies. Because of the historical nature of financial crises and 
downturns, including sovereign debt, and austerity measures in Europe, there is a requirement 
to access accredited material available online. Research data has been sourced from many 
fields. In 2008-09, the University of Tasmania assisted with a research and study trip in the 
United Kingdom. I studied at the London School of Economics and interviewed political 
economists in London. This was a time of high volatility in global markets and the Global 
Financial Crisis was emerging.  
To understand the political and economic context I have researched the works of Keynes, 
Minsky, contemporary economists, Krugman, Stiglitz, Simon Johnson and published works 
by Charles Morris, Satyajit Das, and, Nigel Dodd. I have sourced and referenced against the 
abundance of articles, papers and data in reputable carriers such as The Economist, The 
Guardian, The Financial Times, The New York Times and journals whose commentary on 
changing financial market circumstances provides linkages to the arguments and information. 
Recent articles by political economists suggest that neoliberal ideologies have exerted an 
influence on capital players and helped accentuate social inequalities across the world. In this 
respect, I have drawn on material from contributors of all sides of the political spectrum. I 
have examined heterodox economic responses to these issues, including the works of 
Professor Dick Bryan of the University of Sydney, who has written extensively on the 
―money crisis‖ within the context of the global financial crisis and its current phases. 
I have referred to Pakulski‘s (2005) key text ―Globalising Inequalities: New Patterns of 
Social Privilege and Disadvantage‖. This work seems timely, as Pakulski has provided a 
framework to examine the different forms of inequality through this past decade. Whilst the 
global economy lifts millions out of poverty in India and China, socioeconomic events in 
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developed countries have resulted in widespread unemployment. Spain‘s youth 
unemployment attests to social problems as economies slow down, as is currently occurring.  
Many books have been published on socio-economic and political issues related to the 
current global market conditions. Many have been referenced extensively in this thesis. Other 
material has been resourced from the London School of Economics Financial Markets Group 
Paper Series with contemporary discourse on social and financial issues. The City UK market 
Group provides market analysis through linkages to the Bank of England and the Bank for 
International Settlements providing credible evidence of changing market dynamics.  
I have noted the research available and I am informed by my occupation within a government 
housing department of the linkages between financial markets, their effect on economies and 
the serious nature of social inequalities. Research has centred on developing an argument that 
supports policy reforms that lead to the strengthening of oversight and policy measures that 
afford citizens the opportunities to outcomes that are not limited to the ebbs and fluctuations 
that occur in social circumstances delivered by unregulated and unaccountable market 
players.  
I am informed by research on concentration of wealth patterns, consolidation of financial 
market entities and new ways of sophisticated trading mechanisms. I am informed that these 
conditions will put further stress on citizens if not addressed in a responsible manner. My 
research addresses these issues and promotes options that are available at this point. Because 
of the changing nature of these social and economic problems, and the emotive nature of the 
subject, balanced new material has been difficult to access.  
1.3 Structure of the thesis 
As stated earlier, this thesis examines the socialisation of debt and the rise of political, 
monetary, and fiscal policy that has supported the regime of financialisation. As part of this 
examination, Chapter 2 (The Financialisation of Global Markets) and Chapter 3 (The Social 
Consequences of Financial Markets) detail the rise of finance as the dominant politically 
endorsed structure over three decades. Both chapters provide an overview of expansionary 
economics and the rise and fall of the theory which encapsulated the social reform of high 
levels of home ownership as a vehicle from which capital markets engineered powerful forms 
of accumulated risk through financial engineering. 
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Chapter 4 (Global Financial Systems) consolidates the previous two chapters as it describes 
the systems of finance that influence both global and local economies. Chapter 4 describes 
systemic risks which arise from sophisticated trading networks of algorithm and ―flash‖ 
trades, a trading system that becomes integrated both by scientific advancement and networks 
of ownership throughout the world. These financial market systems have been legitimised by 
neoliberal political economy regimes over the past four decades and provide high-net-worth 
individuals and elite corporations with exceptional political power. These are the systems that 
a global financial tax would oversee and provide oversight. These are systems that enable 
speculative trades of nearly US$700 trillion a year. 
Chapter 5 introduces the conceptual frameworks for a financial transaction tax, which could 
provide a minimal tax on each individual financial transaction. Cumulatively, significant 
resources would be made available to those countries enabling transactions to and from their 
sovereign space. Chapter 5 develops the central issue of accountability of finance and 
financial systems described in chapters 2–4. A financial transaction tax would be a legitimate 
tool specifically engineered for the process of providing a resource base to speculative 
unregulated capital trades. An FTT will not stop or lesson trades as has been touted by those 
lobbying against its introduction. It actually benefits traders by further legitimising their 
activities whilst holding them accountable for some of the negative aspects that trading 
produces. Chapter 5 scopes the framework and approaches to deliver equity. 
Chapter 6 builds on chapters 4 and 5 by describing the nature of political instability sitting 
alongside economic instability as the frameworks that confront developing and developed 
nation states in 2012. The instability of the European economies threatens world growth and 
viability. Chapter 6 examines three critical intersections of global economic and political 
importance. The first is the balance of power between the developing Eastern economies and 
the developed nation states of the West, primarily the G20 counties. Chapter 6 looks at the 
rise of the Beijing Consensus as it overtakes the Washington Consensus in political economy 
and social terms. This chapter examines the socialisation of debt as developed, highly in-debt 
nation states provide public funds to bail out and rescue corporations. Chapter 6 presses the 
point that a global financial tax will provide a policy framework to dampen speculative 
trades, make market trades accountable, and concomitantly advantage nation state economies 
with a resource to reactivate public account systems. . It posits an argument that revenues in 
Australia, the eighth largest derivatives transaction trading nation in the world, should be 
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used specifically to strengthen national social policy commitments to homelessness, and 
provide a targeted resource for sustainable social housing provision. 
The consequences of the continuing financial crises on democratic systems are in its early 
stages. Many established academics support the claim that democracy fails in the current 
phase of financial crises. 
Together this thesis poses the central question: given the structural shift in the balance of 
economic power from the West to the East and the socialisation of debt in neoliberal 
developed economies, is the introduction of a global financial transaction tax a progressive 
economic and social reform to ameliorate the effects of speculative finance capital on nation 
states? Could revenues help stabilise the economic and social effects? 
1.4 Introduction 
The financial transaction tax is a socially progressive proposal supported by eminent 
economists and global leaders. Originally suggested by Nobel Laureate Economist James 
Tobin in 1961, the idea of the tax has been topical, and contested, for five decades. It is, by 
design, an instrument to deal with the pressures of transnational finance activities. On August 
1 2012, France became the first major European country to introduce a Financial Transaction 
Tax into law, with a tax rate of 0.2 per cent on three types of transactions. Fifteen European 
countries are now supporting or closely examining proposals. 
The last three decades has resulted in the globalisation and integration of financial markets. 
This has lead to unprecedented growth in global financial trade and speculation causing 
widespread economic and social pressures.  
Burgeoning derivatives markets are becoming concentrated. Market share
1
 of the 10 largest 
firms in the United Kingdom has increased from 71 per cent in 2001 to 92 per cent in 2010. 
The largest 20 firms accounted for 99 per cent of turnover. In the United States, the largest 10 
financial entities accounted for 95 per cent of turnover in 2010. Many entities operate from 
tax havens where $US 21 trillion
2
 is currently being held.  
More recently, pressures on civil society have arisen through governments allocating 
taxpayer funds to bail out private institutions and to stimulate debt-ridden economies. Civil 
                                                          
1
 ―Derivatives 2010‖. TheCityUK. December 2010. (www.TheCityUK.com)  
2. ―US 21 Trillion hidden in tax havens‖ Tax Justice Network –McKinsey Consultants. ABC News 23 July 2012 
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society and public sector resources have been drained in an attempt to strengthen private 
sector accounts. The socialisation of private sector debt
3
 has been a feature of contemporary 
macroeconomic policy settings across most developed states. Globalisation of finance has 
contributed to financial instability
4
. 
Banking and financial system speculation and concomitant fragility has spread rapidly from 
the United States to Europe and, to a lesser extent, Australia. The International Monetary 
Fund estimates debt levels in the G20 countries to be $US 30 trillion.  
Ratings agency Standard and Poor‘s forecasts a ―global wall‖ of nonfinancial corporate debt 
maturities, due from 2012 to 2016, which will need to be refinanced over the next five years, 
at US$ 43 to US$ 46 trillion
5
. Standard and Poor‘s argues that this factor, amid the current 
Euro zone crisis, a soft US economic recovery following the Great Recession, and the 
prospect of slowing financial growth, raise the downside risk of a ―perfect storm‖ for credit 
markets. There is a growing scenario of global recession that politicians fail to explain. 
Historian Antony Beaver
6
 suggests, ―(t) he public have not been told about how desperate the 
situation is because no politician, then or now, dares to spell it out.‖ 
As a direct consequence of the global credit squeeze, unemployment, and increasing nation 
state debt levels have occurred across civil, industrial and resources sectors with millions of 
workers now facing unemployment, or underemployment. For global citizens, particularly 
those located in developed states, the horizontal linkages that often integrate social 
communities are being replaced by vertical ties binding the individual to the state. Global 
civil societies face considerable inequalities. There is a risk of a job-less generation, 
disconnected, and left behind. 
Two economies have emerged, in parallel, throughout the developed world. The first, the 
―real economy‘ (of developed nation states) has been depleted of resources by the global 
crisis in finance. Second, the ―shadow economy‖, has re-emerged (following the 2008 
financial meltdown), as a dominant force with daily global currency trades of over US$4 
trillion, underpinned by burgeoning derivatives markets. Derivatives markets are recording 
                                                          
3
 Public sector finance transferred to cover private sector debts during recent phases of financial crises. 
4
 Hugo Banzinger. ―Did the Globalisation of Finance Undermine Financial Stability? Lessons in Economic 
Stability.‖ London School of Economics Financial Markets Group Paper Series. Special Paper 211. June 2012. 
5
 Standard and Poor‘s. ―The Credit Overhang: Is a $46 Trillion Perfect Storm Brewing?‖ 10 May 2012. 
(www.cpfinancial.net/.../the-credit-overhang-is-a-perfect-storm)  
6
 Antony Beevor. ―Beevor‘s Europe crumbles.‖ Quoted in Review. Australian Financial Review. 15 June 2012. 
(review@fairfax.com.au)  
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record turnovers of nearly US$700 trillion. Seventy seven per cent of these trades are 
speculative. A concentration of wealth and political power is evident in this shadow 
.economy.  
It is within this context that social accountability of finance becomes the key question of this 
thesis. Can finance capital be allowed an elite market space, and political protection? 
Global political leaders, economists, and civil society groups have endorsed conceptual 
frameworks supporting a global or local financial transaction tax (FTT). European countries 
are examining its merits, and motives. In June 2012 the European Parliament
7
 voted in favour 
of the European Commission‘s proposal for a financial transaction tax. Eleven European 
countries have now supported implementation of an FTT
8
.  
An FTT on financial trades would ameliorate some of the detrimental social impacts from the 
present financial crisis and provide a framework, and rationale, to prevent further disruption. 
An FTT would provide oversight and accountability on speculative finance capital activities 
on a global and nation state level. 
For promoters of rapid deregulation of the global economy attached to policy settings 
pursued under such labels as ―Neoliberalism‖, ―Anglo-Saxon, ―Anglo-American Model‖, or 
―the Washington Consensus‖9, persistent and rising inequality was until recently only a 
modestly embarrassing imperfection in an otherwise appealing picture of market prosperity. 
This prosperity appeared more tangible through booming housing markets and an increasing 
display of wealth in most developed countries around the globe.  
However, this was a prosperity missed by those in civil society who were unable to access the 
wall of hedge fund enabled finance capital in the ―carry trade‖ credit markets. These were 
markets where US dollar surpluses held in China and Asia coursed back through the United 
States and on to Australia for housing, motor vehicle, investment and personal debt. 
                                                          
7
 ―EU Parliament votes for financial transaction tax.‖ KPMG. (www.kpmg.com/.../taxandlegalnewsflashes/) 
8
 Spiegel Online International. Banking and Finance. ―Eleven EU Countries Agree on Transaction Tax.‖ 10 
September 2012. 
9
 John Williamson. ―What Washington Means by Policy Reform‖. In ―Latin American Readjustment: How 
Much has Happened‖ Institute for International Economics 1989. The concept and the name ―Washington 
Consensus‖ originated in 1989 through John Williamson, an economist from the Institute for International 
Economics, an international economic think tank based in Washington D.C. Williamson used the term to shared 
economic policy themes amongst Washington based institutions at the time (including the International 
Monetary Fund, World Bank, and U.S. Treasury Department. 
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Ferguson
10
 argues that over-leveraged personal and business finance is a contemporary 
feature of modern developed state economies.  
Inequality among nations has been explained by the insistence that the leaders of poorer 
nations had not been pursuing the right policy mix of deregulated markets, privatised 
government services, weakened labour unions, and most importantly a readiness to accept 
carry-trade
11
 investments from the growing number of hedge funds and sophisticated 
financially engineered products.  
These global inequalities were identified and remedied by World Bank and International 
Monetary Fund operatives preaching ―open market‖ doctrines to new funding recipients. 
Non-compliance was viewed as a perceived weakness demonstrated by hesitant governments 
resisting deregulation. 
By the last years of the twentieth century, this rationalisation was undercut by a string of 
economic disasters that had befallen governments whose leaders and policies were 
considered exemplary of the new capitalist modelling. México, Thailand, Indonesia, Korea, 
Japan, Brazil, and Russia adorned the gallery of nations whose economies soured shortly 
after their leaders where lauded by the global policy elite for pursuing sound economic 
fundamentals.  
Around the same time, the failure of Long Term Capital Management in the United States in 
1998 exemplified the massive leverage risks in corporations and markets, increasingly 
decoupled from the real economy and historic financial models of trade and development. 
New sophisticated hi-tech transfers of capital through unregulated and largely unknown 




                                                          
10
 Niall Ferguson. 2011. Civilisation: The West and the Rest. Amazon Press. 2011. 
11
 Investors borrowing at low interest rates (in low rate states including Japan and the United States) and lending 
long to businesses and ultimately consumers in countries where interest rates are comparatively high (Australia 
and European countries). ―Carry Trade‖ finance has been a dominant form of credit distribution in developed 
nation states.  
12 Bryan J. North and Rajdeep Sengupta. ―Is Shadow Banking really Banking?‖ The Regional Economist. 
October 2011. (The term ―shadow banking‖ has been attributed to remarks by economist and money manager 
Paul McCulley to describe a large segment of financial intermediation that is routed outside the balance sheets 
of regulated commercial banks and other depository institutions. Shadow banks are defined as financial 
intermediaries that conduct functions of banking ―without access to central bank liquidity or public sector credit 
guarantees.‖ The size of the shadow banking sector was close to $20 trillion at its peak and shrank to about $15 
trillion last year, making it at least as big as, if not bigger than, the traditional banking system). 
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The first decade of the new century (2001–2012) has witnessed the most extraordinary 
political and socioeconomic events, startling in scale and veracity, yet not entirely 
unanticipated given the nature of speculative global capital trades and heavily debt laden 
economies.  
When governments hand control of regulated capital markets to unregulated margin-seeking 
traders, this disconnect becomes palpable, and dangerous. Policymakers, influenced by 
lobbyists in the two largest financial trading nations, the United States and the United 
Kingdom have downgraded and off-shored industrial development, heartland manufacturing, 
and home-grown research and development, in favour of financial services headquarters in 
Wall Street and Canary Wharf. Between these two locales, 85 per cent of the total global 





 argue that the levels of debt in the global financial system are 
unsustainable and that the developed countries must immediately address the crisis of debt. 
Rhodes and Stelter contend: 
Total debt-to-GDP levels in the 18 core countries of the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) raised from 160 per cent in 1980 to 321 per cent in 2010. Disaggregated and 
adjusted for inflation, these numbers mean that the debt levels of non-financial corporation‘s increased 
by 300 per cent, the debt levels of governments increased by 425 per cent and the debt levels of private 
households increased by 600 per cent. But the costs of the West‘s aging populations are hidden in the 
official reporting. If we include the mounting costs of providing for the elderly, the debt levels would 
be significantly higher. Add to this sobering picture the fact that the financial system is running at 
unprecedented leverage levels, and we can draw only one conclusion: the 30-year-old credit boom has 
run its course. The debt problem simply has to be addressed. 
Underpinning this considerable growth in capital markets, and overlaying socioeconomic 
civil society patterns, has been the continuance, over the past two decades, of a new phase of 
accumulation associated with the concentration of capital through centralised financial 
centres. Streithorst
15
 argues that since the 1980s, debt has been the world economy‘s essential 
engine of growth.  
Capital centres emerge alongside, support, and influence capital elite stakeholders over real 
economy socioeconomic outcomes and strategies in all forms of government policymaking. 
                                                          
13
 Bank for International Settlements. 2011.  
14
 David Rhodes and Daniel Stelter. ―Collateral Damage: What Next? Where Next. What to expect and how to 
Prepare.‖ The Boston Consulting Group. January 2012 
15
 Tom Streithorst. ―Debt is Good.‖ Prospect Magazine.  3 February 2012. 
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The new macroeconomic structures are underpinned by financialisation of global markets 
splitting traditional and historical global investment and development funds and trades (real 
economy); into highly complex linkages between agents and borrowers in finance capital 
markets (shadow economy). The 2008 financial crisis and the resultant stagnation of 
economies is often attributed to the spread of shadow banking which accounts for a third of 
total banking assets globally
16
.  
The impact of financialisation reinforces and enables capital accumulation amongst high net 
wealth individuals and corporations, influences political outcomes, turns politicians into 
servants, and, most grossly, develops a new phase of socioeconomic inequity. It has provided 
the structural vehicle for the socialisation of debt.  
In pursuit of the next sophisticated instrument to trade fast and with stealth, the recently 
crippled investment banks including Goldman Sachs have re-emerged with massive profits 
and rewarded, again, top traders with top packages.  
A rising tide of angst and disbelief amongst civil society leaders and policymakers has forced 
an open enquiry into cash market accountability
17
 following disclosure of the LIBOR rate 
fixing scandal. More incessantly, past and present operatives of Goldman Sachs now occupy 
top-level government offices in Italy and Greece as most European countries enter turbulence 
occasioned by a sovereign debt crisis.  
Considerable energy has recently been shown by the leader of the United Kingdom based 
Financial Services Authority (Lord Adair Turner), German Chancellor Angela Merkel and 
newly elected French President Hollande to introduce a miniscule tax on speculative global 
financial transactions as a means to ameliorate the socialisation of debt. These proposals for a 
publicly accountable global financial transaction tax have been mooted since the idea was 
first put forward by Nobel Laureate Economist James Tobin in the 1960s. The case for 
broader tax imposts on speculative capital had been promoted by John Maynard Keynes 
decades earlier.  
Despite the ―unfashionable‖ nature of the tax and attempts by financial institutions and hedge 
funds to dismiss this progressive idea, the recent greed by financial players and capital elites 
                                                          
16
 ―Shadow Banking: A European Perspective.‖ Conference Description narrative. City University. London. 
17
 British Bankers Association ―Calculating Interest‖ 17 July 2012. 
(http://www.bbalibor.com/technicla aspects/calculating interest ) 
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has seen a new investigation of the merits of the tax as a means of countering the deleterious 
effects of the global recession on society. 
The proposal for financial transaction taxes (FTTs) has seen renewed urgency (late 2011–12) 
that has brought French President Hollande, German Chancellor Merkel and European 
leaders together to discuss and recommend the proposals put forward. 
Anni Podimata, the Member of the European Parliament spearheading Parliament's position 
on establishing a financial transaction tax, issued a statement about the intention of 11 
European countries to press ahead with the FTT. The newly formed Dutch Government 
formed on 31 October 2012 became the 11th out of 27 European Union countries to support 
and adopt an FTT. Podimata stated: 
"I welcome the decision of 11 Member States to introduce a Financial Transaction Tax under enhanced 
cooperation on the basis of the Commission proposal of September 2011. It is a socially fair tax, an 
indispensable part of a complete and coherent solution to exit the crisis. This is a reward for Parliament, 
which has been calling for an FTT for over two years. It will contribute to shifting the burden from the 
citizens to the financial industry - which has not yet contributed its fair share to the cost of the crisis. It 
will target the most speculative activities and at the same time provide finances equal to more than half 
of the EU's annual budget at a time of intense fiscal consolidation. We will continue to bring on board 
the greatest possible number of member states. ‖18 
Many versions have been promoted by politicians and researchers and have included a tax 
localised to financial areas such as Europe and Asia. A global financial transaction tax is the 
most ambitious and encompassing model, as it is fair and equitable, and imposes most effect 
on speculative capital market players; those that increasingly monopolise the markets in the 
United States and United Kingdom. A global financial transaction tax on capital inflows and 




This thesis supports a rationale for such an FTT. The rationale for an FTT is sound, but 
capital elites who increasingly dominate politics will influence political motivation. 
Recently the former chief of the International Monetary Fund and now Professor of the Sloan 
School of Management at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Professor Simon 
Johnson, likened the hold of the ―financial oligarchy‖, over US policy, with that of business 
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elites in developing countries including Russia. Other commentators agree. Certainly, the mix 
of capital elites and policymakers is starkly evident in Washington, and in Europe where high 
profile entities with links to high finance have been chosen, not elected, to power. Professor 
Johnson argues that the weight of the US financial sector, on government, is preventing a 
resolution of the current crisis saying
20
: 
In its depth and suddenness, the US economic and financial crisis is shockingly reminiscent of 
moments we have recently seen in emerging markets. The similarity is evident: large inflows of 
foreign capital; torrid credit growth; excessive leverage; bubbles in asset prices, particularly property; 
and, finally, asset-price collapses and financial catastrophe. But there‘s a deeper and more disturbing 
similarity: elite business interests – financiers, in the case of the US – played a central role in creating 
the crisis, making ever-larger gambles, with the implicit backing of the government, until the 
inevitable collapse. Moreover, the great wealth that the financial sector created and concentrated gave 
bankers enormous political weight. 
Johnson suggests that the GFC has unearthed many unpleasant truths about the United States 
and foremost amongst these is that the financial industry has effectively ―captured the 
government‖, a state of affairs that more typically describes emerging markets and is at the 
centre of many emerging market crises and, further, that ―recovery will fail unless we break 
the financial oligarchy that is blocking essential reform. And if we are to prevent a true 
recession we are running out of time.‖21 
Governments in the United States, United Kingdom, Greece, Italy, Ireland, Spain and 
Australia, have all been a part of the momentous cycle of financial infusion and cross-border 
flows of capital over this decade. Each country (apart from the resources-driven and China-
focused Australian economy) is suffering a severe downturn that is savagely effecting 
employment, exports, consumer, and housing markets. Most nation states, developed and 
developing are undergoing considerable realignment in the face of the crises that have swept 
aside modern convention and changed global outlooks substantially, perhaps forever.  
The realignment is integrated further in the dynamic of developing nations versus the failure 
of developed nations to absorb the mismanagement of mountains of debt accumulation, 
particularly over the past decade (2001–2011). 
Economist Simon Johnson provides a summary in this end game scenario in The Atlantic: 
                                                          
20
 Martin Wolf. ―Is America the new Russia?‖ Financial Times. 14 April 2009  
21
 Simon Johnson. ―The Quiet Coup.‖ The Atlantic Online. May 2009.  
( http://www.theaatlantic.com )  
  
Chapter 1 - Introduction  20 
The conventional wisdom among the elite is still that the current slump ―cannot be as bad as the 
Great Depression.‖ This view is wrong. What we face now could, in fact, be worse than the Great 
Depression—because the world is now so much more interconnected and because the banking sector 
is now so big. We face a synchronized downturn in almost all countries, a weakening of confidence 
among individuals and firms, and major problems for government finances. If our leadership wakes 
up to the potential consequences, we may yet see dramatic action on the banking system and a 
breaking of the old elite. Let us hope it is not then too late.  
There has recently been a social resurgence and urgency of world leaders seeking global 
economic and social reform. A global hedge fund research organisation issued results of a 
survey of member funds that predicted another severe financial meltdown would occur within 
five years if financial market players continue efforts to avoid any form of regulation.  
Further financial dysfunction and social disruption has emerged in Greece, which has 
implications for the European Union (EU) and particularly debt-laden Spain, Ireland, Italy, 
and the United Kingdom. The tenuous nature of slow recovery from the GFC has been further 
heightened by the nature of dealings between European states and Wall Street over the past 
decade. Revelations of how Wall Street entity Goldman Sachs helped to mask problems with 
the debt-fuelled Greek and Italian economies has led economists and commentators to 
forecast a decade of further economic and social unrest caused by the seemingly terminal 
nature of debt suffocation across European economies.  
An example of close political and corporate dealings is the relationship of ex-Goldman Sachs 
operative, now Italian Prime Minister Mario Monti, who is now overseeing Italian reform. 
Monti recently supported
22
 the growing push for a European FTT being championed by 
French President Hollande and Germanys‘ Chancellor Angela Merkel. 
The newly instated Greek and Italian leaders are also past Goldman Sachs insiders. The new 
European Central Bank President, Mario Draghi
23
, was Goldman Sachs International‘s vice-
chairman for Europe between 2002 and 2005, a position that put him in charge of the 
―companies and sovereign‖ department which, shortly before his arrival, helped Greece to 
disguise the real nature of its books with a swap on its sovereign debt.  
Mario Monti was an international adviser to Goldman Sachs from 2005 until his nomination 
to lead the Italian government. According to the bank, his mission was to provide ―advice on 
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European business and major public policy initiatives worldwide‖. As such, he was a ―door 
opener‖ with a brief to defend Goldman‘s interest in the corridors of power in Europe24.  
Lucas Papademos was the governor of the Greek central bank from 1994 to 2002. In this 
capacity, he played a role that has yet to be elucidated in the operation to mask debt on his 
country‘s books, perpetrated with assistance from Goldman Sachs. In addition, perhaps more 
importantly, the current chair of Greece‘s Public Debt Management Agency, Petros 
Christodoulou, also worked as a trader for the bank in London. 
Effectively, the rescue efforts of governments in the immediate past (2008–2011) have been 
to transfer private corporate debt to the government balance sheet, thus adding additional 
burdens on the states‘ social and economic responsibilities. Taxpayers and citizens who rely 
on state support systems will see social supports and services wound back, in austerity 
measures that will not hurt elites with capital secreted in tax havens which add US$ 1.2 
trillion each year to the existing accumulated US$ 21 trillion that is stored in global tax 
havens and shelters
25
. Australia loses over AU$ 20 billion to offshore tax shelters each year.  
The International Monetary fund (IMF) reports
26
 that G7 nations now owed a combined debt 
of $US 30 trillion. Economic commentator Associate Professor Steve Keen of the University 
of Western Sydney forecasts at least a decade of economic and social turmoil caused by an 
emerging contagion of debt problems across Europe and the possibility that Greece‘s 
problems will spread to the wider global economy. In shades of the sub-prime deals and 
sophisticated economic architecture to conceal bad debts inherent in collateral debt 
obligations, financial derivatives are playing a strong role in the Greek issues. In dozens of 
deals across the Continent over the past decade, US banks have provided ―off-the-balance 
sheet cash to countries in return for payments in the future. In the case of Greece, that cash 




True reform for real balance to ameliorate the deep-set social losses from financial market 
players will be hard won, against a very highly resourced opposition, and it will take time. A 
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financial transaction tax is the first step in making markets accountable and resourcing public 
accounts.  
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Chapter 2. 
The Financialisation of Global Markets 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides evidence of the ―financialisation28‖ of global financial markets in the 
context that increased speculative finance activity, within the shadow economy, creates 
tensions for nation states, whose control of the real economy becomes increasingly more 
difficult. The proliferation of speculative transactions has created a shadow economy, 
essentially reconfiguring capitalism in modern times. This chapter describes the growth of 
shadow economies and particularly the rise of the financial architecture that enables the 
markets.  
The primary cause of the current crisis
29
 in capitalism has been the global dysfunction of 
financial markets, unaccountable and opaque, discretely distant from the control of nation-
states. Whilst these shadow systems of corporate trading take place parallel but removed from 
real economy business systems, which are subject to the tax rules and regulations of nation 
states. Bryan argues that the ongoing financial crisis first manifested ―as a crisis in stores of 
value, and in that sense it has not been a ‗financial crisis‘ pertaining to financial institutions 
and their solvency, but also a ‗money crisis‘ pertaining to what is used in financial markets as 
money.‖ Further Bryan30 suggests, in respect to transfer to public money to the private sector: 
But in this crisis, the value of these assets crashed and their moneyness disappeared –that‘s what is 
meant by a liquidity crisis. It seems to me very significant that the first intervention of the 
governments and central banks was not about shoring up financial institutions directly, it was to say 
to financiers: bring in your mortgage-backed securities and we will convert them into state money. 
..In the sense that when their moneyness suddenly disappeared the state sought to convert them into 
another form of money‖  
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This chapter distinguishes the growth and sophistication of speculative systems of financial 
trade and concludes that it is ethical, equitable and responsible for global nation states to 
impose a financial transaction tax to in effectively replenish depleted public accounts. 
 The design of the FTT is to raise revenue and modify the behaviour of financial institutions 
and markets in order to minimise excessive risk-taking and speculation. Opaque speculative 
activities are widely seen as detrimental to the healthy functioning of financial markets. 
Financial transaction taxes have a very long history, but have gained much more interest and 
appeal in the wake of the global financial crisis of 2008. Their appeal has elevated since the 
European debt crises of 2010–2011. Regulation through FTT approaches will make market 
players accountable. 
2.2 Background to a Structural Crisis 
Martin Wolf (2011) argues that because of the Global Financial Crisis there has been a 
limited but cautious recovery in many countries including the United States and the United 
Kingdom. There is, however, a major sovereign debt crisis in Europe and very high levels of 
unemployment in most developed countries. As such, the capacity of nation states to defend 
claims on welfare budgets is severely depleted. Many counties in Europe teeter on the verge 
of bankruptcy. Wolf argues that: 
The immediate aftermath of the financial crisis that reached a crescendo in the autumn of 2008 was 
an economic collapse. This was accompanied by heroic action and followed by a welcome recovery. 
Now we are beginning to see a new shape to the world economy. This is a divided world. It is 
divided partly because the illness – asset price bubbles, excessive leverage and financial sector 
irresponsibility – directly affected a number of high-income countries, including the biggest of them 
all, the US. It is also divided because some of the medicine the high-income countries are taking is 
having harmful side-effects on the rest of the world.
31
 
Upheavals in global financial markets have occurred with increasing intensity. Financial 
market volatility in Europe, Russia, the United States of America, Mexico, Southeast Asia 
and Argentina, have caused considerable anxiety to policymakers and created both social and 
financial disruption on a global scale.  
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The 2008 Global Financial Crisis (GFC), and the ensuing credit squeeze contagion, is the 
worst financial crisis since the Great Depression and have redrawn the boundaries between 
governments and markets. The GFC has reconfigured the role of capitalism in modern times. 
It has drawn analysis to the developing societies in Southeast Asia and India as dynamic 
consumer producers to Western countries as direct consumers, with the concomitant transfers 
of capital from the West to the East. It has drawn analysis to the growing disconnect of 
developed consumer economies principally represented by but not limited to the group of 
twenty nations (G20), and developing economies India and China, which by contrast have a 
focus on trade and manufacture of consumables. This tension between developed and 
developing states is a critical feature in this debate. These are crises emanating from the rise 
in the dynamic of financialisation. 
Goldstein
32
argues that much of the literature on the specific subject of financialisation is less 
than a decade old. Epstein (2005:3)
33
 quotes some earlier references to financialisation from 
papers presented to a political economy conference in 2001 arguing that whilst a common 
definition had not emerged in existing literature, clear tendencies had emerged. In this regard 
Goldstein follows the dominant trend offered in early subject literature by Hilferding (1981)
34
 
in his concept that financialisation is a process that alters the fundamental aspects of capitalist 
micro and macroeconomics. Hilferding argued that the fusion of banking finance and 
industry led to forms of financialisation. 
Further, Goldstein suggests that Hilferding‘ s study of a new phase of capital accumulation 
associated with the concentration and specialisation of speculative financial instruments of 
trade, associated with a rise in power of financial players, provides a framework to analyse 
the resurgence of influence that financial markets have over economic and social policies in 
the neoliberal era. Financialisation affects real
35
 economy accumulation, rising macro-
instability, inequity, economic crises amongst most global states, and the subsequent 
formation of policy settings
36
.  
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The financialisation of integrated global markets is both an economic and political construct. 
The closer global financial markets come to genuine integration, the more centrally they act 
in absorbing and challenging the political authority of states. For over three decades, the 
political paradigm has been to ―open up‖ and deregulate financial markets to absorb global 
influence in competitive trading paradigms, earlier related to goods and services, and more 
recently to financial speculation.   
The strongest political systems have engineered a shadow economy, initially through the 
United States and United Kingdom axis; the so-called Anglo-Saxon financial market system 
of financial trading identifiable by the Washington Consensus model of economic and social 
design. A design built around low tax, low regulation, and minimal government interference. 
Alliances between political elites and finance capital market players over the past three 
decades of financialisation have contributed to the sell-out of nation state wealth. 
 Leyshon and French
37
  argue that in the wake of the 2007-2009 financial crisis there 
appeared to be an opportunity to change the dominant role of financial capital in the process 
of financialisation. They argued that in the post crisis period political opportunities existed to 
intervene and reign in the role of investment banks and financial institutions. This rationale 
had been a result of government‘s actions to bailout and nationalise private sector entities. 
Leyshon and French suggested: 
For a brief moment, such intervention appeared to have dealt a significant blow to the ideological 
confidence of neoliberalism and its faith in the supremacy and infallibility of markets as a mechanism 
for allocating resources. Things were going to be different in the wake of the largest financial crisis for 
seventy years. 
Further Leyshon and French state that intervention and reform of financial capital markets 
could have been achieved by ―a revival of ideas displaced and disparaged during the thirty or 
so years of neoliberal dominance. Leyshon and French draw on the works of political 
economists Nesvetailova and Palan
38
 who argued: 
At the level of theory in the midst of the imploding financial markets and banking systems in 2008, 
there was a seemingly serious debate about the return to Keynesian norms of financial regulation and a 
Minskyian framework for understanding finance‖ 
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Contrary to the opportunities that were available to moderate the effects of financialisation, 
excessive speculation in markets, and concomitant social consequences, a series of events has 
developed subsequently to give rise to a new form of market liberalisation enabled by a new 
form of political and financial collusion described by Leyshon and French as ―distributive 
coalition.‖ and further that: 
―The financial crisis was indeed a catalyst for change, but rather than developing a form of capitalism 
wherein the state exerted more control over the economy it seems conversely to have heralded an age of 
austerity and an emboldened form of hyper-neoliberalisation which, as it takes form, has resulted in 
―families …paying bankers bills through rising taxes, shabbier public services and higher 
unemployment‖39.  
Moreover, Leyshon and French suggest that: 
according to the Institute of Fiscal Studies (IFS, 2010)
40
 , in the UK at least it is the poorest families 
that will be expected to pay the highest price. At the same time, as financial markets have rebounded,  
so the high salaries and bonuses of the New York and London financial districts have returned, to 
ensure that `talent' is rewarded and retained, and top-end property prices are on the rise again. 
In contrast Agrawal(2001) 
41
, and Blankenburg and Palma (2009:10)
42
 argue, that in the 
United States, financialisation was an indirect (and, at the time, misunderstood) result of 
opening global capital markets – a development that allowed the Reagan Administration to 
sidestep the hard budget constraints that had confronted previous administrations. They 
(Blankenburg and Palma) argue that an analysis of the financialisation of the United States 
economy offers an important corrective to the view commonly associated with the 
globalisation literature that capital markets have escaped the control of the state.  
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This theme is explained in the financialisation debate as a contest between the Anglo-Saxon 
versus Asian models of financial market modelling.
43
 This Anglo-Saxon versus Asian Model 
of financial market relationship with government is further described as follows:  
 One is the Anglo Saxon (AS) Model in which government designs the basic 
macroeconomic and regulatory policy and financial firms decide on their own how 
to act, or do not act within the policy framework.  
 Second is the Asian model in which the government not just sets the policies but 
also has a larger say in the working of the financial system, including 
accountability and regulation. 
These factors provide a framework to the tensions that now occur between financialisation of 
the global and regional market place. These are tensions which dominate all levels of 
financialisation and have primarily been responsible for the accumulation models of debt in 
the Anglo-Saxon (developed economies) and vast surplus capital (for lending) in developing 
Asian economies. 
Whilst this view of the earlier model locates a United States centric view, it is clear that the 
Reagan Administration introduced the concept of financialisation as ―free-market models‖ 
that were adapted quickly across continents, particularly as Wall Street was given tax-exempt 
status, as was Canary Wharf in the City of London, by then Prime Minister Thatcher. The 
United States as the leading state in the world economy had been able to harness 
developments in global capital markets to domestic political objectives, which proved 
expansive in political, economic, and social terms. Financialisation solved a number of 
intractable problems for the Reagan Administration, as it sought to extricate itself from the 
dilemmas that marked the crisis of the 1970s (Bretton Woods transfer from the gold 
standards). A bear market in the United States lasted between January 1973 and December 
1974, and then faltered. The severe downturn affected all the major financial markets in the 
world, particularly the United Kingdom, and was one of the worst stock market downturns in 
modern history. The crash came after the collapse of the Bretton Woods monetary system 
over the previous two years. It was compounded by the outbreak of the 1973 oil crisis in 
October of that year. This was a major event in the serious recession that hit most developed 
countries through the 1970s. 
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Wallenstein (2010:133)
44
 refers to the crises of the 1970s, which played a central role in the 
national and global political debates, and argues that the term crisis was replaced by the more 
general term globalisation to describe the prescriptive nature of the political economy of the 
period. Wallenstein writes that globalisation provided a more ―optimistic terminology to 
crises‖. This period followed the post war era of 1945–1970 a period he argues is ―aptly 
referred to‖ in French as les trente glorieuses.  
This period marked the height of United States hegemony and also coincided with the most 
expansive Kondratieff A-upturn that the capitalist world economy had witnessed, in respect 
to the enveloping cycle of crises that was to mark the future of world system economic 
paradigms, Wallenstein asserts that downturns, and presumably systemic dysfunction, are 
―absolutely normal‖ in cyclical rhythms, saying ―it is how they live, the way they deal with 
the inevitable fluctuations of their operations‖. For Wallenstein the two key issues are how 
producers make profits, and how states guarantee the world order. In the shadow economy 
and the real economy, both these issues are challenged now, on many fronts. 
Robert Reich 
45
(2008:50) suggests that a number of key issues changed the nature of 
capitalism and the rise of financialisation. Amongst these were Ronald Reagan‘s tax cuts in 
1981, and the waves of deregulation starting in the early 1970s post-Bretton Woods period. 
The growing movement toward financial deregulation introduced the growth in politically 
elected officials lobbying for changes in laws that would give corporations competitive 
advantage, and, seeking far greater influence over decision making. In Washington there are 
now over 10,000 lobbyists, (see Figure 4.9) many ex-politicians with considerable influence 
in capital markets.  
Reich (2008:50) argues that none of these theories looks at global systems of political 
economy as a whole: a period where politics and economics combined. Reich argues further 
that: 
Since the late 1970s a fundamental change has occurred in democratic capitalism in America, and 
that change has rippled outward to the rest of the world. Capitalism has triumphed and not simply as 
an ideology. The structure of the American – and much of the worlds – economy has shifted toward 
far more competitive markets. Power has shifted to consumers and investors. Meanwhile the 
democratic aspects of capitalism have declined. The institutions that undertook formal and informal 
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negotiations to spread wealth stabilise jobs and communities, to establish equitable rules of the game, 
– giant oligopolies, large labour unions, regulatory agencies, and legislatures responsive to local main 
street communities – have been eclipsed. 
Gourinchas and Rey (2005) 
46
 suggest that financial globalisation accelerated as the United 
States economically transformed, and its relationship to other international nation states 
changed, from a World Banker, into a World Venture Capitalist. This thesis argues that in the 
era of current global financial dysfunction, the most pertinent of issues is how nation states 
manage control of their economies from the voracious effects of burgeoning capital markets 
that are unregulated and largely uncontrolled by traditional state mechanisms. This new 
shadow economy management is within the authority of nation states, though the execution 
of financial market management is problematic as there are no definitive accountability 
processes within states or global financial systems. There is also no recognisable grouping of 
financial sector players who would volunteer to scrutiny. The political will to challenge 
markets that use commonalities in the legal systems appears to out of political scope. Paul 
Volker the US economist who is credited as the chief architect of the current global financial 
system, once stated that the automatic teller machine, popularised in the 1970s, was the last 
truly beneficial financial innovation whose benefits are connected to society
47
. As state based 
economists struggle to manage the devastating effects that have been placed on real 
economies by new architectural instruments like Special Purpose Vehicles, Collateral Debt 
Obligations (CDOs) synthetic CDOs, CDO squared and cubed, and Credit Default Swaps 
(CDS) the fallout inevitably is picked up by citizens of states, with increasingly diminished 
capacity to supply services. These are services usually supplied by states and known as 
―common goods48‖. Sometimes, the only relationship that financial players have with real or 
shadow economies is within their nano-second trading window. 
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The current decade from 2001 to 2012 has been defined as the neoliberalist period of low, or 
no, regulation policy influence by states, and strong political support for financial players in a 
crossover of political interests, lobbyist influence, and lax regulation laws.  
This period has witnessed considerable changes in international financial regulation geared 
implicitly toward capital interests. Tacit policy levers provide governments with the ability to 
provide oversight through offshore tax systems but these measures are not used. The 2001–
2011 decade has witnessed an unparalleled growth and financialisation diversity in 
derivatives and cross-border financial trades in sophisticated exotic financial products 
boosted through high technology algorithm ―flash-trade‖ corridors, in milliseconds. Quantum 
global over-the-counter derivatives open positions are over US$600 trillion alone. Currency 
trades are over US$3 trillion a day, every day of the year. 
This decade has also been marked by corporate excess, and resurgence (post GFC) in the 
shadow economy related volumes of inter-nation trade during and parallel to a tightening of 
credit in the real economy. Consequently, the volatility of financial trading, through hedge 
funds, fund of funds, and derivatives markets, many originating from offshore tax havens, has 
emerged as a considerable risk to orderly global financial market function. States are less able 
to guarantee stable economies than they have ever been. The distribution of inherent and real 
risk in markets has become borderless. Elected governments are fragile. 
Concomitantly, persistent problems related to market dysfunction have occurred for global 
nation states, many of which had passed through previous disruptive crises (Southeast Asia, 
Japan, Russia, the United States, and the United Kingdom) which had direct linkages with 
speculative capital inflows and outflows and interest rate speculation on currencies. Many 
had been economically disrupted during speculative short selling trades, such as the short 
selling run on the British Pound by Quantum Fund manager George Soros.  
Many states had been caught unaware that an imminent challenge was being directed at their 
currencies (Southeast Asia, Russia and the United Kingdom). But for hedge fund managers 
the rewards have been breathtaking. Soros earned US$840 million in 2005; a year when the 
average take-home pay for the top 20 US hedge fund managers was US$565 million, a 45 per 
cent increase on the previous year.
49
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Political economists and social scientists have used the description ―revolution‖ to compare 
past financial paradigms to market integration models that have developed over the past three 
decades. Market integration has, in many cases, become ultra-destructive in social terms, 
particularly over the past decades which have seen massive movements of credit from 
investment banks to business and private consumers for real estate and speculative purchases, 
many off which built the major credit bubbles across developed states economies. Integration 
of global financial markets has also played out in the past decades as a transfer from state 
funds to corporate players, then as markets collapsed a further transfer of taxpayer funds to 
bailout corporations. Significant debt problems now plague European and United States 
economies. The socialisation of debt is seemingly a part of developed countries macro-
economic tools which are used freely and with little debate. This is a new socioeconomic 
phenomenon.  
2.3 An International Perspective 
A financial transaction tax has been promoted over many decades to counter the speculative 
tremors falling from the growth and sophistication of market regimes. Nobel Laureate 
Economist Joseph Stiglitz argued in 2009 that the benefits of a regulatory approach provided 
by an FTT are twofold. He equates that a tax philosophy should be to tax bad things rather 
than good in the same way that pollution should be taxed more than work and savings, saying 
that ―what bankers get up to is pollution‖ Further that: 
Very little social returns come from short term trading. It results in extremely volatile and excessive 
trading. So anything that discourages short-termism is to be encouraged. At the same time, the money 
collected can be used to perform a socially useful function. Does anybody seriously believe that 
anything happens because of the sort of micro-second trading we‘re now seeing? It‘s a function of 
speed. No investments are being made as a result of it, no jobs are being created. Finance has a vital 
socially important role to fulfil, which is to raise capital, to run payment systems, to oil the wheels of 
everything society does. But bankers fail to perform that socially useful function- and because of that 
the world‘s economy has suffered. 
Major tensions exist between nation states and international financial markets. The central 
issue is that financial transaction trading plays an ever increasing role in the global 
economies, local and global (real and shadow). Neoliberalist free trade has opened vast 
trading cyber-corridors within the shadow economy, an economy increasingly disconnected 
from the control of states. An economy that has effectively been ―rescued‖ by the application 
of real economy (taxpayer) funds from the public sector to bailout ailing institutions. 
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Although the International Monetary Fund (IMF) indicates that only one third of toxic sub-
prime debts in financial markets have been ameliorated by bailout efforts (bought with 
taxpayer funds), currency and derivatives markets are growing rapidly in volume and 
participants. The IMF found that global banking institutions still had US$3.4 trillion in bad 
debts to write off on top of the US$1.7 trillion paid in bailouts to date. 
Bill Gross, senior executive of the United States‘ largest mutual fund, PIMCO, commented 
on the current critically high levels of state and federal debt in the United States in an article 
headlined ―No Way Out of Debt Trap, Gross Says: US Living Standards Doomed to Fall50.‖ 
Gross argues that ―In the US, states across the country face a collective $125 billion shortfall 
for fiscal 2012, while Congress is facing a budget gap nearly 10 times that size,‖ adding:  
PIMCO founder Bill Gross – one of the world‘s largest mutual funds managers, who focuses mostly 
on bonds – has previously said that if the United States were a corporation, no one in their right mind 
would lend us money. For the last decade, we‘ve been ‗relying on the kindness of strangers‘ to help 
cover our debts... After years of reckless spending, America‘s debt level is nearing a breaking point 
and can no longer rely on foreign capital as a last resort. When a country reaches a certain debt level, 
confidence in that country‘s ability to repay that debt becomes jeopardized, there is really no way out 
of this trap and this conundrum at this point. 
Meanwhile, the debt trap hole gets deeper and deeper. ―The federal government posted its 
largest monthly deficit in history in February 2011, a $223 billion shortfall,‖ The Washington 
Times reports
51. ―That one-month figure, which came in a preliminary report from the 
Congressional Budget Office, dwarfs even the most robust cuts being talked about on 
Washington‘s Capitol Hill, and underscores just how much work lawmakers have to do to get 
the government‘s finances in balance again‖.. The United States debt at the end of 2011 
stands at US$15 trillion and is growing. 
By ―strangers,‖ Gross is referring to foreign counterparts, (China and Japan for example). 
Basically, for years, Americans have spent their dollars on less expensive Japanese and 
Chinese made goods and Indian services. Japan and China turned around and used those 
dollars to buy up United States Treasuries Debt Bonds and other dollar-denominated assets. 
Now after years of reckless spending, America‘s debt level is nearing a breaking point and 
can no longer rely on foreign capital as a last resort. ―When a country reaches a certain debt 
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level, confidence in that country‘s ability to repay that debt becomes jeopardized,‖ says 
Gross, citing the work of Ken Rogoff and Carmen Reinhart in ―This Time Is Different52‖. 
United States Federal Reserve Minutes released in February 2011 indicated that Chairman 
Bernanke has no intention of halting his US$600 billion debt monetisation program in 2011, 
which continues to build the regime of financialisation both in the United States and globally.  
The United States Government deficit for the year to September 2011 will hit a massive 
US$1.6 trillion, which is a US$500 billion increase on last year, despite extensive 
quantitative easing (QE) funds flowing through the system. Political economists and social 
commentators believe that the United States economy and money market positions are 
artificially higher entirely because of monetary and government stimulus rather than gains in 
real economy spending and real economy recovery. 
Despite political statements of an overall broad-based recovery, the current deficit statistics 
reveal considerable cause for alarm, including real and projected deficit accumulation figures 
including: 
 2008 deficit $455 billion 
 2009 deficit $1.42 trillion (stimulus increase of $965 billion) 
 2010 deficit $1.17 trillion (stimulus decrease of $250 billion) 
 2011 deficit $1.6 trillion (stimulus increase of $430 billion) 
 2012 projected deficit $1.1 trillion (stimulus decrease of $500 billion). 
QEI, which ran from around March 2009 to March 2010, saw the monetisation of $1.75 
trillion in mortgage and treasury debt. QEII, currently underway, involves the purchase of a 
further $600 billion in government debt. The program started formally in November 2010, 
and ran until June 2011. By March 2009, as QEI provided $965 billion in addition fiscal 
stimulus began to move through the system, the market took off. It kept going right through 
to April 2010. By this time QEI was over and the net contraction in deficit spending ($250 
billion in 2010) was having an effect. Then the market fell and the lack of federal- and 
deficit-induced liquidity saw the market shrink from April to August 2010.  
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Then in late August 2010, amidst increasing talk of the United States economy entering a 
double-dip recession, Federal Reserve Chairman Bernanke spoke about reviving quantitative 
easing (QE). The market showed some positive reaction but has continued (late 2011) on a 
stalled recessionary pace. QEII ended in June 2011. The United States Government‘s 2012 
fiscal year will see a strategic $500 billion stimulus reduction. When Congress spends more 
than it collects, which is something it does with regular monotony, it issues pieces of paper 
(debt bonds) into global capital markets in exchange for cash for spending on unproductive, 
pet projects. The Federal Reserve could be heading toward a US$2 trillion annual budget 
deficit, compounded by the uprising against Middle East despotic regimes, and with a 
prospect of oil price hikes. The latest round of QE 3 is now placing US$40 billion into the US 
economy as mortgage-backed securities. 
The social consequences of these statistics emerging from the United States are distressing in 
terms of quantitative and qualitative reporting. For the greater American populace the level of 
distress is measured in those forced to seek government assistance. Food stamps are, across 
the United States, now being sent to more than 44 million people. Another 15 million qualify 
– one out of every five Americans. 
Debt, defaults and more mounting global state debt is plaguing countries around the globe. 
The Organisation for Economic Development (OECD) issued a paper in February 2010, 
which researched the value of an FTT, following an examination in November 2009 that 
predicted an unprecedented post-war level of member government‘s budget deficits and debt 
for the decade 2011 to 2020. OECD government deficits and public debt are forecast to 
exceed 7.6 per cent and 103 per cent respectively by the end of 2011, compared to 73 per cent 
in 2007. The OECD‘s Advisory Committee53 argued: 
As a result of the global crisis, including the bailing out of the banking sector, OECD government 
deficits have reached unprecedented levels. For the OECD, the size of fiscal consolidation projected 
at $300–370bn per year over the coming years will place severe budget constraints on governments. 
Working families risk paying twice for the crisis: first through rising unemployment and falling 
incomes and then, as a result of cuts in public expenditure, through reduced access to social services 
and the corresponding rise in inequality. The OECD fiscal consolidation programme would put post-
war welfare systems and social cohesion at risk. And yet these same governments have still to deliver 
on their commitments to finance global public goods, including raising Official Development 
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Assistance to 0.7% of Gross National Income and climate change adaptation and mitigation measures 
for developing countries. The global public good resource gap that would emerge would be in the 
range of $324-336bn per year between 2012 and 2017 ($156bn for climate change, $168–180bn for 
ODA). These figures could change should the global economy move to self-sustaining recovery and 
growth rates and hence tax receipts rise. Nonetheless, at least part of the new public policy coming 
out of the crisis should be grounded on a revision of tax policy. The criteria for tax policy must be 
social justice, economic value and political acceptability. On all these grounds an FTT would make 
sense. 
Foreign exchange traders buy volumes of United States Government Treasury debt. The US 
Federal Reserve does too. Buying by foreigners and the Federal Reserve represents additional 
cash or net new stimulus going into the United States economy (because the funds are not 
taken from elsewhere). Both the Federal Reserve and foreign governments buy United States 
Government debt with money that did not previously exist. The Federal Reserve simply 
creates additional bank reserves to fund its purchases. In addition, in a slightly more complex 
way, so do foreign central banks.  
The big buyers of US Treasury debt – the Asian central banks – do so purely to keep their 
currencies competitive. If they were simply major buyers of US treasury bonds, because they 
wanted to invest in them, they would need to sell their domestic currencies to buy US dollars 
in the Foreign Exchange market. This would push up the relative value of their currencies – 
and detrimentally affect their export markets. Instead of selling existing domestic currency 
and buying US dollars, these countries print additional domestic currency and use that as the 
source of their buying. This is how they keep their currencies ‗competitive‘. This is very 
inflationary. Thus the source of inflation is the United States Treasury debt bond market. This 
debt is monetised (internalised) by the Federal Reserve and foreign central banks to keep 
their export dependent economies afloat.  
This high-risk financialisation, in the US and Europe, ultimately results in asset price 
inflation. Likewise, in Asia, it is consumer price inflation that is the driver of tighter 
monetary policies. Inflation pressure is growing in China and India.  
Markets around the world are fuelled by artificial stimuli, the end result of a decade of 
financialisation of money markets globally. Jeffrey Sachs, Professor of Economics at 
Columbia University argues that in this time of political upheaval Wall Street is so politically 
powerful that it has written its ―own ticket‖ for the past 25 years and ―in a way, that‘s 
shocking‖.  
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Sachs reports
54
 that Wall Street has had its most profitable year (2010) in its history and 
―made profits of US$55 billion in the midst of the biggest global downturn since the 
depression‖ – profits (that have) only been possible because of taxpayers‘ bailouts and a zero 
interest rate policy by the Federal Reserve. Sachs argues strongly for a financial transaction 
tax, which he says, should be harmonised across countries, emphasising that it is a 
progressive and non-distortionary tax. It is a means of adding equality to very unequal market 
outcomes. 
In 2010, markets were reflated by a massive influx of public account bailout and stimulus 
funds. The table below was compiled from statistics that the United States Federal Reserve 
was forced to release under a Freedom of Information request made by Bloomberg in 
December of 2010. The Federal Reserve fought to keep the details of their back-room 
dealings private, but it has come to light that at the peak of the Global Financial Crisis in 
2008, the Federal Reserve made more than $9 trillion loans to both United States and 
international banks including a cartel of 14 United States banks and 35 international banks 
who ―quietly queued up for a financial lifeline‖. 
 
Source: U.S Federal Reserve  
Figure 2.1: United States Federal Reserve – Emergency Loans Quantum. 
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Source: U.S Federal Reserve  
Figure 2.2: Foreign Bank Recipients of CPFF Program55. 
This $9 trillion figure was much higher than expected. The big ―money centre‖ banks and 
investment banks of Wall Street – not to mention at least 35 other non-United States  banks, 
needed many trillions of dollars just to survive the upheavals of 2008. Since then, banks have 
received more bailout funds from the Federal Reserve. Banks have been buying stocks, just 
as the Federal Reserve had planned. Starting in March 2009 the Federal Reserve began 
deliberately targeting higher stock prices. This targeting led to stocks falling in March of that 
year. Every gain in the stock market since is what is called a ―reflation rally‖; this in effect 
means the rise in stock prices is induced, and has been driven by central banks printing new 
money in the form of quantitative easing or (printing money), a process likely to lead to 
hyperinflation in the long run. A process that continues at US$40 billion a month. 
Burgeoning hedge funds, once the exclusive tool of the rich and well placed, now attract the 
investment capital of global state pension funds at significant levels. Hedge fund managers 
are amongst the highest earners in the world. Against this, failing states with massive 
sovereign debt overlays are being forced to adopt draconian austerity measures designed to 
cut states‘ debt. State services and support to citizens is being slashed.  
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James Galbraith called for regulations that would prohibit credit default swaps transactions 
by any European financial entity which has flow-on effects on European citizens. Galbraith
56
 
also called for an immediate tax on financial transactions, arguing that in the current market 
context, dysfunction must be addressed immediately to arrest a contagion, suggesting: ―If 
capital controls must be reimposed to arrest financial contagion then so be it. In a contest 
between the state and the financial markets, with the survival of stable forms of government, 
and civil society, in question, the state cannot be allowed to lose out‖.  
These new dynamics are attracting attention from a wide range of policy makers and 
commentators, as speculative unregulated finance is causing major dislocations on a global 
scale. Clearly evidenced, post-Global Financial Crisis is that unregulated capital has the 
capacity to create global economic change that is severely disrupting civil society. A précis of 
recent turmoil in the aftermath of the global credit crisis and capital flight demonstrates how 
the rapid withdrawal of capital in a protracted credit squeeze affects not only business and 
government financial structures but disenfranchises millions of inhabitants in countries all 
over the globe.  
These new financial dynamics are a demonstration of the changing axis of dominant financial 
nation states, stating that China and the rapidly growing eastern and Indian economies are 
overtaking a stalled United States economy stimulated, falsely, by quantitative easing.  
Deregulation of markets has provided new and volatile trading grounds, which provide 
investors with avenues for financial speculative trading, which can be withdrawn from host 
economies in a matter of seconds. The volatile and unstable nature of business conducted by 
these new elite financial players creates ongoing problems for nation states. OECD figures 
indicate that exchange rate volatility between member states has raised threefold since the 
early 1970s and that after reaching high levels of volatility the rate reached a plateau in the 
1990s, before taking off in a sensational increase trend from 2001 to 2011. Markets rely on 
volatility for wider trade margins. 
By far the most volume of foreign exchange transactions begins with speculative originators 
in the United States, the United Kingdom, and then within OECD member states and the 
flourishing unregulated offshore tax haven bases
57
.The largest trade market is within the City 
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of London, with its complementary offshore centres of The Isle of Man, Jersey and Guernsey, 
and Cayman Islands. Capital held within offshore centres grows by US$1.2 trillion each year, 
even as the real global economies trend toward protracted recession  
In the 1970s, as a result of moves toward financial deregulation and liberalisation, the 
Thatcher Government in the United Kingdom enacted the 1979 UK Banking Act that 
removed discrimination between offshore and onshore financial markets. The City of London 
was afforded offshore status
58
 in an expanding and ultra- competitive, global, financial 
market network. These markets provide a clear distinction between investment and structural 
nation state development in traditional (Foreign Direct Investment) markets and the dynamic 
new investment regimes in speculative currency activities. The City of London was soon to 
become the leading centre in these transactions and, has held and increased this leading edge 
for three decades. The City of London has emerged as the central element in the British 
competitive strategy.  
Commenting on the growing push to bring the United Kingdom
59 
into line with other 
European states on a European financial transaction tax, United Kingdom Prime Minister 
David Cameron told German Chancellor Angela Merkel he will not agree to a financial 
transaction tax that will affect hundreds of thousands of jobs. The financial transaction tax 
initiative had been proposed to pay for another increase in the Eurozone budget. However, 
because London is the financial capital of the continent, Britain would have to pay up to 80 
per cent – or £37billion – of the costs. Financial services account for 30 per cent of the 
country‘s GDP and city experts predict that if the tax is imposed, 500,000 jobs would be lost. 
The dilemma for Cameron is that over the last three decades of financialisation regimes there 
has been a hollowing out of UK based manufacturing and industries. There is literally no 
other employment or economic ―engine room‖ to replicate the financial services industry.  
Concomitantly, global financial markets have been predictably growing in parallel with the 
spread of financial innovations, which in turn can be associated with new forms of 
neoliberalism paradigms, adopted by most western, developed states. Internal capital and 
banking crises, for instance, have developed through events associated with deregulated 
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institutions (traders, banks, funds, and entrepreneurs such as Soros), which have been 
described as the vehicle from which the Asian, Russian and South American and other 
financial crises have formed.  
Charles Goodhart, Emeritus Professor in Banking and Finance with the London School of 
Economics spoke (March 2010) at the University of Tasmania on the subject of Financial 
Regulation and the Global Financial Crisis. Professor Goodhart commenced his address by 
stating that issues of financial markets and outcomes used to be the province of students of 
the subject of Political Economy. It used to be a study of practical issues with a view to 
understanding practical economic outcomes.  
Goodhart suggested that in today‘s markets there is a belief that the Federal Reserve would 
be able to restore stability in times of crisis and that that would prolong real economy asset 
growth patterns, which have trended through from early 1990s through to the present. All 
faith was placed in the past Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan to maintain the period 
of growth irrespective of crises occurring in other countries. The period was known as ―The 
Great Moderation
60‖ distinguished by steady interest rates, contained inflation, and a growth 
rate lower than those in the emerging states of China and India. 
Quiggin argues that ―a variety of explanations have been put forward for the ‗Great 
Moderation‘‖. To the extent that the Moderation has been seen as more than a run of good 
luck, it has typically been explained either by a combination of improvements in 
macroeconomic management associated with central bank independence and reliance on 
monetary rather than fiscal policy and the benefits of economic liberalism, as argued by 
Gerard Baker
61
 who states: 
Economists are debating the causes of the Great Moderation enthusiastically and, unusually, they are 
in broad agreement. Good policy has played a part: central banks have got much better at timing 
interest rate moves to smooth out the curves of economic progress. But the really important reason 
tells us much more about the best way to manage economies. It is the liberation of markets and the 
opening-up of choice that lie at the root of the transformation. The deregulation of financial markets 
over the Anglo-Saxon world in the 1980s had a damping effect on the fluctuations of the business 
                                                          
60




 Gerard Baker. ―Welcome to the Great Moderation‖ The Times. London. 19 January 2010. 
(http;//www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/artice1294376.ece )   
  
Chapter 2 – The Financialisation of Global Markets 42 
cycle. These changes gave consumers a vast range of financial instruments (credit cards, home equity 
loans) that enabled them to match their spending with changes in their incomes over long periods. 
When the Global Financial Crisis hit in 2007, most people believed that the Federal Reserve 
would restore the system, reduce risk, and prices would continue a steady rise. The advent of 
the crisis forced a completely new analysis of what under-layers of new market financial 
instruments looked like and how they acted in market settings in times of crisis. The current 
enduring global financial crisis is the culmination of series events, which include the balance 
of financial and economic power between the East and the West, loose lending on a global 
scale and political misjudgement in developed Western nation states. There is a clear 
historical aspect to this crisis. 
2.4 The History of Financialisation and Crises 
Eric Hobsbawm
62
 called the 30 year period following the end of World War II as capitalism‘s 
golden years, a period of remarkable economic growth with a stable financial system based 
on a ―pegged‖ currency system (until 1973), without the boom and bust cycles which have 
been the main feature of the preceding neoliberal era. Also featured in the growth years of 
capitalism were stable employment, little or no inflation and the building of social support 
networks in the form of housing, health and the welfare state.  
United Kingdom economist John Maynard Keynes influenced policy settings designed to 
allow participating states a mechanism to control inflation whilst producing growth in 
employment and stability within manufacturing sectors. For over three decades, Keynes 
delivered the fiscal mechanism to tighten public spending in order to reduce overheating 
economies and increase public spending to stimulate public spending and thus create 
employment opportunities through the production of goods and services. The Keynesian 
social democratic consensus continued through to the early seventies providing economists 
with the economic levers to stabilise the state in a period of high growth and predictable 
social stability and civilised capital growth.
63
  
The first major financial crisis (following the deregulation of major global markets) occurred 
in Latin America in the early 1970s because of rampant inflation in South American 
countries, Argentina and Brazil. By 1974, all major Western economies suffered high levels 
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of inflation and unemployment following the 1973 Oil Crisis in which oil prices soared, 
precipitating the 1973–74 stock market crash in the United States. A prolonged secondary 
banking crisis followed in the United Kingdom. The Keynesian economic model was 
expected to stabilise leading global economies but failed the test and was partially discredited 
by economists unable to wrestle back global macro and state economic stability. The next 
major upheaval on the international stage occurred in Mexico with the ―Mexican Weekend64‖ 
bank stock crisis which spread across the continent to become the Latin America debt crisis.  
The Wall Street ―Black Monday‖ crisis closed the New York Stock Exchange in October 
1987. Europe witnessed a succession of crises during the early 1990s, quickly followed by 
Mexico in 1994 and 1995. The Asian crises started in 1997 and spread through the continent 
to Russia in August 1998. Each of these crises was triggered by a run on the currency of 
nation states and was highlighted by the inability of those states to defend their currencies. 
These are also political issues. There are no current global political or economic strategies in 
place to prevent any reoccurrences of ―runs‖ on currencies.  
Currency markets remain unregulated and attract a wide range of private and corporate 
players betting in a virtual casino type of trading with daily quantum‘s upwards of US$4.5 
trillion. Capital runs and flight also provide shorting opportunities to market elites. 
These are only the more prominent examples of the 70 banking and 90 currency crises 
recorded since the 1970s. It would appear there are no systems presently in place to arrest the 
exponential global financial trading problems, which are becoming ever more severe in 
nature and repercussive in economic dysfunction. The global nature of trading makes all 
countries vulnerable. The possibility of major dysfunction is only a transaction away. 
In late 1998, a corporate investment system underwent a crisis of its own. The United States 
Government was forced to bail out the beleaguered Long Term Capital Management Fund 
(LTCM) whose corporate failure, in mid-November 1998 reportedly came within a whisker 
of causing massive disruption to the United States and global economies. Global economic 
analysts were amazed at the rapidity of the ensuing crisis and the potential for severe 
financial dysfunction that emerged from the LTCM corporate collapse. Essentially, the 
success of LTCM was built through highly leveraged investment partnerships and on the 
personal reputations of two Nobel prize-winning economists on the executive board. 
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LTCM raised its leverage position up to 140 times its original capital equity and placed 
positions on the relative prices of bonds in the US and overseas markets. Following the 
Russian devaluation, debt moratorium and the flight of capital to safer options, LTCM was 
left with excessive open option positions that it could not sustain (Edwards 1999). 
Within weeks (17–31 August 1998) LTCM was forced to send its investors advice that it had 
lost 52 per cent of its capital value. It had lost all of its original value and was looking at a 
systemic risk to other financial actors. The United States Federal Reserve Bank was forced to 
orchestrate a rescue operation by private banks and financial firms. Commentators and 
reporters in the United States who had labelled the financial disasters in the Southeast Asian 
and Russian areas (and the Japanese slowdown), as being the result of result of ―crony 
capitalism‖ were forced to apply the same label to LTCM, whose small circle of ―name 
officials‖ were bailed out of a potentially far reaching disaster. Long Term Capital 
Management single-handedly created chaos in global markets that potentially (had the United 
States Government not acted swiftly) could have been catastrophic. The world economy was 
within a glance of a meltdown
65
. 
The major growth being experienced in China has gone some way to reviving the Japanese 
economy, although most of the structural problems are still unresolved. Successive ministers 
and prime ministers have been unable or unwilling to deal with the legacy of effectively 
bankrupt banks and the Japanese economy has remained increasingly isolated as a result. 
Adam Posen
66
 who sits on the Bank of England‘s Monetary Policy Committee recently 
commented on the current state of the Japanese economy and its inability to shrug off its 
continuing recessionary spiral suggesting:  
The Japanese economy has entered a recession and it seems it is never coming out of it. It means year 
after year of huge governments deficits and a world of zombie banks that are being kept alive only by 
taxpayer‘s money. It means year after year of false dawns, high unemployment and lapses back into 
recession. It‘s an acute form of economic purgatory and one which Britain is facing. This follows a 
debt fuelled boom that politicians saw as prosperity. The UK has an uncomfortable parallel to the 
Japanese financial system. 
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Whilst the United States growth has fallen, China has continued to build internally with one 
recent report estimating that 64 million units of housing stock remain uninhabited across the 
major cities in China. Japan‘s exports to Greater China (including Hong Kong and Taiwan) 
are now bigger than Japanese exports to the United States. Concomitantly in the United 
States there has been a significant slide in the stock market and a continuing slide in the value 
of the dollar
67
. Events in the developed and developing world have been substantially altered 
by the major event of our time: the Global Financial Crisis. It has accelerated the significant 
interface that exists between developed and developing nation states.  
2.5 The Global Financial Crisis 
Financial Times commentator Martin Wolf
68
 stated, shortly after both the United States and 
the United Kingdom dipped into recession in the wake of the Global Financial Crisis:  
Just as Keynes‘s ideas were tested to destruction in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, Milton Freidman‘s 
(Monetarism) ideas might suffer a similar fate in the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s. All gods fail if one 
believes too much. 
The worst financial crisis since the Great Depression has again redrawn the boundaries 
between governments and markets as a crisis originating in the United States has spread 
across Europe engulfing most North Atlantic states. Following the stock market crash of 1929 
it took three years before the United States Government was able to launch a series of rescue 
efforts to end the Depression that had gripped the country and had dramatically slowed 
growth in other states. Thousands of banks had failed and deflation had set in, national output 
fell by a third and unemployment peaked at 25 per cent. In the aftermath the boundaries 
between the government and markets were tested
69
. 
By comparison, a year after the collapse of the United States investment bank Bear Stearns, 
the government was forced to take the most dramatic economic intervention since the 1930s. 
This time the United States unemployment rate was 6.2 per cent and the country was not 
technically in recession but a series of financial indicators provided enough warning for the 
Federal Reserve to act decisively to avoid a looming financial catastrophe as American 
Insurance Group (AIG), the world‘s largest insurer, teetered on the edge of default, a 
situation that would have spread panic immediately to other nation states and would have in a 
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practical sense prohibited the flight of most global aircraft insured with the AIG. In two 
tumultuous weeks in September and October 2008 the United States Federal Reserve and 
Treasury nationalised the countries two mortgage giants Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, took 
over AIG (the world‘s largest insurance corporation) and extended government deposit 
insurance to US$3.4 trillion in money market funds.  
Effectively AIG is now a publicly owned entity, although executives continued to be reward 
with private sector type bonuses. AIG received US$170 billion in taxpayer bailouts and in the 
fourth quarter of 2008, posting a loss of US$61.7 billion, the greatest ever for any United 
States corporation. Beyond the US $165 million in bonus payments, total bonuses for the 
AIG financial unit reached US$450 million and bonuses for the entire company reached US 
$1.2 billion. This quickly led to public outrage. United States President Obama is reported70 
to have said, ―[I]t‘s hard to understand how derivative traders at AIG warranted any bonuses, 
much less $165 million in extra pay. How do they justify this outrage to the taxpayers who 
are keeping the company afloat?‖ and ―In the last six months, AIG has received substantial 
sums from the US Treasury. I‘ve asked Treasury Secretary Geithner to use that leverage and 
pursue every legal avenue to block these bonuses and make the American taxpayers whole.‖  
In 2008, a temporary short selling ban was placed over nearly a thousand stocks. The United 
States Government pledged to take over US$700 billion in sub-prime related toxic debt into 
its public accounts, a move which was replicated in a series of emergency rescue bailouts 
around the world. The bailouts effectively transferred private sector debt to the public 
account under the government‘s premise that some private sector corporations were ―too big 
to fail
71‖, thus testing the free market philosophy of allowing non-competitive entities to fail 
as a ―natural market correction‖. The landscape of global economic paradigms had suddenly 
and dramatically changed as investment banks that relied on high leverage wholesale funding 
became insolvent. 
Many United State national investment banking icons defaulted including Lehman Brothers, 
whilst Bear Stearns, Morgan Stanley, and Merrill Lynch were taken over by commercial 
banks. The much vaunted ―shadow banking system‖ (the engine room of inter-nation trades 
of a secret nature) and hedge funds, money market funds, securities dealers and an array of 
                                                          
70
 "Obama's Statement on A.I.G." The New York Times. 16 March, 2009. 
(http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/03/16/obamas-statement-on-aig), and ―Obama Orders Treasury Chief 
to Try to Block A.I.G Bonuses,‖ The New York Times. 16, March 2009 
71
 Andrew Ross Sorkin ―Too Big to Fail‖ Open Library 2009 
  
Chapter 2 – The Financialisation of Global Markets 47 
non-bank financial institutions that define the deregulated capital market players in 
American, European (and Australian) banking systems were revealed to be inextricably 
entangled in the start of the second largest economic crisis in history.  
The United States alone expanded its liabilities by more than a trillion dollars in three weeks. 
At the start the crisis the IMF estimated that global losses related to sub-prime mortgage 
originated debt was at least US$1.5 trillion; however, this amount was a low estimate. It is 
now known to be over US$4.5 trillion, with US$1.5 trillion in toxic debt having been 
eradicated by nation states use of public funds. Nearly US$3 trillion, much of it toxic debt 
structures, remains in the financial system as portions of CDOs and other ―sophisticated‖ 
leveraged investment vehicles. The social implications of this transfer of public funds are 
discussed in Chapter 3. 
By the fall of Lehman Brothers and the collapse of other investment banks in September 
2008, many of the developed states‘ economies were already in recession partly because of 
tightened credit facilities (post Bear Stearns) (September 2007) and oil price spikes in early 
2008. Most ―real‖ economies had already been retracting before the September 2008 
meltdown and the first calls to re-regulate the financial markets were heard from virtually all 
developed states caught up in the contagion emanating from the United States. Meanwhile, 
―shadow‖ economy financial players are engaged in daily trades far eclipsing those of pre-
Lehman Brothers meltdown. In fact many institutions such as Goldman Sachs have repaid the 
debt to government and are again paying staff in trading rooms and trading platforms record 
bonuses on unregulated speculative trades, despite growing disquiet across government and 
community sectors.  
Essentially the contest between the state economy and its relationship with unregulated 
markets is at the core of global political economy debate. Whilst states have ceded (since the 
collapse of the gold standard in 1971) considerable ground to the neoliberalist free market 
philosophy, a clear distinction is yet to be put forward in respect to financial transaction tax 
regulatory frameworks on a global scale . Nation states and their local state governments still 
accept professional advice from ratings agencies who determine credit ratings for states‘ 
borrowing and debt structures. Ratings agencies such as Standard and Poors, Moody‘s and 
Fitch assessed mortgage packages in the United States that were bundled into exotic 
Collateral Debt Obligations  based securitised knowing that the risk associated with these 
transaction was extremely high. AAA rated debt from the sub-prime borrowers triggered the 
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massive contagion that is currently enmeshed in the global financial system and creating 
social and economic distress worldwide. Rating agencies were integral in the sub-prime melt-
down. 
Post-Lehman (2008) the then President of the United States
72
, George W Bush, stated to a 
group of Republicans that Wall Street ―needed to sober up a bit and wean itself off all these 
fancy financial instruments‖ and prior to September 2008 events (Lehman collapse) the 
former Chairman of the Federal Reserve Paul Volker gave financiers a ―D grade‖ with a 
critique, saying, ―for all its talented participants, for all its rich rewards, (the) bright new 
financial system has failed the test of the market place.‖ In the short timeframes after 
Lehman, the government took over some of world‘s biggest financial institutions in ―serial 
weekend rescues‖ which required US$700 billion of public resources. Commentators 
suggested that the transformation of all five big American banks investment banks – either by 
bankruptcy or rebirth as commercial banks – is powerful evidence that Wall Street had, 
indeed, failed the test of the marketplace.    
2.6 Credit Contagion 
Parallel to the global credit squeeze (resultant of the Global Financial Crisis) the re-
emergence of transnational shadow economy capital, awash with speculative financial 
instruments (still significantly buoyed by political lobbying influence) dominate the next 
progressive phase of the continuing crisis as it takes hold across Europe. Waves of credit 
(pre-crisis) have now become waves of debt (post-crisis), as governments across the 
developed world grapple with budget cuts and defaults in Ireland, United Kingdom, Iceland, 
Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greek economies. A sovereign debt crisis with underlying 
structural indices post 2007 appears to be deeply entrenched in economic and social 
interplays across North Atlantic continents
73
. Many European countries are now either 
technically insolvent or facing insolvency. Most are producing budgetary cuts at levels not 
seen in recent times. With growing seriousness, European Union nation states are cutting 
services and programs that  target those least able to care for  The following table (2:1)  
evidences the entrenched stratum of government debt being held by European states, showing 
budget deficits and debt as a percentage of gross domestic product. Further information on 
the composition of broad debt levels (household, non-financial sector, and government debt is 
located in Figure 6:1 and 6:2 in Chapter Six of this thesis.  
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Greece Spain Ireland Italy  Germany  
Debt % 
to GDP 
68.6% 112.6% 54.3% 65.8% 114.6% 73.1% 
 
Addressing the growing sense of frustration at debt levels across Europe, Credit Agricole CIB 
analyst Daragh Maher suggested that:  
The preoccupation remains the ongoing fiscal stress in the euro zone and the contagion thereof, 
which is no longer confined to considerations regarding the likes of Portugal, Italy and Spain. 
Instead, it has spread across continents and asset markets, much in the same way as the ripples of the 
(US) subprime crisis extended far beyond initial expectations
75
.  
For five months prior to the Greek bailout, the market stayed afloat because various unnamed 
Greek ―officials‖ claimed that a bailout was coming. The fact that ―rumours‖ of a bailout 
propped the market up indicates that market participants were delusional, inferring that 
lending more money to a bankrupt country would ―solve‖ its debt problem. Greece‘s fiscal 
situation is not all that worse than several other European countries.  Ireland, Spain, and the 
UK, all are running comparable deficits. Italy actually has a higher debt-to-GDP ratio, and 
Germany and the United Kingdom are only a matter of years off from having Greek-type 
debt-to-GDP ratios themselves. (See Table 2.1 above.) 
The current crisis was pre-determined by low interest rate policies in Europe and the United 
States in early to mid-2000 to 2003 as the United States Federal Reserve effectively created 
cheap credit to enable a housing market bubble to replace the NASDAQ stock market 
collapse, and the recessionary mood following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. 
 Morris
76
 argues that the relentless deregulation drive that started during the Reagan 
Administration steadily shifted lending activities to the purview of non-regulated entities, 
until by 2006 only about a quarter of all lending occurred in regulated sectors, down from 
about 60 per cent 20 years before. Dogmatic market capitalists hailed the deregulation, free 
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market ideological trend, none more enthusiastically than Alan Greenspan. In the week 
before LTCM imploded (August 1998) Alan Greenspan
77
 told Congress ―market pricing and 
counter-party surveillance can be expected to do most of the job of sustaining safety and 
soundness‖ further in 2003 stating:  
Crisis of derivatives often raises the spectre of the failure of one dealer imposing debilitating losses 
on its counterparties, including other dealers, yielding a chain of defaults. However, derivative 
market participants seem keenly aware of the counterparty credit risks associated with derivatives 
and take various measures to mitigate those risks.  
Having previously pleaded the case for the US Federal Reserve to intervene in the LTCM 
crisis, Greenspan had changed his market non-interventionist philosophy full turn, insisting 
the Federal Reserve had to intervene because:  
Had the failure of LTCM triggered seizing up of the markets, substantial damage could have been 
inflicted on many market participants, including some not directly involved with the firm, and could 
have potentially impaired the economies of many nations, including our own. (Morris 2008:58) 
This is evidence of the major lines of disconnection in political and economic policy at the 
highest level. Developed nation sates s have endorsed free market models of neoliberalism 
for three decades, knowing that the festive intermix of players in capital markets; political 
identities and lobbyists, had the last say in the bigger question of political economy. This is 
the Achilles heel of modern economic management. In ever growing numbers, civil society 
has been asked to accept the views of their elected members that money, and the wider 
regime of financialisation, is being managed effectively, when clearly there are major market 
disruptions, requiring public bailouts. 
The underlying trigger of the ongoing credit contagion is that market elites and politicians 
failed to understand and assess risks and warn their constituents about high-level risks of 
aggressive lending. Home mortgages became the grist for elite quantitative portfolio 
management after they had been re-engineered into securitised instruments that looked much 
like tradable bonds. This re-engineering greatly improved market efficiencies and reduced 
funding costs but also created the illusion that the underlying risks were well under control 
and understood. The regime was securitisation – packing up loans in the form of 
collateralised mortgage obligations (CMOs) and selling them off to pension funds and other 
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investors. Instead of holding loans on the banks books, banks began to package specific 
tranches of debt as CMOs collateralised loan obligations (CLOs) and collateralised debt 
obligations (CDOs), and sold sell them to outside investors. That way banks would still 
collect hefty start-up fees whilst encumbering very little of their capital. For bankers, lending 
(through securitisation) had become costless and riskless. 
All three of the trends – the shift of a significant portion of financial transactions to 
unregulated markets, the steady worsening of agency problems, and the pretence that all 
mortgages can be successfully securitised together – created the great credit bubble of the 
2000s. Morris
78
 further argues that:  
To be a banker in these times (2001 up until the mid-2007 era was very heaven. When the dot-com 
boom imploded in late 2000, the Fed responded by cutting the federal funds rate from 6.5% to 3-5% 
within the space of a few months. In the aftermath of the tragic events of September 11, 2001 the Fed 
continued to lower rates – all the way down to 1% by 2003, the lowest rate in half a century. The Fed 
(through advice from Greenspan) did not start lifting rates again until mid-2004 , and for thirty –one 
consecutive months the base inflation adjusted short term interest rate was negative. For bankers, in 
other words, money was free. 
Money was free, bankers‘ lending (securitisation and collateral debt obligations) had become 
costless, and mathematicians had banished risk through credit insurance (credit default 
swaps).  
The United States‘ fiscal condition is potentially worse than Greece‘s. The US is expected to 
run a $1.7 trillion deficit this year. The United States‘ deficit is currently US$15 trillion, 12.3 
per cent of GDP, next to Greece in risk and severity. Then, there is debt-to-GDP ratio. If you 
ignore unfunded liabilities like Social Security and Medicare, the US already has a debt-to-
GDP ratio of 98.1 per cent. That is only slightly off Greece‘s debt-to-GDP of 112 per cent. 
Adding the debt of the Government Business Entity, (GBE) Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
mortgage debts (US $5 trillion), and debt is well over a debt-to-GDP of 112 per cent (actually 
it‘s 130 per cent or so). When you include Social Security and Medicare ($45 trillion), this 
puts total US debt-to-GDP at 421 per cent ($59 trillion of debt on a GDP of $14 trillion). The 
true figures make the United States technically insolvent.  
Recently economists have noted that a dangerous gap of mutual distrust and incomprehension 
had opened between the world of Eurozone politics and financial markets and that the gap is 
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wide enough for countries like Greece to fall through. The Greek crisis has again brought to 
focus the tenuous situation of European Union partnerships and the enormous attacks by 
financial speculators on the ―PIIGS‖ (Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece and Spain). Add to that 
the tenuous nature of the United Kingdom economy and it is clear that the wave of sovereign 
debt being absorbed into economies of these nation states is going to be a problem that even 
the ―shock and awe‖ application of massive taxpayer-funded bailouts is not going to readily 
solve, despite short-term ―confidence‖ boosts in markets.  
Johan Norberg
79
 suggests that the difficulties confronting most Anglo-Saxon developed states 
economies in 2011- 2012 are that the global financial crisis, starting in September 2007 was 
―at least part a result of record low interest rates, huge deficits and large scale credit 
consumption‖. Norberg (2011) argues that the current crisis is likely to deepen as 
governments across the world are trying to solve serious sovereign debt problems by 
maintaining fiscal policy settings of record-low interest rates, huge deficits, and large scale 
credit-financed consumption. This time they are also using more novel means of creating 
easy money: bank bailouts, stimulus packages and quantitative easing. Creating economic 
growth through quantitative easing is unsustainable, inflationary, and ultimately leads to a 
worsening of social circumstances for citizens. The IMF states that the world‘s rich 
developed countries have in fact increased their debt levels by 50 per cent over the past three 
years. British Prime Minister David Cameron unveiled a poster during the British election 
campaign saying that a baby born in 2010 would owe the equivalent of 17,000 British 
pounds. This would grow to £21,000 in four years.  
As European leaders approved the massive bailout/rescue package for Greece, European 
central banks began buying Eurozone bonds on May 10, 2010 in an unprecedented injection 
of cash into the beleaguered European financial system. Despite a temporary bounce in 
confidence levels as measured by positive market reaction, the euro currency sank again and 
has continued without sustained support. By early June 2010, the euro sank to a four-year low 
against the US dollar after Spain‘s credit rating was downgraded and the European central 
bank warned of the possibility of bank write-downs. Unemployment across the 16 countries 
that share the euro hit a record of 10.1 per cent with almost 16 million citizens looking for 
work in a rapidly eroding economic and social landscape. 
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Not unexpectedly, governments have been forced to use public funds to bail out the 
dysfunctional international financial system in the same way that the United States 
Government transferred billions of dollars of public funds towards its own financial 
institutions in 2008. Parallel to the use of public funds to replace corporate debt is a swathe of 
austerity programs for the populace. Whilst the reaction in the streets of Europe against tough 
social based austerity measures is continuing, Europe‘s political leaders have launched 
attacks against the veracity of financial markets and particularly international short sellers 
who have targeted faltering economies in their market strategies to exact profits. Dysfunction 
in global financial markets is causing considerable social unrest. 
Angela Merkel, the German Chancellor, threw her government‘s support behind a renewed 
drive to introduce a global tax on financial transactions, insisting that ―ordinary citizens‖ 
were demanding that financial institutions share more of the cost of the global crisis
80
. She 
said that a tax on stock exchange transactions, or a tax on all financial activity, including the 
profits and bonuses paid by banks, was needed, and she was determined to push for a 
decision at the G20 summit in November 2011. If the G20 could not agree on such a 
measure, she said, and then the European Union should act alone. Merkel, British Prime 
Minister David Cameron, and newly elected French President have each expressed support 
for a financial transaction tax (FTT). Cameron, though, only supports a global model. Merkel 
has been the most consistent supporter of an FTT.  
Cameron‘s support for the FTT is a sign that conservative politicians are being forced to look 
at all available resources to balance the undesirable economic effects on public funds. In a 
formal statement of policy to the German Bundestag, Merkel also announced that the ban on 
short selling in Germany would last indefinitely, or until the European Union agreed on a 
common regulation. Ms Merkel toughened the government stance on financial regulation in 
the face of a growing popular backlash against the cost to Germany of providing credit 
guarantees to the weaker economies in the euro zone. She said that the currency crisis in the 
euro zone was the greatest test of the European Union since the signing of the Treaty of 
Rome in 1957. Strong measures are needed. German Chancellor Angela Merkel has spoken 
at length about the possibility that Greece may have to voluntarily leave the euro 
configuration (albeit temporarily) if it fails to meet the strict austerity conditions that are held 
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against loans. The head of the OECD Angel Gurria said that contagion in the Eurozone called 
for swift action by Greece saying, ―(the contagion) is like Ebola‖. ―When you realise you 
have it you have to cut off your leg in order to survive
81‖.  
2.7 Real versus Shadow Economies  
So totally disengaged have ―real‖ state-based economies become from the macro shadow 
financial markets that their presence is only noted during times of dysfunction. The plight of 
local-based nation state economies is severely altered in times of global economy 
dysfunction. The reality for citizens based within market systems aligned to ―real‖ economies 
is that the decade of global macro overlay of credit has created high levels of risk through 
industries, and households. Nation states grappling with sovereign debt have no choice but to 
instigate austerity measures including massive cuts in public service budgets, which will be, 
of necessity, an anathema to its citizens, such is the gargantuan nature of debt reduction 
required to balance national accounts. These measures reduce social opportunity. They create 
precarious housing, employment and living conditions to millions of citizens around the 
globe as I discuss in Chapter 3. 
Three distinct phases map disconnect between real and shadow economies. First, the regime 
of free markets and the concomitant neoliberal paradigm of concentrated wealth and 
consolidating corporate power, thus formulating a vast and highly specialised lobbyist 
machine to sell the strategies for financial engineering. Second, the winding down of the 
industrial and manufacturing sector in favour of unregulated global market players, enabled 
by sophisticated ―state of the art‖ flash and algorithm trading mechanisms to capture the 
trading edge in markets. Third, is a disenfranchised social aftermath resulting from the boom 
and bust cyclical nature of global finance? The necessary de-leveraging of credit markets, and 
with it unemployment, inability of citizens to maintain employment, and business stress, has 
been the politically and social undesirable consequence facing many developed states. 
Whatever gloss is layered across the capacity of current governments to trade out of 
insolvency, and protect their citizens in hard times, there is no escaping the veracity, secrecy 
and political engineering and influence of lobbyists in this contemporary political economy 
phase.  
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The financialisation of global markets was driven by excessive lending on a massive scale 
because all three inhibitors had been taken out of the equation. Global capital supplies to an 
awaiting array of speculative investors were available in large volume. Bank lending (through 
the agency of securitisation) had become common practice, and mathematicians appeared to 
have banished risk through credit insurance (credit default swaps/synthetic CDOs) (see the 
following section). Engel and McCoy
82
 suggest that: 
Subprime securitisation is a relatively new phenomenon, followed on the heels of securitisation in the 
prime residential loan market, first pioneered in the late 1970s. By the early 1990s, technological 
advances made it possible to estimate and price the risk of sub-prime loan pools, paving the way for 
sub-prime securitisations. In 2005, total securitisations of subprime and home equity loans ballooned 




When money is free and lending is costless and riskless, the rational lender will keep on 
lending until there is no one else to lend too. Alan Greenspsan foresaw a glorious new era of 
finance adding to his string of memorable ―bubble‖ endorsements he announced a ―new 
paradigm of active credit management‖.  
Fleckenstein
84
 suggested:  
Even the most unglamorous drudge shops in the gleaming towers of finance chunked out unending 
streams of gold. Home equity loans to risky and strapped homeowners, high-rate credit cards to 
insolvent consumers, and a vast strategy involving banks, accountants, credit agencies and all under 
the policy structures known to the Fed.  
All bubbles burst and by the end of 2007indications that the finance capital driven housing 
bubble was about to end. . By 2007 (after Greenspan against all odds had held interest rates 
low for a protracted period of massive credit expansion), the Economist magazine wrote that 
―the global financial system … has become a giant money press as Americans‘ easy money 
policy spilled beyond its borders… This gush of global liquidity has not pushed up inflation. 
Instead it has flowed into share prices and houses around the world inflation a series of asset 
price bubbles‖. Stephen Roach, chair of Morgan Stanley Asia has the called the US Federal 
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Reserves‘ performance during this period as ―unconscionable‖. At this period, strong political 
leadership was urgently needed, but not forthcoming.  
A survey ―Asset Price Bubbles and Monetary Policy‖ released by the European Central 
Bank
85
 in 2005, was scathing of the fast easy money policies in the US and stated in part:  
{A} s households are typically encouraged to spend out of their capital gains when asset prices 
advance, durable and sizable bubbles can boost consumer expenditure. …In this respect, empirical 
evidence tends to suggest that a deflating bubble in the housing market is more costly than an equally 
sized crash in the in the stock market, as housing equity is more widespread and more intensely used 
as collateral for securing credit‖. 
2.8 Synthetic CDOs and the Global Economy 
Sophisticated financial instruments called collateralised debt obligations (CDOs) became the 
new phenomena signalling the rapid specialisation of money market expertise, using globally 
integrated technology, in the contemporary phase of financialisation. The CDOs spliced 
tranches of debt categorised into risk-rated components by ratings agencies, which investors 
around the world demanded to pass onto the new-age cyber investment markets controlled by 
hedge funds and a growing band of single investors who believed that risk could be measured 
by rating agency assessment.  
Another form of investment vehicle that has played a leading role in the financialisation of 
global markets is the synthetic CDO, which has taken the sophisticated nature of specialist 
innovative architecture to a new level. The synthetic CDO
86
 was also instrumental in the 
matrix of circumstantial events during the sub-prime crisis involving investors, speculators 
and mortgage holders. These mortgage-related securities were seen as the dominant reason 
for the diminution of lending standards that enabled high-risk clients into mortgage loan 
markets. High risk clients who in any other setting would not be granted loans became 
acceptable to loan originators because their sign up contribution (debt) was immediately 
accepted into the portfolio structures being marketed to wider global investors. The portfolio 
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structures accept tranches of high, medium, and low risk debt into securitised CDOs, thus 
layering risk within the investment unit.  
The lowering of lending standards created a higher a volume of speculative debt to be 
incorporated in the financial modelling that inherently differentiated between the desires to 
accommodate low income borrowers and the demand of institutional investors who viewed 
CDOs as safe, positively rated, high yield financial market instruments. Financiers then sell 
these specialist investment vehicles globally.  
A synthetic CDO
87
 is primarily a complex financial security, a speculative investment 
instrument, which manages the risk that an obligation will not be repaid. It is a derivative 
whose value is originated from a predetermined and predefined set of reference securities that 
may or may not be owned by parties (counterparties) that contract over different viewpoints 
and outcomes. Both parties effectively bet on perceptions. Investment banks and hedge funds 
are typical counterparties, and are involved in selecting the reference securities to be wagered 
upon and the counterparties to buying the relative risk. These market players are critical to 
the financialisation of global financial markets. Moreover, each depends on the other. 
Complex legal entities known as structured investment vehicles (SIVs) facilitate contracts. 
One counterparty pays a premium to the other in exchange for a payment if a certain event 
occurs. These premiums are highly leveraged over-the-counter transactions, which are 
unregulated, off the record, and mostly transacted from offshore tax havens. They are, 
nevertheless, highly speculative and use credit default swaps as the medium to transact. Their 
spread can be over a hundred consenting companies, across the globe. It is a form of 
insurance against bonds (securitised debts such as CDOs). The controversial nature of these 
international trades is located in the associated inter-related nature of relationship with ratings 
agencies, who receive payment by the mortgage originator to grade investment risk
88
 inherent 
in the procedures. Payments to ratings agencies were seen as a major contributing factor to 
market dysfunction.  
Residential mortgages became the grist for quantitative portfolio management after they had 
been re-engineered into instruments that looked much like tradable bonds. This re-
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engineering greatly improved shadow economy market efficiencies through reduced funding 
costs, but also created the illusion that the underlying risks were well under control and 
understood. This illusion was aided by the proprietary compliance of ratings agencies 
Standard and Poors, Fitch and Moody‘s, all of whom allocated AAA first grade assessment of 
mortgages sold to high risk citizens without reasonable ability to complete repayment 
agreements. Rating agency compliance thus triggered the economic dysfunction as 
investments collapsed. All three of the trends – the shift of financial transactions to 
unregulated markets, the steady worsening of agency problems, and the pretence that all 
finance can be mathematised – flowed together to create the great credit bubbles of the 2000s, 
and the post Global Financial Crisis sovereign debt now carried by developed states. 
Many economic analysts were raising concerns that the sub-prime debt levels were posing 




Every mortgage industry conference discussed it, every credit committee considered it. The bad debts 
were packaged up in collateralised debt obligations or CDOs – bundles of debt divided into tranches 
from very high-risk ―equity‖ to safe-bet ―AAA‖. In such an environment demand for subprime 
backed CDOs should have fallen off a cliff and thus shut down the boom. But it didn‘t. Demand for 
sub-prime backed debt packages continued to rise and their yields continued to fall. The bubble 
continued on Wall Street even as house prices stabilised and then began to fall. How could that be? 
As more investors realised the precariousness of the bubble demand for subprime debt should have 
disappeared choking off the cash that enabled the boom. Most mortgage industry participants 
assumed that there was a degree of rationality that would constrain reckless behaviour. 
Streithorst
90
 suggests that the difference laid with the availability of the credit default swaps 
(CDSs) and synthetic CDOs which used us CDSs to ―mimic the behaviour of underlying 
debt, thus allowing short sellers a profitable ―if vicious‖ vehicle to lay their bets. This market 
engineering supported the buoyancy of the market, regardless of the nature of the pre-existing 
model which related to houses and mortgages in the ―real economy‖. Fundamental 
differences in the market structures thus demonstrate the growing disconnect between the 
shadow economy (speculative non-transparent financial innovations) and the real economy. 
In 2002, well before the current credit crisis, Warren Buffett, who is one of the most 
successful investors in history and in 2008 was ranked by Forbes Business Magazine as the 
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richest person in the world, raised serious concerns
91
 about the incentives of market 
participants working with derivatives and specifically warned about the explosion in 
derivatives: 
The derivatives genie is now well out of the bottle, and these instruments will almost certainly 
multiply in variety and number until some event makes their toxicity clear. Central banks and 
governments have so far found no effective way to control, or even monitor, the risks posed by these 
contracts. In my view, derivatives are financial weapons of mass destruction, carrying dangers that, 
while now latent, are potentially lethal. 
Lessons to be learnt from the financialisation of markets have been short lived as Republican 
members of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission in December 2010 voted to remove the 
terms ―Wall Street‖, ―Shadow Banking System‖ and ―Deregulation‖ from the bipartisan 
report on the causes of the most significant global economic crisis of our times. The 
Republican Party report said the crisis was the United States Government‘s fault and that it 
had nothing to do with hedge funds or creating mortgage-backed securities such as CDOs and 
CDSs. The Republicans stated in the report that the crisis had nothing to do with big bonuses 
or skewed incentive structures and laid the fault directly on the government forcing banks ―to 
make bad loans to poor people‖. The Republican Chairman of the House Financial Services 
Committee
92
 told a reporter the purpose of the regulators (during the prelude to the crisis) is 
―to serve the banks‖. These responses to a financial catastrophe (ongoing) indicate the high 
level of political deficit of global leaders who have aligned themselves intricately with money 
market elites. 
2.9 Expansionary Economies  
Darvas and von Weizsacker
93
 argue that short-term speculation and the parallel increase in 
liquidity made markets more efficient than before and that a larger share of additional trading 
is the consequence of anomalies in financial markets. They argue that it linked to the 
excessively low interest-rate policy of major developed countries since the early 2000s, 
which has fuelled the dual expansion of money and credit with subsequent asset-price booms 
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that further fuelled trading activity, with this activity grossly outpacing expansion of nation 
state economic activity registered as gross domestic product (GDP. For example, the annual 
turnover in global financial markets was 20+ per cent of global GDP in 1995 and 70 per cent 
in 2007, with 64 per cent of this market being derivatives related to fixed income products 
(including CDOs and CDS). Gross open positions on over-the-counter derivatives were 
US$80 trillion in 1998 and by late 2007 and the Lehman‘s precipitated meltdown, the figure 
was US$680 trillion, more than 40 times the size of the annual GDP of the United States. The 
gross open position post crisis is US$583 trillion. 
Hedging and distribution of interest-rate risk may not be related solely to fixed-income 
securities, but also to credit. There are no readily available statistics on all-inclusive world 
credit, but its stock may be between 100 per cent and 200 per cent of world GDP, which was 
US$55 trillion in 2007. Adding the stock of credit to the stock of fixed-income securities, the 




The past decade (2001–2012) has been a financial speculators‘ utopia. Offshore financial 
centres including known tax havens as well as designated low tax zones of Canary Wharf in 
London and Wall Street hit optimum trade levels. More than half of all global financial 
transactions were siphoned through offshore financial centres and the lack of transparency, 
lax regulatory approaches by governments, and sophisticated financial modelling, has 
prevented external scrutiny. The paradigm of shadow economies is built on secrecy and 
lobbying at the highest political levels.  
Very little is known about who owes, and who is obligated, but it is obvious that the process 
of securitisation has made asset classes highly tradable and the consolidation processes 
therein makes the task of evaluation and nature of risk analysis and identity virtually 
impossible. United States economic commentator Robert Reich
95
 argued: 
What is desperately needed is a clear delineation of the boundary between global capitalism and 
democracy – between the economic games, on the one hand, and how its rules are set on the other. If 
the purpose of capitalism is to allow corporations to play the markets as aggressively as possible, the 
challenge for citizens is to stop these economic entities from being authors of the game.  
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The systemic risk associated with offshore markets, the essential ―engine room‖ for 
speculative transactions is described in detail in Chapter 5.  
2.10 Financialisation and Concentration of Wealth  
From 1980 to 2006 the wealthiest 10 per cent of Americans increased their share of national 
income from 35 per cent to 49 per cent. In the 1970s, the richest one per cent of Americans 
owned 20 per cent of America. On the eve of the Global Financial Crisis they owned 40 per 
cent of the nation‘s wealth. During the Keynesian era of the 1970s and early 1980s, American 
CEOs earned 25 to 30 times the salaries of median workers‘ wages, but by 2007 it had 
reached 500 times
96
. In Australia, a recent survey
97
 estimated that the wealthiest 20 per cent 
of society own 61 per cent of the nation‘s wealth whilst the poorest 21 per cent own one per 
cent.  
The financialisation of global economies has been examined  by political economists, 
concerned that the rise in the neoliberalist models have placed democracy and the capitalist 
economy at risk, further, suggesting that governments were ―structurally dependent‖ on 
corporations in the closed economies of the post war world. Lysandrou (2011) argues that the 
driving force behind the structured credit products that triggered the financial crisis was a 
global excess demand for securities, and that key to the build-up of this demand was the huge 
accumulation of private wealth
98
. 
This perceived inter-dependence has become much stronger with the increasing models of 
international financial liberalisation and has deepened the dependence of global states to both 
the real and shadow financial markets. A number of scholars
99
 have concluded that 
international financial deregulation is associated with regressive taxation and income 
dynamics, as well as decreasing government expenditures, which is concomitantly explained 
by the continuing neoliberalist economic modelling, which prefers the sale of state-owned 
services to the private sector. This is contradicted by the willingness, during this phase of the 
sovereign debt crisis, of the state to accept corporate debt into public accounts.  
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The position argued in this thesis is that the financialisation of western Anglo-Saxon 
economies is placing an ever-increasing burden on the standard of living, employment 
expectations, and provision of services, for citizens of those states. In terms of the post- 
Lehman Brothers crisis, it is estimated that the cost to governments globally will be in excess 
of US$7trillion. That is, US$4 trillion in transfers of government money to bail out 
corporations, effect broad stimulus packages, and realign commitments to the provision of 
government education, health services and environment protection already depleted by the 
neoliberalist modelling and the erosion of the corporate tax base over three decades. The 
socioeconomic costs of the current crisis are high. In Spain alone, the unemployment rate is 
estimated to be 21 per cent, adding to likelihood of social turmoil across this and other 
countries
100
.  Eurostat, economic forecasters, estimates that 25.1 million men and women 
were unemployed in the European Union in June 2012, of whom 17.8 million are from the 
Eurozone
101
.  A financial transaction tax would provide an ethical response to making the 
financial sector more accountable. 
2.11 Conclusion  
The recent phase of sovereign debt crises across Europe and the United States has arisen 
because of the continuing imbalance between economies running large current account 
surpluses and economies running large current account deficits. This imbalance of trade in 
finance (and consumables) is between three of the world‘s largest economies (Japan, 
Germany and China), and the heavily indebted nation states in Europe and North America. 
This imbalance has underpinned the transfer of China‘s excessive savings to the United 
States, which has engineered a financial system based on high volume, low interest finance. 
This series of circumstances may not be unique but the social consequences are now being 
felt across the globe as the participants in the (almost) free market in finance are called to 
account. For the lenders and on-sellers in shadow economies, their accumulated 
concentration of wealth has been mesmerising. For members of real economies, the time of 
reckoning is at hand. Banks are debt laden, civil society is under great pressure and the 
immediate prospect of debt reduction will be painful.  
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This chapter has examined the implicit policy mechanisms that have underpinned the rapid 
growth in transaction volumes, and the disconnect between the ―real‖ and the ―shadow‖102 
economies, as the key measure of financialisation in the decade 2000–2011. This chapter 
looked specifically at financialisation as a framework which introduces Chapter 3: The Social 
Consequences of Financial Markets. Chapter 3 examines the social costs directly emanating 
from unwise lending and borrowing on a global scale and liberalisation of markets.  
 Macro level interplays directly influence social consequences. Significant political economy 
directions include, primarily, the balance of power between the emerging BRIC economies of 
Brazil, Russian Federation, India, and China and the developed Western economies of the 
United States, Europe, and Australia. . Related directly to this is the reliance of Western 
economies upon China. Policymakers in Western countries struggle to find political relevance 
in nation state communities facing high debt repayment and high unemployment in stagnant 
economies. Chapter 3 examines the social consequences emanating from fragile market 
economies now dominated by buoyant shadow economies increasingly disconnected with the 
real economies of developed Western nation states that after thirty years of growth now face 
retracting economies with declining wealth. Declining stock rates of 9.6 per cent over the past 
five years
103
 have occurred in Australia. Democratising fragile finance is a social imperative. 
 
                                                          
102
 The real economy defined as internal state economies that are known and taxed but not always regulated and 
the shadow economy as unregulated with borderless impact (i.e. over-the-counter derivatives markets). See also 
reference 115. 
103
 Alan Kohler. Australian Broadcasting Commission. Inside Business Program. 5 August 2012 
  
Chapter 3 – The Social Consequences of Financial Markets 65 
Chapter 3 
The Social Consequences of Financial Markets 
3.1 Introduction 
Wilhelm Reich (1933) suggested that governments and elected leaders should 
consider the social implications of economic policy outcomes when he asked: ―What 
do we owe one-another as members of the same society when we no longer inhabit 
the same economy?‖104 
Chapter 3 seeks to explain the effects that current political settings, which enable 
unregulated capital markets, have on society, locally and across borders. The aim of 
this chapter is to develop an argument that evidences the urgent need to provide 
stability in global markets through the introduction of a regulatory taxation 
mechanism. 
Severe social consequences have been a feature of the Global Financial Crisis and its 
second phase of credit contraction, and financial deleveraging
105
 .Austerity measures 
across Europe and North Atlantic countries restrict welfare states‘ service provision 
capacities and turn this crisis into the most socially destructive in modern times. 
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Bresser-Periera
106
 (May 2010:2) argues that the major change to world financial 
markets that occurred after the end of the Bretton Woods system in 1971, is now 
entrenched and associated within the regime of financialisation and hegemony 
through  neoliberalism.  
Further, Bresser-Pereira suggests that:  
financialisation will be understood here as a distorted financial arrangement based on the 
creation of artificial financial wealth, that is financial wealth disconnected from real wealth 
or from the production of goods and services. Neoliberalism, in its turn, should not be 
understood merely as radical economic liberalism but also as an ideology that is hostile to 
the poor, to workers and to the welfare state. Second, I will argue that these perverse 
developments, and the deregulation of the financial system combined with the refusal to 
regulate subsequent financial innovations, were the historical new facts that caused the 
crisis. 
As set out in Chapter 2, following the Global Financial Crisis there has been a re-
emergence of transnational capital, awash with speculative instruments, and political 
influence. This denotes the next regressive phase of the Global Financial Crisis, a 
crisis increasingly integrated with North Atlantic economies and a crisis that 
continues to place risks on Australian civil society. Whilst the real economies of many 
global states are faltering in their recoveries, shadow economies are buoyant, 
protected and dangerous in that they will always place stress on states which appear to 
be cautious or unwilling participants, and inflict financial harm even on unwilling 
participants 
This chapter describes the breakdown of the neoliberalist economic regime as the 
crisis essentially becomes a battle between states and the unregulated shadow 
economy financial markets with civil society the unprotected and often 
disenfranchised interface between the key determinates.  
. As nation states in East Asia, China, and Vietnam join the industrial democracies of 
India and Japan to provide finance and goods to the integrated global economy, many 
citizens have become alarmed at the ever-widening effects of financialisation of 
globalised markets, and the variety of social issues that manifest in the form of 
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economic and political instability, unemployment, under-employment in times of 
downturns, destabilisation of states‘ internal financial systems, and environmental 
degradation.  
Many economists have been calling for a moderation in the free market approach 
enthusiastically adopted by politicians over the past three decades and freely adapted 
by capital markets particularly over the past decade (2001–2012). Multi-layered 
shadow economy structures are increasingly disassociated from state-based real 
economy regulatory systems, but at the same time create key changing forces in the 
economic and social life of nations
107
. Dysfunction in fast growing global shadow 
economies triggers interest rate rises in state-based economies with the instant result 
that homeowners are disadvantaged, capital value evaporates, and investments are 
downgraded. This also has an effect of competition in currency valuations between 
countries. Shadow economy players win, or lose, on sophisticated fraction-of-a-
second bets on interest rate and currency value fluctuations in a vast trading theatre 
that affects economic and social choice.  
Four trillion dollars is traded every day in the currency trade markets alone. Most 
trades are within shadow economies.  
 
Figure 3.1: Shadow Bank vs. Traditional Bank Liabilities, 1952–2007.108 
3.2 Social Realities of Financialisation 
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The emergent regime of financialisation has been ―sold‖ to global citizens following 
the dot.com bubble and bust in the United States and the terrorist attacks in New 
York. With public confidence at low levels the Bush Administration, Alan Greenspan 
engineered a financial revival through the introduction of almost free money, with 
hedge funds and investment banks, channelling carry trade finance originating from 
China and Japan. This combined with a growing sophistication in financial 
architecture created the ―perfect storm‖ of cheap money to translate into new debt 
passed onto consumers through all western nation states in a Wall of Money. From 
2003 to 2005, outstanding mortgage debt grew by US$3.7 trillion (an amount almost 
equal to the US$3.8 trillion of total outstanding debt). Fleckenstein argued that in 
three years (2003–2005) the United States had accumulated in debt what had 
previously taken 200 years to ―rack up‖109, adding that ―one might wonder how 
Chairman (Greenspan) felt with the ‗mortgage-for-anyone-with-a pulse‘ was 
concerned when, on April 8 2005 Greenspan ―let the country know where he stood‖ in 
respect to the flood of credit through to consumers saying: 
(T)he technological advances have resulted in increased efficiency and scale within the 
financial services industry. Innovation has brought about a multitude of new products, such 
as subprime loans, and niche credit programs for immigrants...With these advances in 
technology, lenders have taken advantage of credit-scoring models and other techniques for 
efficiently extending credit to a broader spectrum of consumer‘s, leading to a rapid growth 
in sub-prime lending. 
Peter Boone and Simon Johnson (July 2010)
110
 argue that: 
During the last four decades governments in wealthy countries have built up large 
contingent liabilities due to the implicit guarantees they have provided to their financial 
sectors. Politicians are motivated to create near term growth and always reluctant to permit 
hardships that would otherwise arise from defaults and greater austerity. As a result, the 
industrialised world has experienced excessive and dangerous financial sector development. 
Including all promises, U.S. and European taxpayers back over 250% of their GDP in 
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implicit obligations, all of which contribute to the development of moral hazard in lending 
around the world. If this incentive system remains in place and these liabilities continue to 
grow unchecked, the eventual end of this ―Doomsday Cycle‖ – with repeated bailouts for 
distressed lenders – will be large sovereign defaults and economic collapse. The current 
round of regulatory reform is not sufficient to stop this trend. 
 
Figure 3.2: The Creation of Securities from Loans111.  
This chart describes the complexities of loan originators in the comparatively new 
financial market led securitisation of loans. Securitisation of loans figured 
prominently in the ―subprime meltdown‖ as finance capital engineered a product to 
channel finance to lenders and then home buyers in the United States. The process of 
securitisation allowed underwriters to package loans (high and low risk) to on-sell 
through global investment banks. Special Purpose Vehicles enabled the packages to 
be wrapped and on-sold).  
This chapter explains sovereign debt and the concomitant phenomenon of the 
socialisation of debt. The two decades from 1980 to 2000 have delivered 
extraordinary economic growth to most developed countries through the liberalisation 
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of finance. This continued through the next decade (2001–2007). In the United States 
alone, increases in housing wealth reached US$8 trillion; peaking in 2007 and then 
dropping by over 25 per cent in the third quarter of 2008 (post Lehman). Housing 
wealth has now turned to housing debt of unprecedented levels with 4.1 million 
mortgages across the United States either foreclosed (2.1 million) or at serious risk of 
foreclosure (over 2 million mortgages with no repayments for longer than 90 days).  
For the troubled government-guaranteed mortgage agencies Freddie Mac and Fannie 
Mae, their ongoing solvency is threatened by mortgages originated during the ―free 
lending period‖ of 2006 and 2007 which account for 24 per cent of the total portfolio 
valued at US$5 trillion.  
Against this, credit losses for these mortgages total 67 per cent of the securitised 
portfolio values and still threaten the entire system
112
. In what follows, this chapter 
seeks to explain the current dynamics of financial markets from a social and 
stakeholder perspective. The wider social implications are drawn against a 
background of developments in the shadow and real economies. Consistent with the 
central views and arguments in this thesis, a position is put that posits moderate 
regulatory reform through the introduction of a financial transaction tax on a global 
unilateral scale. This thesis argues that speculative capital trades are injurious to 
global civil societies. 
3.3 Weakened Social and Political Structures  
Wallenstein 
113
argues that the term globalisation became the more optimistic 
euphemism to describe the economic and concomitant social crises that played 
through successive cycles from 1970 to the present time. He (Wallenstein) suggests 
that the period 1945 to 1970 marked the height, and supremacy, of the United States‘ 
hegemonic period referred to as les trente glorieuses: the most expansive Kondratieff 
A
114
-upturn that the world had ever known. Against this the cyclical rhythms of 
downturns were a natural market circumstance of world capitalist system 
functionality, with the two key interfaces being how states guarantee the world order 
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of social norms of welfare and common goods, and producers make profits within the 
processes of supply and demand. These are the necessary function of expansion at 
state and global levels.  
The United States‘ real economy could well have been delivered a death blow by the 
after effects of the financial crisis. The real economy
115
 has been effective in shifting 
corporate debt to the public sector in order to prop up ailing financial interests (post 
Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns) but the net effect of high level government debt is 
significant government cutbacks and program tightening in the form of austerity in the 
public service account.  
Transnational capital players on the other hand have been successful in providing 
unprecedented lobbying techniques to stall and discredit government approaches to 
regulate capital markets. Unregulated markets have recovered from a relatively 
modest post Global Financial Crisis slump to record daily international turnover both 
in numbers of trades and quantum
116
. Notional amounts outstanding of over-the-
counter derivatives climbed 18 per cent to $707.6
117
 trillion by the end of June 2011, 
compared with the six months ended December 2010, when they increased three per 
cent, the Bank for International Settlement said in their report. Interest-rate swaps 
jumped 21 per cent to $441.6 trillion in the first half, accounting for 62 per cent of the 
total amount, the report showed. Credit-default swaps rose eight per cent to $32.4 
trillion. 
Critiques of free market capitalism locate their focus on the structure of markets and 
their relationship to social institutions. The instability and volatility of active markets 
can devalue the economic base of real lives, or in more macro-scenarios can lead to 
the collapse of national and regional economies. Susan Strange
118
 (1986:9-10) called 
this instability ―casino capitalism‖, a phenomenon she links to five trends: innovations 
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in the way in which financial markets work; the sheer size of markets; commercial 
banks turned into investment banks; the emergence of Asian nations as players; and 
the shift to self-regulation by banks.  
The speed at which markets work combined with their now, near-universal 
pervasiveness, results in a volatility that extends globally. Approximately US$7 
trillion dollars are invested daily as speculative foreign currency transaction trading 
convoys
119
. The quarterly turnover in global exchange-traded interest rate derivatives 
hit US$600 trillion (gross outstanding contracts) in 2007 (pre-crisis), US$80 trillion in 
equity-related trades, and US$8 trillion in currency-related derivatives
120
.  
Market analysts argue that there are two views that explain the explosion of global 
financial transactions from 2000 to 2010. The first suggests markets are more efficient 
due to increasing technology specifically related to lower transaction costs through 
higher volume, sophisticated mechanisms, and efficiencies. The second argument 
posits a regime of flawed incentives, within markets protected by governments that 
have held fiscal policy settings of low interest rates. This has fuelled speculative 
expansion of money and credit into asset price booms, resulting in trade activity 
outpacing the expansion of economic activity at state levels.  
The voracious nature of free market expansionary support by governments has been 
the key feature of the political economy over the past two decades. Key developed 
nation states engage in the voluminous financial trade convoys through specifically 
and strategically placed trading centres (Wall Street and Canary Wharf), as designated 
financial centres. Governments are seduced by the flow-on effects of cheap money 
and high volume trades, huge profits and the concomitant employment related tax of 
highly paid traders and executives operating in specific geographical locations. With 
the onset of the Global Financial Crisis and the employment and trade volume 
downturns, governments in the United States and Great Britain are bending under the 
social distrust and dis- ease that were unimaginable even five years ago. The integrity 
of states has been questioned and alarmingly, found wanting. In the United States, and 
Great Britain, property speculators have unfinished asset developments around the 
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cities and countryside. In these countries and in Australia building and property 
industry sector workers, architects, and families have been displaced.  
In ―The Crisis of Global Capitalism121‖, investment guru George Soros also highlights 
the potential for disequilibrium in the financial system, and the inability of non-
market sectors (state-based governments) to regulate markets. In ―False Dawn‖, John 
Gray (1998:76)
122
  echoes, ―national governments find themselves in environments 
not merely of risk but of radical uncertainty‖. Gray attacks the paradigm of 
neoliberalism for weakening social and political institutions in both first and third 
world nations. ―In the late twentieth century there is no shelter – for corporations or 
for governments – from the global gale of creative destruction.  
Rapidly shifting economies driven by unregulated markets have real consequences on 
the lives of individuals. The velocity of social, economic, and technological change as 
well as the shifting of ownership in the forms of mergers and takeovers results in an 
unpredictable relationship with work. In ―Corrosion of Character‖, Richard Sennett123 
(1998) captures this impact of the flexible capitalism across two generations of 
workers. From service workers in a bakery, to capital traders in Canary Wharf, to 
IBM software engineers, work has become increasingly illegible and job security 
increasingly tenuous. Financial and technological innovation drives organisational 
instability. Shifts in the tenuous relationships between the real and shadow economies 
can destabilise whole sectors of the economy, both eliminating and creating jobs. 
Social risk and uncertainty lurk on the edges of both state and global employment. 
Adapting to the volatility and unpredictability of the economy is difficult and anxiety-
ridden. Increasingly states are left to manage the fallout from market ebb and flow. 
This theme was enunciated by Pierre Bourdieu (2005:1)
124
 who described 
neoliberalism and free market systems:  
 ..as the dominant discourse would have it, the economic world is a pure and perfect order, 
implacably rolling the logic of its predictable consequences, and prompt to repress all 
violations by the sanctions that it inflicts, either automatically or – more unusually –through 
the intermediary of its armed extensions, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 
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Organisation for Economic Development (OECD) and the policies they impose: reducing 
labour costs, reducing public expenditures and making work more flexible. Is the dominant 
discourse right? What if, in reality, this economic order was no more than the 
implementation of a utopia – the utopia of neoliberalism – thus converted into a political 
problem? One that, with the aid of the economic theory that it proclaims, succeeds in 
conveying of itself as the scientific description of reality. 
Bourdieu argues that the theory of neoliberalism is, akin to pure mathematical fiction 
and that from this sort of Walrasian
125
 ―pure theory‖ flow all the deficiencies and 
faults of the discipline of economics and the fatal obstinacy ―with which it attaches 
itself to the arbitrary opposition which it induces, through its mere existence between 
a properly economic logic based on competition and efficiency, and social logic, 
which is subject to the rule of fairness‖. 
Further, Bourdieu suggests the theory of neoliberalism is de-socialised and de-
historicised at its roots and has sought to ―make itself true‖ and empirically verifiable. 
―In effect, neoliberal discourse is just one amongst many. Rather it is a strong 
discourse, the way psychiatric discourse is in an asylum‖. ―It is so strong and so hard 
to combat only because it has on its side ―all of the forces of a world of relations of 
forces, a world that it contributes to making what it is‖.  
This theme is extended by Selbourne
126
 who states: 
Britain‘s way of life, like the way of life of all nations was an organic and particular 
creation. It had its own ecology, as does the natural world. But I the last few decades, and at 
accelerating pace, a great unravelling has taken place in Britain, a free country degraded of 
its freedoms, And ―business as usual‖ will serve the British interest no more than Goldman 
Sachs and Lehman Brothers have served the world economy. The difference between 
freedom and licence has been unlearned. The country‘s broadly shared values rested, among 
other things, on convention, on common law and custom, on a sense of community and 
despite social inequality, on respect for public service and on a belief in the work ethic. 
They have not survived the self-degrading moral and market free-for-all which has been 
unleashed upon the land. It has reduced the citizen to a mere customer and consumer, and 
has invited so many free-loaders- from duck house parliamentary cheats to fiddlers of the 
welfare system, indigenous and incomers alike – to take liberties with this battered country 
rather than to fulfil their obligations to it. Moreover the truth about these matters is not the 
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exclusive possession of either left or right, but lies between them: you cannot strengthen 
―social cohesion‖ while privatising public institutions which hold civil society together, or 
by slashing public provision in order to pay for the harms caused to the polity and economy 
by unbridled private interest.  
The macro economic and political issues are further developed by introducing the 
processes inherent in the transfer of power from the West to East: the force majeure, 
which is further discussed in the following chapter on systems analysis. The Global 
Financial Crisis, and ensuing sovereign debt contagion, has raised serious questions 
about the future of the European Union and the capacity of developed nation states as 
the axiom of power shifts to state capitalist models of China and eastern economic 
zones. This crisis is forcing politicians to bend to pressure from conservative political 
persuasions, desperate to protect the privileges won over decades of neoliberalism.  
This argument has a logical extension in the current world of political economy where 
politicians in the United States have been forced to water down significant financial 
regulation reforms
127
 within structures of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act 2010, because opponents engaged an ―army‖ of lobbyists 
with over US$600 million in ―incentives‖ to argue against the reform by pressing to 
maintain the status quo in the neoliberalist financial trading and banking system.  
Chapter 5 describes the growing nature of forensic lobbyists whose persuasion has no 
borders, other than self-interest. Whilst those corporate players and high net wealth 
individuals (HNWI) engage in the territory which defines both the shadow and real 
financial systems, a new corporate welfare assistance program is being supported by 
the Obama Administration in a matrix so dysfunctional and unconscionable that it 
could only come from a government system tied implacably to a financial and 
political system dominated by neoliberalists. This has been evidenced in mid-2012 by 
the seeming reluctance of politicians to bring finance capital speculators into account 
over the LIBOR scandal. Understated borrowing costs on international markets had 
been known for years
128
. 
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Similarly, corporate subsidies and tax breaks take money from middle income wage 
earners and then the state transfers these funds to speculators to subsidise industry. 
―The Washington Examiners‖ columnist Tim Carney129 calls this new subsidy as the 
purest form of corporate welfare saying, ―we are lending money to foreign 
governments or companies so that they will buy from Boeing or Pfizer and Archer 
Daniels Midlands but the money to pay for it comes from middle class pocket books‖.  
This argument is placed firmly at the hands of government leaders in the Obama 
Administration by Douthat
130
 who argues that the transfer of funds from the middle 
class to the corporate sector in the United States is not the ―most pernicious sort of 
redistribution from the successful to the poor; rather it‘s from the savers to the 
speculators, from outsiders to insiders, and from the industrious middle class to the 
reckless unproductive rich. The types of rich he identifies as hedge fund players 
whose incomes are often in excess of US$500 million a year. This redistribution is 
clearly a phase of the shift in the geopolitical balance of power, manifest in all 
structures of the economic system. Ironically, the economic powerhouses of the 
United States and the United Kingdom are at the forefront of major change. 
3.4 United States Health and Wealth in Decline 
A United States Federal Reserve report
131
 suggested that with the decoupling of 
unprecedented numbers from the workforce and housing sectors across the United 
States, most Americans felt poorer. The report indicated that households had lost 
US$5.1 trillion (9 per cent) of their wealth in the last three months of 2008 and that 
this amount was the highest ever recorded for any period during the 57-year history of 
the central banks records. For the full year, taking in the period spanning the Bear 
Stearns (September 2007) and Lehman Brothers (September 2008) implosions, 
household wealth across the United States dropped by US$11 trillion or 18 per cent. 
The report says that stock market declines will add trillions to the quantum of losses 
occurred. Most of the wealth lost was related directly to stock market losses, which 
fell heavily post Bear Stearns, with the Standard and Poors 500 Index market 
indicator falling a 23 per cent in the fourth quarter of 2007 alone. Comparatively, the 
value of residential real estate fell less (US$870 billion or four per cent overall).  
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Krugman (2010:1)
132
 likens the current state of economic and social malaise in the 
United States to the ―US being crippled by a financial crisis – a crisis parallel in depth 
and social severity to that of the Great depression of 1938–1940‖. Krugman says that 
one key difference this time is the lack of capacity for the country to pull its self out 
of a dire situation as it did under President Roosevelt in 1938 via a massive public 
financed stimulus in the form of warfare reparations. Equivalent in today‘s terms to 
the equivalent of US$30 trillion, the economy in the United States under Roosevelt 
lifted from dire consequences, in 1938, to become an economic powerhouse 
transforming a welfare economy in deep depression to a warfare economy destined to 
consolidate the hegemonic power structures of the United States for decades.  
Krugman argues that when an economy is deeply distressed with high levels of 
unemployment, a Keynesian approach to stimulus is maintaining spending and 
relative employment rather than an austerity approach during which spending is 
constrained, jobs lost as the state falls into recession. The current Obama 
Administration is acting on this advice knowing there are only further pledges of 
public debt to stimulate an economy almost devoid of a panacea for long-term 
recovery.  
Whilst for middle to low median income Americans the losses in real estate and 
retirement funds has been substantial absolute losses sustained by the most affluent in 
the society was greatest because they owned a higher proportion of stocks and bonds 
which were first hit as markets severely retracted post Bear Stearns and through the 
ensuing period to Lehman Brothers collapse. The New York Times reports that the top 
20 per cent of income earners are known to spend more that the bottom 60 per cent. 
This has a significant effect on post-crisis spending in economic recovery models. 
This reduced the overall borrowing of the population, but the federal government 
borrowed significant amounts to service bailouts.  
Recently (2011–2012), United States Government borrowing has increased at an 
annual rate of 37 per cent. The systemic nature of structural problems 
(unemployment, housing defaults, lack of manufacturing opportunities, and urban 
decay), and commitments to universal health care pose unprecedented constraints to 
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broader economic rebuilding across the United States and Europe; two North Atlantic 
continents subjected to the proliferation of vast quantities of cheap money throughout 
the 2001–2011 decade. These are two continents now struggling for a formula to 
repay debt and provide services to an ever-increasing number of citizens dependent on 
government assistance to sustain their lives. 
Within Europe, nation state governments have rescued the banks in country after 
country, neither asking nor getting anything in return. Public funds have bailed out 
corporate entities faltering on bankruptcy. Rather than accept the neoliberalist free 
market edict that had allowed the market to dispatch those who failed, successive 
governments readily transferred the debt to the public account, thereby significantly 
altering the capacity of the state to fund its services and maintain orderly supply of 
public goods. Halimi argued that the secrecy code of the state (Greece) and the 
corporation (Goldman Sachs) is not new, is not unnoticed, but at a time of 
considerable social focus on the default and issues surrounding an economy, it cannot 
be dismissed. He (Halimi 2010) 133 states: 
So Goldman Sachs first helped Greece to borrow billions of Euros in secret, and then told it 
how to get round the European restrictions on public debt
134
. The bill for this ground-
breaking financial advice was subsequently added to the huge Greek deficit. And the 
winners and losers? Lloyd Craig Blankfein, CEO and chairman of Goldman Sachs, received 
a $9m bonus; Greek civil servants will lose the equivalent of a month‘s salary each year. A 
country, like a bank, is ―too big to fail‖. So Greece will be rescued – at a price. The 
European Central Bank claims to know all about Wall Street‘s game, and ECB president 
Jean-Claude Trichet is taking a very hard line with the Greek government, warning that 
Greece will have to take ―vigorous steps‖ to mend its ways, ―under close and constant EU 
supervision‖. In other words, hand over control of its economic affairs and reduce its 2009 
deficit – 12.7% of GDP – to 3% by 2012. To cut the deficit by almost 10%, particularly in 
an area of weak growth, is an almost impossible task, requiring major surgery rather than 
―discipline‖. Oddly enough, the aim of the exercise is to strengthen the euro at the very time 
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Angela Merkel considered that ―it would be a disgrace if it turned out to be true that 
banks (referring in this case to Goldman Sachs) that already pushed us to the edge of 
the abyss were also party to falsifying Greek statistics‖. Goldman Sachs is unlikely to 
be moved by this tirade. Barack Obama‘s comment on Blankfein‘s US$9 million 
bonus was anodyne: ―I, like most of the American people, don‘t begrudge people 
success or wealth. That is part of the free-market system.‖  
Arguments from free market enthusiasts posit that wealth serves the whole 
community. Goldman Sachs paid 0.6 per cent tax
136
 on its profits in 2009; these 
positions in favour of community benefits from free markets are questionable against 
the extraordinary levels of taxpayer funds transferred over continents to bail out 
corporate entities. This is socialisation of the private sector
137
 and the socialisation of 
debt. Lysandrou
138
 argues that: 
The richest one per cent of Americans earns nearly a quarter of the country‘s income and 
controls an astonishing 40 per cent of its wealth. Inequality in the US is more extreme than it 
has been in almost a century – and the gap between the super-rich and the poor and middle 
class people has widened drastically over the last 30 years. In the United States, a partisan 
debate over how to cut deficit spending and reduce the US‘ $14.3 trillion debt is underway. 
As low and middle class wages stagnate and unemployment remains above nine per cent, 
Republicans and Democrats are arguing over whether to slash funding for the medical and 
retirement programs that are the backbone of the United States social safety net, and 
whether to raise taxes – or to cut them further. 
These are the end points of the decades of neoliberal financial regime based on the 
abandonment of the gold standard of the early 1970s as a leveraging landmark 
followed by the Glass-Steagall era of deregulation by the Clinton Administration, and 
the concomitant private sector expansion of new forms of credit and derivatives.  
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3.5 Nation States Finances 
So totally disengaged have ―real‖ state-based economies become from the macro 
shadow financial markets that their presence is only noted during times of 
dysfunction. The reality for citizens based within the market systems aligned to ―real‖ 
economies is that the massive overlay of lax credit has created high levels of risk 
through industries, households, and government balance sheets. Nation states 
grappling with sovereign debt have no choice but to instigate massive cuts in public 
service budgets which will be, of necessity, an anathema to its citizens, and more 
importantly most detrimental to those citizens who rely on government services.  
This new tension runs through from real economy stakeholders (federal, local and 
state government service providers and the not-for- profit organisations) in much the 
same way as it does between governments and financial market players globally. This 
new dynamic is profound in terms of inter-relations between stakeholders and those 
political parties who provide responses. It is certainly new political territory where 
governments are actively socialising corporations such as the AIG.  
The same disengagement between largely unregulated and self-regulated financial 
players and nation states elected bodies was recently highlighted in a bond equity loss 
by the State of California when financial market heavyweight Goldman Sachs, 
allegedly, placed shorting positions against bond defaults. California, already 
struggling against its own crippling state debt, accused Goldman of gross impropriety 
in its dealing with government, arguing that further losses reduce California‘s 
capacity to fund services and pension agreements. Recently the State of California 
came under ―friendly fire‖ when Goldman Sachs made a $35 million bet in the credit 
derivatives market against California, the biggest such trade in the past few years by 
Wall Street banks that underwrite the state‘s bond sales, according to information that 
the banks provided to the state. 
The Financial Times (June 2010) reported
139
 that California, the biggest issuer of 
United States‘ state debt, this year began an inquiry into the trading of credit default 
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swaps (CDS)
140
 by its six major underwriters, which have earned $215 million of 
commissions on bond sales since 2007, reporting: 
Bill Lockyer, California‘s Treasurer, wanted to determine if banks selling its bonds were 
simultaneously booking profits by betting or facilitating bets against the debt. Mr Lockyer 
also wanted to work out the effect that trading in credit derivatives could have on the 
perceived risk of default of California, and borrowing costs. This is particularly important 
when US state and local governments have suffered several years of budget deficits and face 
long-term concern about pension obligations. 
Such is the draconian nature of debt reduction required to balance national accounts 
that citizens already marginalised by the macro financial market dysfunction will be 
dealt the double blow of less money to balance the family and personal budget whilst 
living in debt riddled countries with little scope to maintain safety net support for a 
wider audience of its citizens in need of basic services supplied by the state.  
3.6 Changing Economic and Social Debate 
Peter Bohmer and Robin Handel argue that centre left political parties are embracing 
the same economic policies and consorting with anti-Keynesian macroeconomists, 
leaving the likes of Paul Krugman and Joseph Stiglitz
141
 to argue their case on the 
sidelines. They ask whether this is an intellectual mistake on their part arguing:  
What if we drop the assumption that the purpose of today‘s economic policies is to rescue us 
from the Great Recession, and put in its place the hypotheses that centre left political parties 
are now aimed at benefitting higher income groups rather than promoting the interests of 
their former political constituencies? 
For decades prior to the financial crisis of 2008 and the onset of the Great Recession, 
neoliberal economic policies were championed by centre left as well as right wing 
governments. Not only Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan, but Tony Blair and 
Bill Clinton also claimed that neoliberal policies would improve economic 
performance by removing unnecessary and counterproductive shackles on regulated 
financial trading, global capital trades and corporate creativity. But while 
privatisation, deregulation, tax cuts for corporations and the wealthy, capital 
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liberalisation, and capital trade liberalisation did not increase global growth rates or 
reduce poverty as advertised, these policies did greatly enhance corporate power, 
disempowered workers, consumers, and citizens, and have produced a substantial and 
entrenched redistribution of income and wealth. Fiscal austerity, social stigmatism, 
and stalling financial reform in response to the worst financial crisis and deepest 
recession in 80 years is not about improving economic performance as its proponents 
claim. These policies are more concisely about continuing to shift income and wealth 
from the poor to the rich, and from the industrial and manufacturing sectors to the 
rapidly growing (and lobbyist influenced) domains of neoliberalist finance, insurance, 
and real estate (known as FIRE) which have become increasingly ascendant in the 
United States and Europe, despite the fact that these policies will worsen the 
economic slump and make another financial crisis likely. This new positioning by 
right and centrists politicians has fundamentally altered state-based relationships and 
placed social charter theories in disarray. At no other time of financial market 
breakdown and dysfunction has there been a tectonic shift to the right. Centre right 
and right ideologists now have a charter to consolidate wealth. Consolidating wealth 
is also related to growth in poverty quantitatively across developed states. United 
States economist Paul Krugman
142
 suggests that:  
I‘m starting to have a sick feeling about prospects for American workers – but not, or not 
entirely, for the reasons you might think. Yes, growth is slowing, and the odds are that 
unemployment will rise, not fall, in the months ahead. That‘s bad. But what‘s worse is the 
growing evidence that our governing elite just doesn‘t care – that a once-unthinkable level 
of economic distress is in the process of becoming the new normal. And I worry that those 
in power, rather than taking responsibility for job creation, will soon declare that high 
unemployment is ―structural,‖ a permanent part of the economic landscape – and that by 
condemning large numbers of Americans to long-term joblessness, they‘ll turn that excuse 
into dismal reality. Not long ago, anyone predicting that one in six American workers would 
soon be unemployed or underemployed, and that the average unemployed worker would 
have been jobless for 35 weeks, would have been dismissed as outlandishly pessimistic – in 
part because if anything like that happened, policy makers would surely be pulling out all 
the stops on behalf of job creation‖.  
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Krugman argues that the United States Congress is ―sitting on its hands‖, with 
Republicans and conservative Democrats refusing to spend anything to create jobs, 
and unwilling even to mitigate the suffering of the jobless. Krugman further argues 
that ―Congress can‘t afford to help the unemployed – that we must get budget deficits 
down immediately or the ‗bond vigilantes‘ will send U.S. borrowing costs sky-high‖. 
The economy versus civil society, deficits versus employment settings, must be seen 
against the dire structural public debt that pervades the country. The United States 
Government has accepted the social cost of further financial disruption. The nation‘s 
public debt including municipal bonds and the US$7 trillion new deficits amounts to 
US$18 trillion, equivalent to the Greek scale of 120 per cent of gross domestic 
product.  
America is continuing lack of response to intractable and crippling unemployment 
levels is described by Stockman (2010)
143
 as ―the pretence that its new monetarist and 
supply side doctrines are rooted in its traditional financial philosophy‖. Stockman 
argues that in the past, Republicans depended on the regular balancing of accounts, 
―in government, in international trade, on ledgers of central banks and in financial 
affairs of private households and business‖ but that new regimes amount ―to little 
more than money printing and deficit finance – vulgar Keynesianism robed in the 
ideological vestments of the prosperous classes‖. More consequently, he purports that 
these approaches mock political party ideals and feed ―serial financial bubbles and 
Wall Street depredations that have crippled our economy‖.  
Citing a growth in the shadow banking systems (investment banks, and finance 
companies and special conduits that lie outside the regulated banking system), from 
US$500 billion in 1970 to US$30 trillion, by September 2008, Stockman argues that 
the hollowing out of wider American economy is a ―destructive‖ social change as 
high value quality jobs in services and technology professions shrunk 12 per cent to 
68 million, from 77 million. These jobs have been replaced by part-time low paid 
positions. Stockman
144
 says that it is not surprising that during the last ―bubble‖ (2002 
to 2007) the top one per cent of Americans –―paid mainly from the Wall Street 
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casino‖ – received two thirds of the gain in national income, whilst the bottom 90 per 
cent got only 12 per cent.  
On this point Krugman concurs and adds:  
Some of us have tried to point out that those bond vigilantes are, as far as anyone can tell, 
figments of the deficit hawks‘ imagination — far from fleeing U.S. debt, investors have 
been buying it eagerly, driving interest rates to historic lows. But the fear mongers are 
unmoved: fighting deficits, they insist, must take priority over everything else — everything 
else, that is, except tax cuts for the rich, which must be extended, no matter how much red 
ink they create. The point is that a large part of Congress — large enough to block any 
action on jobs — cares a lot about taxes on the richest 1 per cent of the population, but very 
little about the plight of Americans who can‘t find work‖.  
In the United States, wealth is highly concentrated in a relatively few hands. As of 
2007, the top one per cent of households owned 34.6 per cent of all privately held 
wealth, and the next 19 per cent (the managerial, professional, and small business 
stratum) had 50.5 per cent, which means that just 20 per cent of the people owned a 
remarkable 85 per cent, of the state‘s assets, leaving only 15 per cent of the wealth for 
the bottom 80 per cent (wage and salary workers). In terms of financial wealth (total 
net worth minus the value of one‘s home), the top one per cent of households had an 
even greater share: 42.7 per cent. Table 3.1 and Figure 3.3 present further details 
drawn from the careful work of economist Edward N. Wolff at New York University 
(2010). 
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Table 3.1145: Distribution of Net Worth and Financial Wealth in the United States, 1983–
2007. 
 Total Net Worth Financial Wealth 
Year Top 1% Next 19% Bottom 80% Top 1% Next 19% Bottom 80% 
1983 33.8% 47.5% 18.7% 42.9% 48.4% 8.7% 
1989 37.4% 46.2% 16.5% 46.9% 46.5% 6.6% 
1992 37.2% 46.6% 16.2% 45.6% 46.7% 7.7% 
1995 38.5% 45.4% 16.1% 47.2% 45.9% 7.0% 
1998 38.1% 45.3% 16.6% 47.3% 43.6% 9.1% 
2001 33.4% 51.0% 15.6% 39.7% 51.5% 8.7% 
2004 34.3% 50.3% 15.3% 42.2% 50.3% 7.5% 
2007 34.6% 50.5% 15.0% 42.7% 50.3% 7.0% 
Notes: 
Total assets are defined as the sum of: (1) the gross value of owner-occupied housing; (2) other real estate owned 
by the household; (3) cash and demand deposits; (4) time and savings deposits, certificates of deposit, and money 
market accounts; (5) government bonds, corporate bonds, foreign bonds, and other financial securities; (6) the cash 
surrender value of life insurance plans; (7) the cash surrender value of pension plans, including, 401(k) plans; (8) 
corporate stock and mutual funds; (9) net equity in unincorporated businesses; and (10) equity in trust funds. 
Total liabilities are the sum of: (1) mortgage debt; (2) consumer debt, including auto loans; and (3) other debt.  
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Figure 3.3146: Net Worth and Financial Wealth in the United States, 2007. 
In terms of types of financial wealth, the top one per cent of households has 38.3 per 
cent of all privately held stock, 60.6 per cent of financial securities, and 62.4 per cent 
of business equity. The top 10 per cent has 80–90 per cent of stocks, bonds, trust 
funds, and business equity, and over 75 per cent of non-home real estate. Since 
financial wealth is what counts as far as the control of income-producing assets, it has 
been said that just 10 per cent of the people own the United States of America. 
In 2009 the United States Department of Agriculture
147
 released a report that counted 
the number of hungry families. Some 16 per cent of all families in the United States 
were food insecure (up from 12 per cent in 2007). That amounted to 49 million 
people, including more than 16 million children. That is over a quarter of all the 
children in the United States. In 2009, the number is higher but it is not known how 
much. About one-third of those families went hungry. The other two-thirds survived 
because they had access to federal food programs, or got food at a local food pantry or 
soup kitchen. That means they were hungry too, but not quite as much. Hunger is not 
spread evenly.  
More than one-quarter of all black and Latino households were food insecure, 
compared to 16 per cent in general and more than 13 per cent of all families made up 
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of single mothers and their children. Some 42.2 per cent of food-insecure households 
had incomes below the official poverty line of US$21 834 for a family of four, in 
2008. So more than half of all hungry families had incomes above the national 
poverty line, a line so low that millions of families not officially ―in poverty‖ do not 
have enough money to buy the food they need. In 2009–2010, with unemployment in 
California reaching more than 12 per cent, these numbers were on the increase.  
Families who formerly had no trouble feeding themselves, who went out to eat in 
restaurants, cannot now put enough food on the table to keep everyone from going 
hungry. There has been a massive increase in the number of people who went to food 
banks, food pantries, and soup kitchens to try to make up for what they could no 
longer buy. In 2010, almost five million people went to food pantries last year, up 
from four million the year before. By the end of 2010 government affiliated food 
banks and community food kitchens served more than 37 million Americans, up from 
2006 by 46 per cent
148
. 
Asked to consider the future of social organisation in the United States, Krugman 
stated: 
What lies down this path? Here‘s what I consider all too likely: Two years from now 
unemployment will still be extremely high, quite possibly higher than it is now. But instead 
of taking responsibility for fixing the situation, politicians and Fed officials alike will 
declare that high unemployment is structural, beyond their control. And as I said, over time 
these excuses may turn into a self-fulfilling prophecy, as the long-term unemployed lose 
their skills and their connections with the work force, and become unemployable. I‘d like to 
imagine that public outrage will prevent this outcome. But while Americans are indeed 
angry, their anger is unfocused. And so I worry that our governing elite, which just isn‘t all 
that into the unemployed, will allow the jobs slump to go on and on and on.  
3.7 The Rise of the Global Precariat
149
  
Across most North Atlantic countries, the political actions transferring corporate debt 
to the public account could not have come at a worse time. Those most vulnerable, 
living in otherwise developed European nation states layered in debt, will fall through 
the social safety nets, victims of one of the most insidious economic escapades of our 
time. An economic and social framework supported by most Western governments 
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through three decades of neoliberalist regimes of high level greed and corruption, of 
massive personal and corporate profits, but now witness to the social class of citizen 
known as the precariat.  
Pakulski
150
 argued that global social inequalities are taking different forms than those 
of earlier periods, and that globalised inequalities are less structured than national 
class hierarchies are. Pakulski suggests that issues of democracy and elite power have 
shaped the inequalities that have come to prominence during the past decade of 
neoliberalism. Transformations of manufacturing and information technology to 
China and India have displaced millions of citizens in developed economies and 
―hollowed out‖ manufacturing ―heartlands of the United States, Europe and 
particularly the United Kingdom where the finance sector has been given full 
government support. Inequalities, high youth unemployment and social decline now 
feature as key negative transformations in many societies.   
If one accepts that the financial system has a political as well as economic dimension, 
then it follows that the political and economic effects have a social benefit and dis-
benefit. This altered state suggests a vast number of people who are suddenly 
disconnected from mainstream societal structures and become dislocated from 
systems. Guy Standing
151
 suggests that: 
Forty years ago, it was widely predicted that by now everybody would be working for 
income for about 20 hours a week, living in security and in professional positions of some 
kind. Instead, we have experienced the growth of a new and dangerously angry class, the 
precariat.  
The ―precariat‖ is a term now applied to millions of citizens living under precarious 
conditions of informal part-time employment, unaffordable private sector, or 
unavailable social housing systems, illegitimacy and illegality in state frameworks, 
and living out a threatened and precarious personhood, disengaged from the 
mainstream societal norms. New global precariat city dwellers are hireable on 
demand, available at call, exploitable at will, and fireable at whim. These vast 
―surplus new suburban populations‖ were previously driven into cities by the relative 
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urgency of the politically favoured neoliberal regimes, by the reorganisation of the 
countryside, by agribusiness, and as escapees from war ravaged or brutalising 
dictatorships, or by climate change. A precariat concentrated into segmented and 
unsupported spaces, as incubators of organised crime and disease
152
.  
These are the new city dwellers eking out a subsistence survival when promises of 
employment fail to eventuate and housing is unavailable. The precariat are the 
disadvantaged surplus populations, already displaced, even before the latest shock 
wave of dysfunction in global markets. Groupings described as the precariat exist and 
manifest  in countries like the United Kingdom and the United States, as 
manufacturing and industrialisation gave way to the chorus of political leaders who 
put their countries‘ growth into a macro-economic matrix of private financiers who 
themselves remain permanently shielded by tax havens and the extensive web of 
corporate and family trusts.  
Austerity measures across Europe will affect severely on the already disadvantaged in 
communities. In Australia, recent announcements of services reductions have seen 
many not for profit organisations saying they are simply unable to cope with the 
growing number of disenfranchised and homeless people presenting at their services. 
An ACOSS Australian Community Sector Survey
153
 revealed that there was a 12 per 
cent increase in assistance provided by agencies with 745 respondent agencies 
reporting provision of services on 6.180 million occasions in 2010 compared with 
5.513 million occasions in the year before. 
The International Labour Organisation
 
estimates that worldwide unemployment could 
rise by at least
 
30 million people, and possibly as much as 50 million people,
 
from 
2007 to 2009, if conditions continue to deteriorate. It
 
also expects that more than 200 
million people, mostly in developing
 
economies, will be pushed into poverty 
(Recommendations of the
 
UN Commission of Experts on Reforms of the International 
Monetary
 
and Financial System, 19 March 2009
154
, p. 2). According to
 
Greenspan, if 
one adds to the losses of the financial and listed
 corporate sector ―the thousands of 
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billions of dollars
 
of losses of equity in homes and losses of non-listed corporate
 
and 
unincorporated businesses that could easily bring the aggregate
 
equity loss to well 
over US$40 trillion, a staggering two-thirds
 of last year‘s global gross domestic 
product‖155 (Greenspan 2009).  
These vast ―surplus new suburban populations‖ (often citizens dislocated from 
subsistence farming) are relocated into cities by the relative urgency of the politically 
favoured neoliberal regimes, by the reorganisation of the countryside to agribusiness, 
and as escapees from war-ravaged areas. A precariat concentrated into segmented and 
unsupported spaces, as incubators of social unrest, organised crime, and disease.  
More recently, the precariat have been manipulated and exploited by political regimes 
of all persuasions from variously nefarious geographies to major cities in Europe, 
China to the United States.  
In China the precariat are persuaded to leave subsistence farming and become 
working consumers, amongst millions of like citizens providing growth in the 
economy of a strong communist social system. In the United States, the same type of 
authoritarian system tacitly supported lower income persons through mortgage 
originators into their own homes in a disaster that is yet to be concluded, let alone 
mitigated, by the four million plus mortgage holders who have walked away from or 
at risk of walking away from their now unaffordable home. As China continues its 
economic transformation from industrialisation to consumer-based growth, the 
apparent difference between state capitalism and welfare capitalist models in the West 
will become deeper.  
This is where, in the West, an effective interface between capital and social systems 
would be greatly enhanced by a financial transaction tax regime. This interface would 
link the disparate nature of political forces tending to now polarise between rentier 
capitalism in the West and state sanctioned capitalism in the East. 
 Three distinct phases map the structure and polarisation of political forces of both left 
and right persuasion. First is the regime of unregulated markets and the neoliberalist 
paradigm of concentrating wealth and corporate power, consolidated by formulating a 
highly specialised lobbyist machine to support new regime strategies for financial 
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engineering. Second is the winding down of the industrial and manufacturing bases in 
favour of global financial markets. Third is the establishment of high-level financial 
engineering enabled sophisticated ―state of the art‖ flash and algorithm trading 
mechanisms to capture the ―edge‖ in market technology. This leads to the dichotomy 
of social voids as a result of the boom and bust cyclical nature of finance and the de-
leveraging of unsustainable credit markets. This creates a social scenario of reduced 
services, high levels of unemployment, inability of citizens to maintain part-time 
employment, and the fractures that this causes across communities.  
Whatever political ―spin‖ is layered across the capacity of current governments to 
trade out of insolvency, and protect their citizens in hard times, there is no escaping 
the veracity, secrecy and political influence of lobbyists in the contemporary political 
economy phase. This existing phase is marked by excessive profits and the 
concentration of wealth, and is now marred by savage cuts in social services 
provision. Another unaddressed issue (as states battle to control sovereign debt) is the 
number of citizens looking to retire (particularly in the United States where the 
veracity of the public account to fund retirees is soon to be tested) and the states‘ 
reduced ability to fund the retirement programs in many European countries. As 
surely as neoliberalism has been a growing and dominant paradigm across developed 
and developing countries, the next phase of prolonged slow growth and recession will 
take place in economies tainted by high debt. This is a very political problem. 
The banking crisis that began in 2007 and became a global crisis in 2008 will 
probably represent a turning point in the history of capitalism. Besides being the most 
serious economic crisis that market-oriented, capitalist economies have faced since 
1929, it is also a social crisis. The International Labour Organization predicts that 
unemployment will have grown from around 20 million to 50 million by the end of 
2009. According to the Food and Agriculture Organization, as the incomes of the poor 
are falling due to the crisis but the international prices of food commodities remain 
high, the number of undernourished people in the world will increase by 11 per cent 
in 2009, and, for the first time, exceed one billion. The questions that this major and 
seemingly intractable social crisis raises are many. Why did it happen? Why did the 
theories, organisations and institutions that emerged from previous crises fail to 
prevent this present global sovereign debt crisis in Europe and the United States? 
Some economists and global leaders sought solutions.  
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3.8 The Minsky Phases  
Twenty-five years ago, when most economists were extolling the virtues of financial 
deregulation and innovation, a maverick economist named Hyman P. Minsky 
maintained a more negative view of Wall Street. Minsky noted that bankers, traders, 
and other financiers periodically played the role of arsonists, setting the entire 
economy ablaze. Minsky argued that the very logic of ―Wall Street capitalism‖ 
encouraged businesses and individuals to take on too much risk, he believed, 
generating ruinous boom-and-bust cycles. The only way to break this pattern was for 
the government to step in and regulate the moneymen.  
Many of Minsky‘s colleagues regarded his ―financial-instability hypothesis,‖ which 
he first developed in the 1960s, as radical. In the political climate of the United States 
economy in the 1970s and 1980s, Minsky was a pessimist: his vision of financial 
capitalism emphasised inherent capital market instability, and unpredictability of 
financial flows, rather than the optimality of free market specificity
156
. Today, with 
the European crisis seemingly on the verge of metamorphosing into a recession 
enveloping continents, references to the Minsky theory have become commonplace. 
Minsky‘s hypothesis is well worth revisiting. The first stage is recognising the market 
policy and making a correct diagnosis. 
There are five stages in Minsky‘s model of the credit cycle: displacement, boom, 
euphoria, profit taking, and panic. Kindleberger
157
 analysed hundreds of financial 
crises dating back centuries and found them to share a common sequence of events, 
one that followed monetary theorist Hyman Minsky‘s model of the instability of a 
credit system. Fundamentally, the more stable and prosperous an economic structure 
appears, the more leverage and speculative financing will build within the system, 
eventually making it highly vulnerable to a surprising, extreme collapse.  
A displacement occurs when investors get excited about something – an invention, 
such as the Internet, or a war, or an abrupt change of economic policy. The current 
cycle began in 2001, with the United States Federal Reserve chief Alan Greenspan‘s 
decision to reduce short-term interest rates to one per cent post September 11, 2001, 
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and an unexpected influx of foreign money, particularly Chinese money, into United 
States Treasury bonds. With the cost of borrowing – mortgage rates, in particular – at 
historic lows, a speculative real-estate boom quickly developed that was much bigger, 
in terms of over-all valuation, than the previous bubble in technology stocks. 
As a boom leads to euphoria, Minsky argued, banks and other commercial lenders 
extend credit to ever more dubious borrowers, often creating new financial 
instruments to do the job. During the 1980s, junk bonds played that role. More 
recently, it was the securitisation of mortgages, which enabled banks to provide home 
loans against the risk they would ever be repaid. Investors who bought the securities 
would be left to deal with any defaults in the real economy. In the shadow economy a 
vast array of exotic financial instruments were engineered to provide trade 
instruments for corporate and institutional market players. These instruments included 
collateralised mortgage obligations (CMOs), collateralised debt obligations (CDOs), 
and synthetic CDOs, to package up and structure securitised debt, and credit default 
swaps (CDS) to insure against insolvency. Structured investment vehicles (SIVs) 
provided the unregulated instruments (derivatives) for over-the-counter (OTC) trades. 
According to data available from the Bank for Financial Settlements (June 2007) 84 
per cent of all trades in derivatives is OTC
158
. Ninety-five per cent of all financial 
trades are speculative in nature and bare no relative good to the public. Unlike 
regulated exchanges in the real economy, the OTC market trading takes place on a 
one-to-one basis between the buyer and the seller and prices and volumes are not 
disclosed
159
. The Minsky model seems to chart a course for highly leveraged financial 
systems heading toward a collapse. Without state intervention and the transfer of 
public funds to the private sector, this system breakdown would be upon us. The 
following provides evidence of social decay falling into steep decline. 
3.9 Social Fallout and Incarceration 
In the United States, protracted unemployment is causing considerable concern both 
in terms of numbers and social issues related to support services. The worsening 
economic situation reduces state aid to services for the poor and unemployed. If job 
seekers were to find work at any sort of sustained rate it would take at least five years 
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for unemployment to reach an ―acceptable ― level of five per cent. Incarceration levels 
in the United States are at all-time high
160
. One in 200 Americans is incarcerated. 
A report in the United States
161
 analysed the recession-driven drop in wealth. As of 
December 2009, median white wealth had dipped 34 per cent to $94,600 and median 
black wealth had dropped an incredible 77 per cent to $2,100, leading Memphis 
mayor A.C. Wharton to say ―This cancer is metastasising into an economic crisis for 
the city, it‘s done more to set us back than anything since the beginning of the civil 
rights movement‖. The Bureau of Labour Statistics162 reported no change in the 
current record numbers of unemployed stating: 
Both the number of unemployed persons, at 14.6 million, and the unemployment rate, at 9.5 
per cent, were unchanged in July 2010. In July, the number of long-term unemployed (those 
jobless for 27 weeks and over) was little changed at 6.6 million. These individuals made up 
44.9 per cent of unemployed persons. The number of persons employed part time for 
economic reasons (sometimes referred to as involuntary part-time workers) was essentially 
unchanged over the month at 8.5 million but has declined by 623,000 since April. These 
individuals were working part time because their hours had been cut back or because they 
were unable to find a full-time job. About 2.6 million persons were ―marginally‖ attached to 
the labour force in July, an increase of 340,000 from a year earlier. These individuals were 
not in the labour force, wanted and were available for work, and had looked for a job 
sometime in the prior 12 months. They were not counted as unemployed because they had 
not searched for work in the 4 weeks preceding the survey.  
Whilst the shadow financial trades and interests remain as the political arm of the 
global neoliberal regime in most western and many non-western countries, its 
influence is felt most strongly in the English speaking world, especially in the United 
States and like all ideologies the regimes are evaluated by their consequences. 
Neoliberalism has brought to the United States a high level of inequality and an 
unparalleled level of wealth concentration to the masters of the capitalist paradigm.  
Between the mid-1970s and 2007, the gross domestic product of the United States 
trebled whilst during the same period the median income of Americans remained 
stagnant. During the Keynesian era 1970s and early 1980s, American CEOs earned 
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25–30 times the salaries of median workers‘ wages, but by 2007 it had reached 500 
times
163
. The top 10 hedge fund managers alone in the United States had average take 
home pays in excess of US$500 million in 2006. The financialisation of the United 
States and Western economies has been created by a coalition of the financially 
wealthy against a degradation of services and conditions for the vast majority of 
citizens now embracing record debt levels.  
Despite well scripted political statements that sub-prime borrowers were at fault for 
optimistic loan expectations that could not be met, the underlying cause of the so-
called sub-prime meltdown was the voracious appetite of the booming derivatives 
markets to engineer securitised investment vehicles calibrated to accept tranches of 
high risk housing mortgages to roll into collateralised debt obligations, and insured 
through credit default swaps to sell off around the world as the new sophisticated way 
to invest. The social fallout from this three-year financial dysfunction is still to be 
played out. Government bailouts for sovereign debt-affected states are now really 
continuums of loans as financial integration through neighbour nation states is 
complex. All nation states are affected. Only one third of the terminal international 
financial market toxic debt has been located and ameliorated by the use of taxpayer 
funds. The remaining debt is virtually unpayable by states already laden with public 
account debt. The outlook for social services for those already affected is bleak. The 
inevitable intersection will be played out between strongly lobbied politicians 
protecting the spaces between sovereignty of states and shadow economy operatives. 
The consequences will inevitably fall to disadvantaged civil society already weakened 
through absorption of debt and a growing precariat whose mass will rise substantially. 
3.10 Housing Market Dysfunction  
The immediate effects of rapid escalation of financial liquidity was extremely fast 
growth in United States private housing sector. Between the 1980s and the late 1990s, 
homeownership was around 64 per cent of all dwellings. By mid-2005, the American 
dream of home ownership (and its concomitant associated benefits of stable 
communities, schools, and a solid base for developing family finances), realised 
homeownership rates of 69 per cent. The new entrants to homeownership were 
                                                          
163
 Robert Manne and David McKnight. ―Death throes of the neo-liberal delusion‖ based on the chapter 
―Goodbye to All That? On the Failure of Neo-Liberalism and the Urgency of Change.‖ The Monthly 
March 2011.  
  
Chapter 3 – The Social Consequences of Financial Markets 96 
disproportionately African American and Latino families (through the agency of sub-
prime, Alt-A, and ARM mortgage facilitators), becoming homeowners in the 
burgeoning wastelands across the country that were rapidly transposed as developing 
subdivisions and streets with no names.  
Mortgage lenders by 2003 were having difficulty finding enough people to sign up to 
housing loans so they settled on signing NINJA (No Income/No Jobs/No Assets) 
clients to ―honeymoon loan‖ mortgages, with low initial rates, then rates getting 
higher and unaffordable as the cycle progressed. Sub-prime loans jumped from an 
annual volume of US$145 billion in 2001 to $625 billion in 2005. More than a third 
of all loans represented more that the value of the property
164
. This large-scale 
liquidity directed at home buyers lasted through to early 2007 when the market, 
saturated with new debt levels, started to see a wave of mortgage defaults as rates 
climbed out of the early ―honeymoon‖ rate periods. 
The nation was witnessing the greatest sale of home mortgage products in United 
States history. Purchasing turned to a default epidemic in 2007–2008, deteriorating 
into a housing and social nightmare of proportions unseen in any other time. It was 
driven by corporate madness, excessive, non-sustainable and irrational, but with no 
political resistance. During this period the Bush Administration (United States), Blair 
Government (United Kingdom), and the Howard Government (Australia) did not 
attempt to curb the tide. The most irrational events were the things that did not happen 
during the escalation of money coming into countries as credit for consumers. 
Politicians failed to warn consumers that markets were actually working against each 
other; that the behaviour of market players was schizophrenic, without rules, and 
investments were inherently risky. As social risk became a political risk, politicians 
orchestrated their responses in favour of the capital market players.  
In 2007, a paper appeared in the, Environment and Planning A, charting how 
American mortgage markets (well known for discrimination by exclusion) had come 
to ―operate as venues of segmentation and discrimination by inclusion: credit is 
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widely available, but its terms vary enormously'‖165 . Wyly et al in their paper 
describing the ―sub-prime phenomenon note: 
Discriminatory exclusion persists in some submarkets, but is now accompanied by 
discriminatory inclusion and segmentation: a specialized breed of financial institutions 
working with real-estate industry actors and secondary-market investors has propelled 
dramatic growth in `subprime' lending. As used in the industry, subprime refers not to below 
prime interest rate, but rather to lenders‘ judgments of less-than-perfect borrowers ... the 
rapidly growing subprime market provides fertile ground for abuse, fraud, and exploitation 
in a syndrome known as predatory lending ... .Activists and advocates who have fought for 
years against practices that unfairly excluded qualified minorities are now faced with 
aggressive predators who have found ways to extract profits even when high-risk loans force 
borrowers into delinquency, default and foreclosure. 
Hedge funds and institutional lenders supported booming real estate businesses 
securitising and rolling up mortgages into collateralised debt obligations and hundreds 
of billions of US dollars began rolling into markets as ―carry trade‖ finance 
(borrowing low and lending long) money came through the United States from host 
nations Japan, China, Korea, and other East Asian countries.  
This was the start of the ―buying back our money‖ fiscal policy enacted by the United 
States Administration of President George W. Bush. Enablers were a fiscal policy of 
low interest rates, collusive politics between financial interests and policymakers, 
sophisticated IT systems, and the process of creating free trade agreements to 
governments in order to create a wider consumer audience. Free trade in finance 
agreements proved particularly useful for Australia. Australia‘s agreement was 
finalised shortly after the Howard Government‘s commitment to the ―Coalition of the 
Willing‖ agreement for engagement in the Iraq War. Australia was courted by the 
United States to sign the agreement. Prior to this, the United States and Australia had 
limited commitments to free trade to selected geographically aligned countries.  
Two decades of growth in the neoliberalist ―free‖ market economy in the United 
States delivered US$8 trillion in housing wealth alone. The agreement with the United 
States delivered the finance to drive the housing ―bubble‖ in Australia from 2001. 
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In the past decade, it is estimated that up to eight million American families lost their 
homes due the twin socioeconomic events of automatically resetting mortgages 
engulfing the sub-prime borrowers along with huge rises in unemployment rates. 
Almost 11 million homeowners in the United States owe more on their mortgage 
contracts than their homes are worth
166
. This is a major social catastrophe. It is a 
catastrophe that London School of Economics Professor Willem Buiter cited in an 
article entitled ―Home Loans in the US: the biggest racket since Al Capone‖167. 
Interestingly, Buiter is critical of a plan put forward by President Obama to allow 
distressed borrowers to try to renegotiate mortgage repayments, calling it (the plan) ―a 
tax on the prudent to subsidise the imprudent that is both inefficient and unfair‖, 
echoing growing sentiment in the United States that there is a limit on the taxpayer 
support that should be offered to corporations or citizens who have willingly 
undertaken risk.  
In contrast to Buiter, the former Chief Economist with the International Monetary 
Fund, Simon Johnson, argues strongly that the social cost to nations represents 
immense hardship in respect to personal, community and government outcomes. In 
addition, those governments have a high level of responsibility to lessen the damage 
from wholesale foreclosures. Writing in the New Republic
168
 Johnson suggests: 
It‘s important to know that there is a clear case to be made for using taxpayer money to 
reduce the number of foreclosures and help homeowners refinance their mortgages. On the 
negative side, foreclosures destroy economic value in several ways: transaction costs push 
foreclosure itself; reduced value of foreclosed houses, and impact on houses in the 
neighbourhood; reduced property taxes for local governments; and increased crime due to 
vacant houses. The death spiral of foreclosure-forced sales, falling house prices, and further 
foreclosures needs to be broken.  
During the past decade (2002–2012), policy settings enabled loose credit to most 
developed countries, especially those with special status through the ―Coalition of the 
Willing‖. Carry trade finance169 at very low rates (ex Japan at 0.5 per cent) was 
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introduced by hedge funds into countries like Australia to finance a housing blitz, 
with mortgages at rates of six per cent or lower. Unregulated lenders proliferated in 
Australia with easy money outlets opening in cities and country towns offering as 
much money as consumers requested. This scene was replicated across the United 
Kingdom, Ireland, Spain, Greece, and Iceland where a burgeoning financial services 
industry started to make a mark on lending and corporate services. 
To accompany the almost free money, a new asset class of credit derivative, credit 
default swaps (CDSs) were devised that insured banks issuing collateralised debt 
obligations (CDOs), against loan defaults. Brokers took their profits (commissions) up 
front, packaged the risk as securitised parcels of CDOs, thus ensuring that the risk was 
passed off to investors, both local and global.  
An independent survey ―Asset Price Bubbles and Monetary Policy‖ released by the 
European Central Bank in 2005
170
 was scathing of the ―fast easy money policies‖ in 
the United States and stated, in part, ―As households are typically encouraged to 
spend out of their capital gains when asset prices advance, durable and sizable 
bubbles can boost consumer expenditure… In this respect, empirical evidence tends to 
suggest that a deflating bubble in the housing market is more costly than an equally 
sized crash in the stock market, as housing equity is more widespread and more 
intensely used as collateral for securing credit‖. This housing market failure and the 
subsequent systemic toxic debt endemic in financial instruments have caused a 
protracted global downturn, Home buyers and credit users with loans on cars, 
consumer goods, and plasma televisions are now wondering who to blame for the 
predicaments that threaten to place them in a financial bind for a generation. The 
contagion becomes a double bind for those now losing employment whilst at the same 
time watching the equity dissipate from housing and superannuation investments. It is 
socially unacceptable. Peter Costello and former Prime Minister John Howard 
encouraged the free market paradigm, signed a free trade agreement enabling 
excessive carriage of cheap finance into Australia, oversaw the massive housing 
bubble and were clearly at the wheel as Australians became the largest borrowers per 
head of population in the world. They should be made accountable. 
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The story is similar across most developed countries suffering from the intractable 
pain of a sovereign debt crisis as the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis. Across 
Europe and particularly in the United Kingdom where banks, homes, businesses, and 
the once mighty investment houses which effectively delivered strong gross domestic 
product growth to the United Kingdom‘s economy via the City and Canary Wharf 
investment centres in London, have hit the wall. It is estimated that the net loss to 
each taxpayer in the United Kingdom, from combined stock market downturns, loss 
of equity in houses and property, and decline in savings, is in the vicinity of £40,000. 
The downturn has obliterated 1.2 trillion pounds from Britain‘s national wealth171. 
Analyst Dharval Joshi of RAB Capita
172
 suggests the combined impact of the share 
market and property downturn has been equivalent to the loss of a full years economic 
output in the United Kingdom. 
3.11 America’s Rotting Foundations 
These figures could be far worse. Economics analyst David Rosenberg of the firm 
Gluskin Sheff has reported that two thirds of American homeowners have a mortgage 
(approximately 56 million in total). Half of these mortgages are guaranteed by Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac, the government-sponsored enterprises, themselves so heavily 
financed with taxpayer funds during the Global Financial Crisis. The two 
government-funded entities are extremely fragile and will be even more so if the 
current rate of mortgage default continues. Another 35 per cent of the portfolios are 
with banks of various types across the nation.  
Prolonging the social dilemma for governments is the dynamic that money supply to 
the public account in states around the world is shrinking. Ratings agency Standard 
and Poor‘s 173recently released a report estimating an amount of up to US$46 trillion 
would be needed to bailout the non-bank financial sector by 2015. In addition, the 
regime of taxpayer bailouts of the private sector has substantially drained the public 
                                                          
171
 ―Official: 40,000 Pound loss for every taxpayer‖ The Observer. 25 January 2009. 
172
 Dharval, Joshi in Barry Riholtz. ―The $4 trillion dollar question.‖ The Big Picture. 15 July 2020. 
173
 Gareth Vaughan.  Interest.Co.Nz. May 11 2015. ―Standard and Poor‘s warns of potential US$46 
trillion 'perfect storm' in global credit markets. Credit rating agency Standard & Poor's says a global 
"wall" of non-bank debt needed to meet companies' funding requirements over the next five years is 
increasing the risk of a perfect storm developing in global corporate credit markets. .Standard and 
Poors says non-financial corporations in the Eurozone, Britain, United States, China, and Japan need 
between US$43 trillion and US$46 trillion over the next five years. This includes US$30 trillion of 
debt to be refinanced (with three-quarters of this between 2012 and 2016), and US$13 trillion to US$16 
trillion of new money (for capital expenditure and working capital) that S&P estimates is required to 
spur economic growth‖. 
  
Chapter 3 – The Social Consequences of Financial Markets 101 
account. This may well be the prime determinant of continued economic slowdown. 
The supply measurement known as M3 or ―broad money‖ – all the money there is on 
loan or in circulation – has been contracting at a rate of almost 10 per cent annually in 
the United States.  
Since the beginning of the global credit crunch following the Global Financial Crisis, 
central banks have been printing new stimulus money at an unprecedented rate, 
desperately adding liquidity to a financial system in danger of freezing up. M0, the 
narrowest measure (piquantly called ―high powered money‖) is the only part of the 
money supply controlled by central banks and it has dissipated considerably since 
September 2008 with the collapse of Lehman Brothers. Investment bank funds dried 
up in the scramble to deleverage toxic and real debt. It is this discrepancy between the 
narrow and broad money supply that bodes very badly for the future. China now holds 
US$1.170 trillion in United States Treasury debt bonds (almost as much as the annual 
produced wealth of Russia). Bulard
174
 argues, ―China‘s leaders even in their wildest 
nationalist dreams could not have imagined a more spectacular reversal of history 
than that the United States should be chastened and no longer top of the (capitalist) 
class, appealing to China to bail it out and boost world growth.‖  
United States Chairman of the Federal Reserve Ben Bernanke was a respected scholar 
of the Great Depression. Bernanke‘s explanation is that the spread of that calamity 
centred on the abject failure of bank intermediation. In the early 1930s, as more and 
more banks failed, they took with them their particularised knowledge of their 
customers‘ credit risk, which made lending riskier and thus less likely. It is again the 
unwillingness of banks to lend that may deepen the current downturn
175
. The rise of 
M0 and the fall of M3 suggest that from both a Monetarist and a Keynesian 
perspective, deflation is becoming likely.  
3.12 Conclusion 
This chapter has described the social consequences that occur when financial systems 
become unstable. The chapter describes the rise of wealth through three decades of 
neoliberalist free market regimes where household and corporate wealth were realised 
through deliberate policy settings which encouraged specific economic policy 
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prescriptions to ―reform‖ financial markets and create free trade amongst states and 
financial interests. Broadly termed ―the Washington Consensus‖176 the policy advice 
had been the formative structure through which the United States provided funding 
and aid responses in the dynamic growth periods through to the Global Financial 
Crisis (GFC). High-level wealth creation was also enabled through the post GFC 
period by the expansion of international finance trade by hedge funds and 
sophisticated information technology expansion.  
Some sections of the global economy were affected by the GFC but have remained 
buoyant and sustainable (international, unregulated over-the-counter banking and 
financial markets/shadow economy), whilst real economies burdened with debt are 
facing considerable periods of adjustment and social pain. These issues have arisen 
during earlier episodes of financial and concomitant regional destabilisation; it is only 
recently that the economic dysfunction that displaced millions in other countries, 
Southeast Asia, South America and Russia is producing similar challenges to western 
societies. Arguments brought forward in past decades remain the same.  
Thompson
177
  observed that the challenge to the nation state‘s ability to regulate 
national economic conditions is illustrated by the Asian financial crisis of 1997. The 
severe depreciation of several Southeast Asian currencies was initially triggered by 
predatory offshore currency speculation. While the currency markets may not appear 
to have much direct connection with the lives of most people not involved in financial 
investing, the social repercussions of the crisis were considerable. World Bank 
statistics for Thailand (1999) reveal that between 1996 and 1998, the suicide rate 
increased by 40 per cent, the rate of abandoned newborns and orphanage admissions 
increased by 20 per cent, and the number of children being treated for drug abuse rose 
by 200 per cent. While this reflects no simple cause and effect relationship, the point 
is that the political and economic conditions under which the majority of the world‘s 
population exists are subject to the influence of the global financial markets. Yet the 
market actors responsible for these increasingly unpredictable capital flows work for 
                                                          
176
 John Williamson. First presented in 1989, Williamson, an economist with Institute for International 
Economics used the term to summarise conditions and policy advice by Washington based institutions 
such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, and the United states Treasury Department.  
177
Peter Thompson. "The Political Economy of Information in the Global Financial Markets and their 
Insulation from Democratic Accountability." Paper presented to the Political Economy International 
Association for Media and Communication Research for the IAMCR Conference 2004, Porto Alegre, 
Brazil, July 25- 30, 2004.  
  
Chapter 3 – The Social Consequences of Financial Markets 103 
institutions which eschew any democratic accountability and which operate in virtual 
economic spaces that are becoming increasingly insulated from state 
intervention/regulation. 
Increasingly developed and developing nation states around the world continue to be 
dominated by the new controlling political economy powers of unregulated capital 
players in the form of central banks, hedge funds or high-net-worth individuals. The 
crisis in global social poverty has increased.  
Three macroeconomic and political circumstances are influencing the future. The first 
relates to the changing balance of power between the West and the developing nation 
states in the East. This chapter has described the influence of the East upon the West 
financially. Second, the weakened economic conditions in the developed nation states 
of the West have their own fracture lines as the state has transferred vast amounts 
from the national public account to bailout banks, stimulate economies and rescue the 
private sector, thus substantially weakening the ability of the state services. The third 
and most important point is that regime change to debate and promote more equitable 
distribution systems, including a global financial tax, have been suffocated by the 
political influence of high-net-worth individuals who have the financial and lobbyist 
collusion with politicians to protect their selfish interests. This last point overrides the 
first issue, which could be managed by diplomacy. The second and third issues are 
possibly insurmountable given the massive concentration of wealth and influence 
derided by the capital elites over several decades. Even though a financial transaction 
tax would impact very slightly on the speculative trading market, it is 
disproportionately refuted at high political levels. The speculative transaction sector is 
miniscule in the scheme of the global society but holds an excessive control over 
political mechanisms and influence. It is the end of an era of excess at the top global 
political and corporate levels. It is the end of a growth period in the world that has 
produced high levels of wealth. An excess that has flowed through to citizens of 
countries around the world with the assistance of governments, ratings agencies, 
institutional players, hedge funds and anonymous capital tycoons secreted in tax 
havens.  
Chapter 4 argues a case for systemic change and proposes a framework to implement 
a socially progressive policy instrument in the form of a Financial Transaction Tax.  
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Chapter 4 
Financial Systems Analysis 
4.1 Introduction 
The aim of Chapter 4 is to provide an analysis of political, economic and social 
linkages that are embedded in global political economy systems. These linkages 
provide an explanation of theories underpinning the current global financial and 
sovereign debt crises. Chapter 4 builds on the arguments set out in Chapters 2 
(Financialisation of Global Markets) and Chapter Three (The Social Consequences of 
Financial Markets).  
Chapter 2 formulated and explained the processes of financialisation of markets and 
the regime of socialisation of credit as the underpinning cause of the global financial 
and sovereign debt crisis. Chapter 3 proposed an explanation of how speculative 
markets have delivered extreme negative social consequences within developed nation 
states. Chapter 4 posits the view that tensions between global ―shadow‖ economies 
and ―real‖ economies of developed nation states have had serious effects on most state 
capacities to provide civil society services, stable national accounts, and social 
programs.  
Current systems of global political economy suggest a strong shadow finance system 
influence which contrasts radically to outcomes in real economies of most developed 
and developing countries. Shadow finance systems have, in recent times, heavily 
deleveraged from investments in stocks and shares (in regulated economies) to 
concentrate on derivatives in a new financial architecture that avoids ―the concept of 
conservative banking
178
 altogether‖. This dynamic is quantified by the unprecedented 
growth in over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives markets, which expanded
179
 by US$106 
trillion, to US$707 trillion, between December 2010 and June 2011.
180
 Real 
―domestic‖ economies remain disconnected, deflated, and detached in terms of debt 
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ratios to gross domestic product (GDP), as evidenced within European Union 
economies struggling with default and an inability to sustain growth
181
.  
In Australia these altered economic circumstances are defined, and referred to as a 
―two-speed economy‖. The Australian two-speed economy is essentially a 
manifestation of the global contest of faltering and failing financial systems 
competing against the emergence of rapidly expanding economies in Southeast Asia, 
South America and Indian sub-continent. It is essentially an economic contest 
between savings-oriented Eastern economies, led by China, and consumer-based 
Western nation states. Optimism about economies in Asia and pessimism about 
economies in the West is likely to be the prevailing mood of the current decade 
(2012–2022).  
Australia has emerged as one of the strongest and most resilient economies in the 
developed world due in large part to unique geographical and natural minerals 
abundance. Australia has received exponential returns on resource wealth and is in 
close proximity to emerging economies India and China. Australia has also expanded 
its international standing in the shadow economy sector as quantified in terms of OTC 
derivative trades, which had grown to US$3 trillion (notional amounts outstanding) by 
December 2010
182
. Politically Australia is positioning its economic growth as a centre 
of financial trade in the East Asia area. It is allied to the United States by a formal 
trade agreement. 
Even though the United States‘ economy is now recovering marginally (early 2012), 
an apparent inability to control the federal budget deficit and a rising national debt 
present a picture of both economic and political malaise. Similarly, the threat of 
sovereign-debt crises continues to hover over the European Union – and the European 
Union‘s response has so far been anything but convincing (see Chapter 3). The 
conventional wisdom is that a profound shift of economic and structural political 
power from West to East is indeed underway. The question is whether the transition 
will be smooth or turbulent. Social indices would suggest that most developed states 
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are locked in a protracted political and economic crisis. Their relativity focus has 
become more regional. 
Within political economy systems debate, there is evidence of a new phase of 
globalisation. The United States alleges Chinese currency manipulation, as China 
allows its currency to appreciate as the Chinese consumer market begins to fulfil its 
potential. The relationship between China and the United States is seen as a 
microcosm of the new relationship between emerging and developed nation states. 
The largest player in global systems architecture is China. This economy is 
transforming. It is transitioning from its industrial production stage, which has 
maintained high GDP growth for two decades. The changes have been deliberate in 
terms of risk avoidance as China‘s main consumer systems markets of Europe and the 
United States have been challenged and are in economic decline since the Global 
Financial Crisis of 2008. The transition in China from an industrial export and 
investment-led economy, to a consumption economy marks a major strategic change, 
which will affect China, and possibly global momentum.  
According to the optimistic scenario, the Western world will abandon any flirtation 
with protectionism, as it increasingly realises that the growth markets for the West‘s 
large company‘s lies with the emergent states of China, India and Brazil, and East 
Asia. 
For neoliberal economies, this global and local crisis reveals fault lines in lax global 
regulation and supervision, misplaced political support of tax havens, tax free zones, 
and liberalised economic spaces to privileged players. This raises fundamental issues 
about future approaches for a system that has a political capacity to reform 
burgeoning speculative financial trading regimes to the benefit of global citizens 
through appropriate tax mechanisms. An ethical global tax system would provide an 
economic return to ameliorate some of the negative consequences delivered by 
shadow banking and dysfunction in financial markets. Neoliberal economies cannot 
support both ailing corporate structures and lose billions to tax havens.  
The essence of the problem – as the Governor of the Bank of England, Mervyn King 
(May 2012)
183
 has stated – is that global banking institutions are global in life, but 
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national in death. Dysfunction in banking and investment systems fall through to 
local markets. This occurs frequently when international financial systems falter, and 
citizens of states are penalised. King describes this new dynamic as a ―crisis in 
capitalism.‖  
Before describing the emerging movement toward a financial transaction tax and 
presenting the models that have been brought forward, it is important to describe the 
international political and economic relationships that are prominent and emerging as 
system-based factors that differentiate shadow economies from local based nation 
states‘ real economies.  
Brock
184
 (2011) argues that increasingly we are ―living in the age of economists, the 
Age of Larry Summers, as it were, but economists have less and less say about the 
important issues of our time‖. Further, Brock suggests that:  
the term economic imperialism has been circulated for three decades. It refers to the reality 
that, of all social sciences, economics has emerged as the most relevant, most useful, and 
most rigorous discipline. Its perspective on social behaviour and its analytical methods have 
invaded every facet of sociology, political science, and social psychology.  
Three main themes will be drawn in this chapter. First, the global regimes of 
unregulated, and politically sanctioned trades through offshore financial centres, is 
explained in terms of the changing nature and consolidation of trades from a wide 
range of offshore entities to the modern politically sanctioned centres of Cayman 
Islands, Wall Street and the City of London. Second, this increased offshore activity 
promotes the concentration of wealth, exorbitant privilege, and a political dilemma for 
governments supporting capital players whilst grappling with high levels of sovereign 
debt in real economies, and negative circumstances for civil society. Third, structural 
financial systems have created considerable tensions for elected governments; on the 
one hand pressing for fiscal growth in a time of high crisis, and on the other proposing 
radical services cuts to electorates already under intense socioeconomic constraints. 
Against these changes, the central question of this thesis is reinforced. Is the 
introduction of a global financial transaction tax a plausible and sustainable economic 
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and social policy mechanism to stabilise financial fragility and contribute resources in 
order to ameliorate the damage dysfunctional shadow finance has on nation states? 
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4.2 The Growth of Financial Systems 
Montani (2011) argues that the 2007–2000 financial crises caused a dramatic fall in 
global output and employment and a serious deterioration of public indebtedness for 
many governments forced to rescue the banking system from failure. The crisis 
showed that national governments are not able to regulate the global market by means 
of the traditional instruments
185
 of political economy. Speculative trading technology 
mechanisms have increased whist macro wealth in real economies has decreased. 
Specific national banking crises in the past have been more severe – for instance, the 
collapse of the United States banking system between 1929 and 1933 and the resultant 
depression. What is unique about this crisis is that severe financial problems have 
emerged simultaneously in many different countries, and that its economic impact is 
being felt throughout the world as a result of the increased interconnectedness of 
economic and political systems within the global political economy.  
Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas and Helene Rey argue that the leading global economy, and 
the central country in the International Monetary System, the United States of 
America (US), has enjoyed an ―exorbitant privilege‖ in global financial circles186. 
They (Gourinchas and Rey) contend that the last two decades of have been 
characterised by a sharp increase in international systems‘ capital flows and in 
particular by the rising dynamic of globalisation of equity markets
187
, especially 
derivatives trading designed specifically as speculative trades inherent in the types of 
network sophistication that avoid regulation, governance and oversight. These are 
networks harboured in tax havens and tax free zones.  
This does not mean, at this point, that economic recession, which many countries in 
the world now face, will be as severe as that of 1929–33. The crisis of the early 1930s 
was made worse by policy responses, which can be – and are being – avoided today. 
However, it is clear that however effective the policy response, the ongoing economic 
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and social cost of the financial crisis will be very large and will engulf countries with 
little or no connection to speculative trades. Social consequences from this crisis are 
extremely disruptive and far-reaching, and regionally systematic in nature. Europe‘s 
chronic sovereign debt positions affect consumer purchases originating in East Asia. 
An East Asian consequential downturn flows to Australia, which supplies 
commodities to China and India. Slowing economies in East Asia dampen capacities 
to continually purchase debt bonds to service United States debt level in this system.  
We therefore need to ask profound questions about what went wrong, whether past 
intellectual assumptions about the nature of financial risk were seriously mistaken, or 
deliberately ignored, and what needs to be done to reduce the probability and the 
severity of future financial crises. An examination of regulatory approaches indicates 
systemic failure at both global and nation state levels. It indicates close collusion 
between economic and political elites. The secret and sophisticated technological 
approach of automated high-speed algorithm traders has enabled large quantum 
capital convoys across most developed countries. High-speed traders have the 
capacity to bet up (or short trade) national currencies. Hedge funds and their high-net-
worth individuals‘ interests utilise legal tax free zone status in dispersed offshore 
havens.  
At the same time, the United States has become a net borrower. Economist Ben 
Bernanke
188
 (2005) explained the huge increase in the United States‘ current account 
deficit as ―a remarkable reversal in the flows of credit to developing and emerging-
market economies, a shift that has transformed those economies from borrowers on 
the international capital markets to large net lenders‖.. These systems‘ growth regimes 
have been politically supported. 
In essence, the new global financial system, combined with global (East versus West) 
macroeconomic imbalances, helped create unsustainable credit boom and asset price 
inflation. Those features then played a crucial role in reinforcing the severity of the 
financial crisis and in transmitting financial system problems into real economy 
downturns. The shock to the banking system has been so great that it has impaired the 
financial system‘s ability to extend credit to the real economy. This dynamic 
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continues to play a major role in exacerbating economic downturn. This, in turn, 
undermines banking system strength in a self-reinforcing feedback loop. The current 
level of public debt as a percentage of gross domestic product in Europe is an example 
of the deeply embedded underlying structures that are likely to restrain growth for a 
long period of time. Belgium (100.2 per cent), Italy (118.4 per cent) and Greece (130 
per cent) are all higher in percentage terms than Ireland
189
. 
Any agenda for regulatory reform therefore needs to address both the systemic factors 
which drove the initial over-extension of credit, and the factors which have played a 
crucial role by deepening the crisis and increasing the length and severity of the 
aftermath. Reforms should include responses to: 
 The massive growth and increasing complexity of the securitised credit 
model, underpinned by inadequate capital requirements against trading 
books, which facilitated unsustainable growth in credit extension to 
households and to some parts of the corporate sector. 
 An ethical approach to regulating and taxing cross-border capital flows 
through the introduction of a global financial tax across all trade corridors. 
 Extensive commercial bank involvement in trading activities, which meant 
that falling asset prices have had a large and rapid effect on bank 
profitability, and in turn on perceptions of their credit worthiness, creating a 
collapse in bank funding liquidity. 
 High leverage in multiple forms, which helped drive the rapid growth in 
credit extension and asset prices, and which increased the vulnerability of 
the system, since asset price falls had an amplified impact on system capital 
adequacy. 
 The complexity and opacity of the structured credit and derivatives system, 
built upon a misplaced reliance on sophisticated mathematics, which, once 
irrational exuberance disappeared, contributed to a collapse in confidence 
in credit ratings, huge uncertainty about appropriate prices, and a lack of 
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trust that published accounting figures captured the reality of emerging 
problems. 
 Lack of adequate capital buffers, as a result of which commercial banks‘ 
losses have driven falling confidence in the banking system, impairing the 
ability of the banking system to extend credit, and creating a powerful 
feedback loop between banking system stress and downturn in the real 
economy. 
Macro-imbalances in the finances of the United States, the world‘s biggest economy 
are showing considerable signs of distress. By the end of June 2011, US borrowings 
were at a record US$15 trillion, more than the total for the Eurozone as a whole. 
Many political economists and political science students are asking, ―is America 
bust?‖190  
President Obama is promising to halve the budget deficit by 2013 and stabilise the 
debt at just over 70 per cent of GDP by 2015, but bipartisan political support for 
reform has not been reached. The first target date is just two years away and no one 
knows quite how that will be achieved. Politicians cannot agree on a compromise.  
While countries across Europe are announcing austerity packages, Spain is cutting 
€15 billion, Germany €80 billion – the United States administration‘s instinct is to 
spend its way out of recession. US President Obama failed to persuade the rest of the 
G20 about the benefits of increasing spending in the face of the global crisis, yet he is 
also having little success in persuading people at home of the need for austerity. As 
one of the few western countries that still has the wherewithal to keep spending 
through printing currency in quantitative easing tranches of stimulus funding, the 
United States has been a big component of the negative global economic outlook as it 
increases indebtedness.  
Kenneth Rogoff, Harvard Professor, whose book This Time it Is Different
191
 is the 
definitive analysis of the history of financial crises, accuses the United States of 
storing up trouble for itself by using a trick called ―playing the yield curve‖: taking 
advantage of the fact that the rates for short-term borrowing are lower than for longer-
                                                          
190
 Heather Connon. ―Is America going Bust?‖ Prospect Magazine 19 August 2011. 
191
 Kenneth S, Rogoff and Carmen M. Reinhart ―This Time it is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial 
Folly.‖ Amazon Press, New York. 2011. 
  
Chapter 4 – Financial Systems Analysis 113 
term debt. About half of United States debt matures in the next three years (2012–
2014), a far higher proportion of short-term debt than it has had at any time in the 
past, and a far shorter maturity profile than other economies: the average for United 
Kingdom, for example, is 14 years. It is worth remembering that the Greek crisis was 
triggered by the need to refinance short-term borrowings, forcing the country into its 
crisis €110 billion bailout and €35 billion cuts package. 
No one expects the United States to need such a bailout, but the huge amount of debt 
which will need to be refinanced in the next three years means it is vulnerable to a 
―buyers‘ strike‖, should investors decide there are better opportunities elsewhere, or to 
demand higher yields for the increased risks of the rising deficit. Much depends on the 
attitude of the Chinese Government, which currently holds around half of all US debt. 
So far, China has shown no inclination to stop buying it, but the risks that the appetite 
could wane are already evident. China is moving gradually to a free float of its 
currency, ending the dollar peg, which could eventually cut the supply of dollars to its 
export earners. 
It also means the United States is missing the opportunity to lock into long-term rates, 
which, while higher than short-term ones, are still very low by historical standards. As 
this stands, a small rise in interest rates could have a big impact. Jim Leaviss, head of 
retail fixed interest at fund managers M&G, points out that a two per cent rise in 
interest rates across all maturity levels could push the United States‘ interest bill from 
the current ―troubling‖ 17 per cent of revenues‖ to around 33 per cent. That, says 
Leaviss ―could put economic recovery at risk.‖192 
Such a rise in rates looks unlikely in the near future. Even the most hawkish of 
economists thinks that interest rates will stay low for at least another year to keep the 
recovery going. That recovery, and the tax revenues it will generate, is vital to keep 
the faith that the United States will be able to deal with its deficit. But Rogoff points 
out that judging by historical standards, the higher the budget deficit, the lower 
economic growth tends to be: his (Rogoff‘s) rule of thumb is that, at a deficit of 30 
per cent of GDP, growth will average 3.7 per cent; at more than 90 per cent – which 
the US will reach this year – it falls to 1.7 per cent. Through 2012, this level has just 
been achieved.  
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With a worsening European sovereign debt crisis, debt maintenance, austerity cuts 
and public anger, America‘s status as a safe haven may not change in the near future. 
Analysts at Barclays Capital argue that the dollar‘s status as a reserve currency means 
it can run far bigger deficits than other countries. Without that status, the United 
States‘ credit rating would already been downgraded from AAA to AA, the same as 
Spain. However, as long as its currency remains more than half the world‘s reserves – 
currently it is 60 per cent – a downgrade looks unlikely. The consequences of system 
breakdowns remain at high risk in a rapidly changing world. 
The last decade has seen an explosion of world financial system macro-imbalances. 
China, and some other East Asian emerging developing nations have accumulated 
very large current account surpluses, while large current account deficits have 
emerged in North Atlantic developed economies of the USA, UK, Ireland, Spain, 
Germany, Greece and Italy amongst other countries. Many economies carry 
substantial outstanding national debt without the ability to reduce debt other than by 
reduction in public account expenditure in the form of the much-vaunted austerity. 
A key driver of those imbalances has been very high savings rates in countries like 
China; since these high savings exceed domestic investment, China and other 
countries must accumulate claims on the rest of the world. China‘s savings philosophy 
mirrors that of other East Asian countries which have accumulated very high current 
account surpluses on the back of consumer spending and debt acquisition in the 
United States, Australia, United Kingdom and most developed countries that operate 
under neoliberal philosophies. However, since, in addition, China and several other 
surplus countries are committed to fixed, or significantly managed exchange rates, 
these rising claims take the form of central bank reserves. These are typically invested 
not in a wide array of equity, property or fixed income assets, but almost exclusively 
in apparently risk-free or close to risk-free government bonds or government 
guaranteed bonds (see Figure 4.1). 
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Figure 4.1193: Global Current Account Balances 1993 - 2008. 
 
Figure 4.2194: Foreign Ownership of Marketable Bonds as percentage of Amounts 
Outstanding, Dec 1994 - Jun 2007. 
This in turn has driven a reduction in real risk-free rates of interest to historically low 
levels (Figure 4.3).  
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Figure 4.3: UK Real Interest Rates (20 Year Bonds Yield at May 25 or Nearest Week Day), 
1985 - 2005. (See Reference 161) 
In 1990 an investor could invest in the United Kingdom or the United States in risk-
free index-linked government bonds at a yield to maturity of over three per cent real; 
for the last five years the yield has been less than two per cent and at times as low as 
one per cent. Now in the United States the index-linked government loans are 
between zero and 0.5 per cent. These low rates were designed to stimulate a faltering 
economy post September 11. These very low medium- and long-term real interest 
rates have in turn driven two effects: first, they have helped drive rapid growth of 
credit extension surges to many developed countries, particularly in the United States, 
Europe, and Australia, but not exclusively for residential mortgages – with this 
growth accompanied by a degradation of credit standards, and fuelling property price 
booms which for a time made those lower credit standards appear costless. In 
Australia, this cheap credit has resulted in the highest per capita debt of any developed 
country. The second effect is a global deleveraging of unprecedented proportion. 
4.3 The US Economic Surge 
Global systemic market change was substantially enabled when the United States 
economic surge began in 1995 and continued unabated through to late 1999 when the 
Federal Reserve cut central fund rates from 6.5 to 3.5 per cent (in two months) as a 
fiscal policy response to stimulate the economy after the dot.com crash in 2000–01. 
The dot.com stock market bubble, fuelled by technology and internet stocks, fed the 
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United States economy into a frenzy from 1995 through to 1999
195
 (under then 
President Clinton), despite the public utterances of Federal Reserve Chairman Alan 
Greenspan, who worried about the ―irrational exuberance‖ of his Treasurer Robert 
Rubin‘s economic strategy to cut deficits and lower interest rates. A year later 
Greenspan reversed his philosophical approaches with the comment that he accepted 
the ―possibility of a new paradigm‖196. This defined the start of a new era of low 
interest rates, a new era of credit assertion, and, by design, developing freedom for 
global financial markets. Morris (2008:67) suggests that: 
the 2000s real estate bubble may be one of those rare beasts conjured into the world solely 
by financiers, which is confirmed by the fact that housing bubbles also occurred in the 
United Kingdom, Australia, Spain and other countries where residential lending became 
universally loose. 
The dot.com bubble burst and had a major effect on stock and share prices, causing 
alarm with the speed and ferocity that overcame markets. The new Greenspan strategy 
proceeded to stimulate the economy by immediately lowering interest rates: a 
personal strategy by the Federal Reserve Chairman that was to set the course for 
recurring boom and bust cycles, not confined to the United States, but globally in 
nature and local in effect. In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, United States 
federal rates were again lowered to one per cent or below, the lowest rate in the 
United States for over half a century. This provided the launch pad for high leverage, 
hedge fund exuberance, and the engine room for global credit expansion. 
For 31 consecutive months, the base inflation-adjusted rate was negative. Money was 
virtually free. The doors opened for financial engineers to rapidly design new 
instruments to take advantage of spreading risks through securitisation, IT-assisted 
instantaneous transfers, over-the-counter and off-balance-sheet banking arrangements, 
and money laundering and ―fund parking‖ through hedge funds operating from tax 
havens. An intersection between regulated and unregulated markets grew rapidly 
under Chairman Alan Greenspan
197
 and the George W. Bush Administration. 
Unregulated markets operated largely offshore (shadow banking and finance), whilst 
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regulated markets came within onshore governance structures within the real 
economy. This disconnect is still observed and radically favours investors. 
Hedge funds, carry trade finance providers, and institutional lenders supported global 
booming real estate
198
 businesses securitising and rolling up mortgages into 
Collateralised Debt Obligations with hundreds of billions of US dollars beginning to 
roll into markets as ―carry trade‖ finance (borrowing low and lending long) money 
came through the United States courtesy of IT-enabled instant transactions from host 
nations Japan, China, Korea, and other East Asian countries. This was the start of the 
―buying back our money‖ fiscal policy enacted by the government of George W. 
Bush. Developed countries were awash with cash, or so it seemed. Global financial 
systems provided the next stage of integrated capital growth. To find borrowers was 
the next priority for geared-up, moneylenders. This system growth provided a 
bonanza for new financial products. 
4.4 Housing Markets Provide Collateralised Debt 
The United States was witnessing the greatest sale of home mortgage products in its 
history and this purchasing turned to a default epidemic in 2007–2008, ultimately 
deteriorating into a housing and social nightmare of proportions unseen in any other 
time. It was driven by political settings designed to stimulate the economy, and 
enabled by corporate greed, excessive, non-sustainable and irrational, but no one in 
the Bush Administration or Blair Government (or the then Australian Howard 
Government in Australia) tried to curb the tide, or warn borrowers of the risks.  
 The resultant economic collapse produced consequences that were not scoped into 
political governance models that supported this type of irrational growth, either before 
or during the unprecedented escalation of money coming into countries as credit for 
consumers. This is a political phase where economics, specifically highly technical 
economic sophistication became dominant in financial systems. 
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The process of delivering vast amounts of credit was a political construct across 
developed nations
199
. As social and financial risk became political risk, politicians 
orchestrated their responses in favour of the capital market players. This process 
intrinsically linked to a proliferation of lobbyists mostly based in Washington. 
Politicians in this era either lacked accountability or were so tied to capital and 
corporate elites that their positions were already compromised. Politicians were highly 
influenced by market-driven political ideologies linked to neoliberalism and supported 
by well-funded lobbyists. Kaiser (2009) argues
200
 that  
Over the past four decades Washington became a dysfunctional capital. ..money made by 
special interests using campaign contributions and lobbyists to influence government 
decisions, and money demanded by congressional candidates to pay for their increasingly 
expensive campaigns, which can cost a staggering sum. Politicians need for money and the 
willingness, even eagerness, of special interests and lobbyists to provide it explain much of 
what has gone wrong in Washington. They have created a mutually beneficial mutually 
reinforcing relationship between special interests and elected representatives, and they have 
created a new class in Washington. 
High-risk housing markets are not confined to the United States; rather, they are a 
feature of most neoliberal developed nation states, including Australia where 
mortgage holders look to social services to assist with payments. It is a catastrophe 
that London School of Economics Professor Willem Buiter cited in a recent article 
entitled ―Home Loans in the US: the biggest racket since Al Capone‖. In contrast to 
Buiter, the former Chief Economist with the International Monetary Fund, Simon 
Johnson argues strongly that the social cost to nations represents immense hardship in 
respect to personal, community and government outcomes. In addition, that those 
governments have a high level of responsibility to lessen the damage from wholesale 
foreclosures. Writing in the New Republic
201
 Johnson suggests: 
It is important to know that there is a clear case to be made for using taxpayer money to 
reduce the number of foreclosures and help homeowners refinance their mortgages. On the 
negative side, foreclosures destroy economic value in several ways: transaction costs push 
foreclosure itself; reduced value of foreclosed houses, and impact on houses in the 
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neighbourhood; reduced property taxes for local governments; and increased crime due to 
vacant houses. The death spiral of foreclosure-forced sales, falling house prices, and further 
foreclosures needs to be broken.  
A survey ―Asset Price Bubbles and Monetary Policy‘ released by the European 
Central Bank in 2005
202
 was scathing of the ―fast easy money policies‖ in the United 
States and stated in part:  
As households are typically encouraged to spend out of their capital gains when asset prices 
advance, durable and sizable bubbles can boost consumer expenditure. …In this respect, 
empirical evidence tends to suggest that a deflating bubble in the housing market is more 
costly than an equally sized crash in the in the stock market, as housing equity is more 
widespread and more intensely used as collateral for securing credit.  
. Ben Bernanke of the United States Federal Reserve has effectively named the 
current crisis as ―market failure‖. This economic market failure is entering a new 
social phase as millions of jobs are lost around the globe, first from the resources and 
mining sectors which had fed industrial growth in Asia, then from the manufacturing 
and building sectors, then from the public sector as governments rapidly lose income 
and resources (often relocated to financial market trading rooms). 
Writing in the Washington Independent correspondent Mike Willis
203
 pointed to the 
major social issues behind defaults saying: 
Foreclosures nationwide topped 2.3 million last year, up 81 per cent from 2007 and 225 per 
cent from 2006, according to RealtyTrac, an online foreclosure database. In December, 
Credit Suisse estimated that, without government intervention, more than eight million 
families could lose their homes to foreclosure by the end of 2012.  
The story is as bleak in the United Kingdom where the downturn has obliterated 1.2 
trillion pounds from Britain‘s national wealth204. Analyst Dharval Joshi of RAB 
Capital says the combined impact of the share market and property downturn has been 
equivalent to the loss of a full year‘s economic output in the United Kingdom. 
The boom and bust cyclical rotation is considerably more destructive in housing 
markets throughout European countries than in Australia where a combination of 
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resource-based export material demand, a growing population and high private 
property demand is driving the real estate market to ever higher territory and has 
given Australian consumers in all asset classes the dubious distinction of being the 
highest debt per capita nation in the world, a position that is unsustainable.  
Debt levels in developed states have been accommodated by China and East Asia‘s 
capacity to accumulate and lend. It is accompanied by sophisticated trading 
mechanisms and innovation through capital convoys, algorithm and flash trading 
carrying huge volumes of finance. New sophisticated types of financial carriage from 
savings nations (China, Korea, Southeast Asia) to consumer nations (Europe, United 
States) have created radical systemic change in global political economy. The 
following chart (Figure 4.4) looks at the rising levels of debt in the United States, the 
United Kingdom and the European Union.  
 
Figure 4.4205: Household Debt as Proportion of Gross Domestic Product, 1987–2007. 
Cheap credit , lending, willingness by accumulators, and new powers vested in the 
those undertaking models of concentration of wealth have driven, among investors, a 
ferocious search for yield – a desire among speculators who wish to invest in bond-
like instruments to gain as much as possible in spreads above the risk-free rate, to 
offset at least partially the declining risk-free rate. Twenty years ago a pension fund or 
insurance company selling annuities could invest at 3.5 per cent real yield to maturity 
on an entirely risk-free basis; now it would be only 1.5 per cent. Many new 
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sophisticated financial products, which appear to add 10, 20 or 30 basis points to that 
yield, without adding too much risk, have looked very attractive to macro investors. 
Investment banks (looking like Ponzi scheme hedge fund arms), hedge funds and 
unregulated high-net-worth individuals have, this decade, driven massive growth in 
speculative betting across borderless trade zones. Convoys of finance, some 
distinguishable, others invisible, dominate the tax-free air zones from Wall Street to 
Canary Wharf, to Hong Kong and Sydney. Developments are rapid in financial 
trading and players continually look for an edge. This has come in the form of 
technology where high frequency trading specialists are usurping the agency of hedge 
funds that have lost the edge in efficiency and charges. Trading systems, concentrated 
in ever decreasing but powerful clusters bypass political attempts to negotiate 
progressive reform through proposed positions on financial transaction taxes.  
Whilst significant losses have occurred in the real economy operated by nation states, 
primarily in the developed world, there has been an excess of capital flowing through 
corporations and high-net-worth individuals located in countries around the world 
with the assistance of governments, ratings agencies, institutional players, hedge 
funds and anonymous capital elites secreted in tax havens. This is the new post-2008 
phase of a global system, which features a new sophisticated mode of capital 
accumulation, and a concomitant concentration of wealth. It comes with increased 
systemic risk. The challenge for global governments is clearly to rigorously develop 
options for a more equitable global system that includes a tax on traders‘ transactions. 
After all, they use the same legal system in both the origination of a trade and the 
receipt thereof. These trading systems are discussed in the following section. 
4.5 Financial Innovation and Systems  
Systemic risk is principally located in international markets increasingly removed 
from nation state interference. This risk is immediately inherent in the collusion of 
politicians and financial interests. Most important in the systemic risk evaluation 
arguments has been the growth in centres designed to accommodate high levels of 
finance and effectively shield these areas from tax regulation or political influence. 
The vast wealth (estimated at US$12.6 trillion) of tax haven entities has been 
politically supported for decades as the political and economic elite flaunt wealth and 
luxury items in the Cayman Islands and largely British Government protectorates, 
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including the City of London
206
, around the world. The protection of tax-free zones is 
highly political as noted by Shaxson who suggests: 
The term ―tax haven‖ is a bit of a misnomer; because such places aren‘t just about tax. What 
they sell is escape: from the laws, rules and taxes of jurisdictions elsewhere, usually with 
secrecy as their prime offering. The notion that elsewhere (hence the term ―offshore‖ is 
central. The Cayman Islands tax and secret laws are not designed for the benefit of the 50 
000 odd Caymanians, but help wealthy people and corporations, mostly in the US and 
Europe, get around the rules of their own democratic societies. The outcome is one set of 
rules for a rich elite and another for the rest of us. 
Further, Shaxson describes the City
207
 as a ―highly resourced lobbying organisation‖.  
These interconnected entities are in themselves both bastions of wealth, and risk, as 
the concentrations of wealth and influence ebb and flow from a large number of 
critical bases in the 1990s to a very small number of high volume protectorates in 
2011. The Australian economy loses AU$20 billion each year to havens, including 
Vanuatu
208
. They enable large trade volumes. 
One of the most efficient instruments in contemporary financial systems is the special 
purpose vehicles (SPVs)
209
 amongst other scientific and sophisticated speculative 
financial trading instruments. On this point, Nesvetailova
210
 (2010:48) argues that: 
The function of both SPVs and SPEs raises severe prudential problems. Tax havens have 
made it exceedingly easy to set up offshore SPVs yet crucially they do not have the 
resources, especially in terms of people, to perform appropriate due diligence on what are 
very sophisticated financial vehicles. For example, the Cayman Islands banking system 
holds assets of over 500 times its GDP and Jersey holds resources of over 80 times its GDP. 
It seems pertinent to ask whether such small jurisdictions can allocate sufficient resources to 
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monitor and regulate such colossal sums of money. A report by the UK‘s National Audit 
Office
211
 clearly suggests they do not.  
The demand for yield uplift, stimulated by macro-imbalances, has been met by a wave 
of financial innovation, focused on the origination, packaging, trading and distribution 
of securitised credit instruments. Increasingly the sophistication of new instruments 
becomes the domain of corporate elites with the resources to fund and develop market 
edge products. Simple forms of securitised credit – corporate bonds – have existed for 
almost as long as modern banking. In the United States, securitised credit has played a 
major role in enabling mortgage lending. 
From the mid-1990s, financial system development entered explosive growth in both 
scale and complexity, with huge growth in the value of the total stock of credit 
securities (see Figure 4.5); an explosion in the complexity of the securities sold, with 
the growth of structured credit products; and with the related explosion of the volume 
of credit derivatives, enabling investors and traders to hedge underlying credit 
exposures, or to create synthetic credit exposures (synthetic collateral debt obligations 
and credit default swaps) (Figure 4.6). Proliferation of these market-betting 
instruments concomitantly lifted the need for secrecy of trades (and profits).  
 
Figure 4.5212: The Growth of Securitised Credit: Securitisation Issuance Trends in United 
Kingdom, 1996–2007. 
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Figure 4.6: Growth in Outstanding Credit Default Swaps, 2004–2008. (See footnote 178) 
This lethal dose of financial innovation most notably came into play in the ―Too Big 
to Fail‖ dynamics surrounding the AIG insurance corporation in the United States. 
AIG took part in credit default swaps on collateralised debt obligations, the securitised 
investment pools of sub-prime mortgages whose dramatic collapse in value in 2008 
was the proximate cause of the Global Financial Crisis
213
 (Lanchester 2010:60). 
These financial innovations sought to satisfy the demand for yield uplift. It was 
predicated on the belief that by slicing, structuring and hedging, it was possible to 
―create value‖, offering investors combinations of risk, return, and liquidity which 
were more attractive than those available from the direct purchase of the underlying 
credit exposures. It resulted not only in massive growth in the importance of 
securitised credit, but also in a profound change in the nature of the securitised credit 
model
214
. It also resulted in the carriage by hedge funds of enormous amounts of 
global capital.  
Nesvetailova
215
 suggests that the Cayman Islands, Ireland, Luxembourg and Jersey 
are attracting a high proportion of sophisticated investment from opaque and 
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concealed hedge funds and high-net-worth individuals from around the world, many 
based in these tax havens. The Bank for International Settlements
216
 suggests that 
about 28 per cent of all cross-border transactions are carried out through offshore 
clusters. Of this 28 per cent (US$ 29.164 trillion), the Cayman Islands (US$1.7 
trillion), Switzerland (US$1.4 trillion), Ireland (US$1.2 trillion) were the most 
prominent along with Bahamas (US$436 billion), Jersey (US$326 billion), Bahrain 
(US$205 billion) and Singapore (US$773 billion). This investment is related to the 
shadow economy. 
The current financial and economic systems
 
crisis, which has forced the past United 
States Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan to question the
 
coherence of 
dominant conceptual financial and macroeconomic frameworks, is unprecedented
 
in 
global reach and systemic gravity. Some basic figures speak
 
for themselves. 
According to Blankenburg and Palma
217
  global financial assets rose from US$12
 
trillion in 1980 to US$196 trillion in 2007. The International
 Monetary Fund‘s Global 




. Global cross-border capital flows more than doubled
 
between 2002 and 
2008, with foreign investors holding one in
 
four debt securities and one in five 
equities. While in 2000
 
only 11 countries had financial assets of more than 350 per 
cent of
 
gross domestic product (GDP), 25 countries had deepened their
 
financial 
markets to the same extent by 2007. As early as 1990,
 
money managers had increased 
their control of United States corporate equities
 
from eight per cent in 1950 to 60 per 
cent Similarly, pension funds had extended their share of total
 
business equities from 
less than one per cent to just short of 39 per cent, and
 
their fraction of corporate debt 
from 13 per cent to 50 per cent  
In the period from 1986 to 2006,
 
the United States‘ financial sector as a whole 
increased its share of corporate
 
profits from 10–30 per cent, while its outstanding 
debts grew from
 
20 per cent of GDP in 1980 to 116 per cent in 2007 According to
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Tett
219
 outstanding positions on credit defaults
 
swaps today amount to no less than 
US$600 trillion, with
 
the risk embodied after discounting mutually offsetting contracts
 
still as high as US$14 trillion. As noted in the introduction notional outstanding 
amounts on over-the-counter derivatives are in excess of US$700 trillion. 
With the 2007–2008 collapse of the Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers investment 
banks, the ―curtains have now come down on this ‗dance of the trillions‘‖ (Palma, 
2009
220
), and toxic debt becomes a tangible feature of the terrain. The immediate 
―hangover‖ in the form of high levels of toxic debt is surreal not only in its sheer 
quantitative dimensions, but also because it is riddled
 
with uncertainty. The 
socialisation of this debt is also a systems feature. As Tett remarked: 
in the end the chain
 
that linked a synthetic CDO of ABS [a collateralised debt obligation
 
of 
asset-backed securities], say, with a ―real‖ person, was so convoluted it was almost impossible 
for anybody to fit that
 






 predicted in 2005 that the United States‘ deficit figures were 
unsustainable saying that: 
The US right now is absorbing 80 per cent of global savings. Well when you hit 100 per 
cent, the music stops and leading figures, people like Paul Volker, the former Chairman of 
the US Federal Reserve, people like George Soros, the great speculator, have all made 
statements that they fear a major financial crisis within the next five years because the 
system is unsustainable.  
Prestowitz would possibly be surprised by global debt contagion that is now the next 
phase of the global financial crisis. The financial crisis in Europe outweighs that of 
the United States in sheer intensity, but in the context of financial systems, the 
European debt crisis could become global. A recent article stated, ―The financial crisis 
in Europe, seemingly never-ending, has now hit a potentially disastrous phase. With 
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interest rates on Italian and Spanish debt soaring, France looking shaky and even 
Germany having trouble in the debt market there‘s a real possibility that the euro zone 
might just break apart‖223.  
4.6  Risk Modelling  
Whilst the growth of offshore entities is a prominent systemic feature, over the past 
two decades, studies specifically related to the subjective nature of systemic risk have 
been missing in contemporary literature. In March 2011, the Bank of England (BoE) 
informed this enquiry through Working Paper 413
224
 which provides an analysis of 
the systemic risk present in global financial markets, and presents a case that the rapid 
development of financialisation of global money markets is prone to substantial risk. 
The BoE Paper suggests:  
An astonishing feature of the 2008 financial crisis was how quickly and extensively the 
relatively small write-downs in US sub-prime mortgages spread to a situation where only 
two years later governments worldwide had to provide massive support to their banking 
systems. International banks played a key role in transmitting contagion through their claims 
on each other. The paper examines how the interconnectedness of the international banking 
system impacts the threat of systemic risk in the international banking network.  
The BoE Working Paper explains that cross-sectional systemic risk is defined as the 
potential for shocks that hit one part of the shadow financial system and is rapidly 
transmitted to the rest of the system. This potential can be analysed in a variety of 
ways. The BoE approach abstracts from specific details about shocks and looks more 
at the contagious capacity of the network, whilst examining the extent to which the 
international banking network became more broadly contagious over time.  
To do this the Bank of England chose a benchmark modular structure to examine 
changes in the extent to which contagion spreads out of the fixed offshore tax haven 
clustering. The benchmark used is the clustering for 1989 quarter three (Q3) when the 
United Kingdom, Japan, the United States, and the Cayman Islands were combined 
into one tax haven module. This allows the examination of how systemic risk 
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associated with financial problems that originate within these major offshore financial 
centres increased over time.  
The amount of contagion flowing outside the fixed modules from 1989 Q3 has 
increased since the end of the 1980s and it peaked in 2008 quarter two (Q2), just 
before the Lehman Brothers‘ default. It remains at a relatively high level. When 
financial stress crosses many national boundaries, it is more problematic in the 
systems approach. This is partly because different legal systems and political 
preferences have to be compromised (see Chapter 6 in relation to financial transaction 
taxes and legal systems). For example, London School of Economics Law and 
Financial Markets Project (2009)
225
 explain that Lehman Brothers‘ global business 
operated with over 100 data systems that were owned and managed by some of the 
6,000 legal entities within the group worldwide. 
Claessens, Dell‘Ariccia, Leaven and Igan (2010)226, and Tucker (2010)227, emphasise 
difficulties in international coordination over crisis resolution. A corollary is that a 
network where financial stress can move rapidly across national boundaries should 
feature a greater systemic crisis. As comprehensive as the data is, they may not 
capture all the channels of contagion that mattered for this (2008) crisis. For example, 
banks‘ exposure to risk through derivatives such as credit instruments or swaps (CDS) 
and futures
228
, are difficult to measure, because of the opaque nature of trades, more 
usually through sophisticated networks.  
Also absent are off-balance-sheet positions through special bank-sponsored 
investment vehicles (SIVs). The BoE says, ―we do not have complete data on other 
non-bank financial institutions that became commingled with banks in the build-up to 
the crisis, the so-called shadow banking system‖. These missing links certainly 
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mattered in transmitting the crisis. The current crisis is operating and affecting 
unidentified market players outside regulated and monitored networks. In addition, 
European banks funded themselves through purpose-built and supposedly 
independent off-balance-sheet vehicles that lent long-term back to their bank creators. 
These conduits (investment banks including Goldman Sachs) funded investments by 
issuing, and rolling-over shorter-maturity paper, sometimes using a complex 
repackaging of the securitised assets of their creators as collateral
229
. These 
sophisticated networks were severely tested in 2007–2010.  
Even though losses only appeared in some of the components of composite assets, 
these instruments were sufficiently difficult to disentangle that investors‘ confidence 
and the whole market was shattered across the board and the contagion theory took 
hold
230
. As the banks that created these damaged vehicles took them back on to their 
own balance sheets, they acknowledged their exposure to this correlated risk. Other 
non-bank financial companies, such as United States money market mutual funds, had 
purchased many of these assets
231
. Other non-bank financiers and entities, such as 
monoline (Credit Default Swaps) insurers, had guaranteed payments and both became 
embroiled in the global financial crisis. The argument that ―modellers‖ present in their 
defence is that models were correct, but they simply did not have enough credible 
historical data on sub-prime mortgages.  
The international interbank market was already growing in 1985  The market grew 
strongly until 1987, and then after a brief pause following the stock market crash in 
1987, picked up speed again to finish the decade in strength. An important driver of 
this expansion was Japanese banks, which were channelling surplus domestic funds 
onto world markets. European banks also became increasingly active in cross-border 
lending over this period as foreign exchange controls were removed in France and 
Italy, and as the prospect of greater financial and trade integration in the region 
loomed. It might have also mattered that many countries independently placed lower 
capital requirements on interbank lending than on commercial credits during the 
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1980s and that many banking centres liberalised their domestic financial regulations 
as discussed in Chapter 2. 
This first systemic boom petered out by the end of the decade (1990). The United 
States, Japan, Sweden and Finland suffered a sequence of domestic banking crises and 
world growth slowed down. There was also turbulence associated with the speculative 
attacks on the European exchange rate mechanism. International interbank flows 
remained subdued until 1994. Japanese banks in particular began to withdraw lending 
to other major international banks from 1989 quarter four (Q4), although they soon 
started to lend to other Asian banks. The second growth spurt came to an end with the 
catastrophic Southeast Asian crisis (1997 and 1998) and the collapse, and potential 
systemic contagion, of the United States based hedge fund Long Term Capital 
Management (LTCM) (1998). Once growth was halted, the rise in United States‘ 
interest rates in 1997, fears over the costs of European economic monetary union and 
deleveraging of earlier excesses combined to enforce an international slow down, thus 
international interbank market grew at low or negative quarterly rates until 2002.  
Importantly, Bernard and Bisignano 
232
explain how this second boom (1884 to 1997) 
was related to an excess of liquidity and low market interest rates, just as in the build-
up to the recent Global Financial Crisis and current sovereign debt crisis. Cheap 
money from Asia, Japan and China entered the global arena, whilst growth in United 
States investment banks and their sophisticated trading mechanisms began significant 
gearing (leveraging of external funds). At this time European banks increased their 
share of this rapidly expanding market. Many funds were channelled through offshore 
centres, in another parallel with the more recent credit build-up.
233
 
Post-LTCM shocks, when the market picked up again, invigorated fast and for a long 
time. This was the ―long boom‖ which led up to the current crisis. It was the 
beginning of a sustained period of low interest rate policy settings. Bulletins published 
through the Bank for International Settlements Quarterly Reviews over this period cite 
and analyse the investments of Asian economies, petro-dollars, the role of offshore 
financial centres and hedge funds, and more generally excess liquidity as causal 
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factors. Between 2001 and 2010 over-the-counter interest rate derivatives trades in the 
United Kingdom rose from US$238 billion to US$1,235 trillion in average daily 
turnovers. In Australia, the average daily turnover in this market rose from US$10 
billion (2001) to US$42 (2010).
234
 
Importantly, many nation-state banks shared in this expansion, and hence it can be 
thought of as a truly international expansion.  This third boom ended between 2007 
and 2008 with the Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers collapse. Once the international 
banks began to suffer losses on investments with third parties (in the United States 
sub-prime market), they cut back from lending to each other. While this had happened 
at least twice before since the mid-1980s, the drop in interbank lending since 2008 is 
remarkably abrupt: in just over a year annual growth decelerated from 30 per cent to -
20 per cent! 
In 1985 Q1, the United States formed an offshore haven module with the Cayman 
Islands. Over 25 per cent of all United States finance and wealth was domiciled there. 
These two banking groups remain together, reflecting that the Cayman Islands are the 
principle offshore centre for the United States banking system. The IMF recently 
estimated that 57 per cent of the assets of the Cayman Islands banking system are 
overnight ―sweep accounts‖ in branches of US banks). High-net-worth individuals are 
based in this haven. But in this latest systems-based crisis, contagion could well have 
traversed this apparently innocuous route – Cayman Islands residents were large 
foreign holders of private-label United States mortgage-backed securities leading up 
to the crisis Robert Tamborini
235
suggests:  
All learned reconstructions (of the world financial crisis) of the disaster agree on the points 
that (1) buyers and sellers of financial products have created too much risk, (2) the market 
prices for these products are dramatically wrong in that they grossly understated their 
riskiness, (3) there has been an unprecedented growth of production and trade of these 
products, and hence of the total mass of risk (the so-called systemic diversifiable risk) (4) 
derivative and insurance markets have contributed to, and have been swept up by, this 
general mispricing as they have alimented the most dangerous financial illusion: the 
disappearance of risk. On top, negative financial externalities have been persuasive by way 
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of financial contagion, the process whereby toxic assets have spread all over the world, and 
defaulting intermediaries have infected their interconnected partners. 
Another module containing only the United Kingdom is about 23 per cent of the 
overall tax zone system. It turns out that the United Kingdom banking group is always 
in the most influential module (or the second most prestigious module for the entire 
sample located in Figure 4.7) , no doubt given its role as a host to many foreign-
owned banks as well as the international nature of its own banks. After these two 
large modules come four others with much smaller in terms of prestige (size and 
influence in the offshore systems). Japan, Belgium, France and Germany and 
Luxembourg together, have prestige scores ranging from 9– 7 per cent. At the other 
extreme, within the chart, there are seven modules that have prestige under one per 
cent which includes Australia. Apart from the US–Caymans and Germany–
Luxembourg modules, all countries are in their own modules. It is perhaps not 
surprising that Luxembourg forms a module with Germany.  
Importantly, the network now has fewer propensities to absorb contagion when 
compared to the turn of the century, and certainly when compared to 1989. In this 
contagion network, the United Kingdom is singled out as the central hub in this 
metropolis where stress arrives and is likely to be sent out again to many destinations. 
A year or so later, stresses from the United States‘ sub-prime market dysfunctions 
began to make themselves felt on international banks. Tellingly, this system remained 
in this contagious state right up until 2008 Q2 (just before the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers). 
In late 2011 the international financial system remains in a broadly contagious state. 
In Figure 4.7 (Bank of England), the areas taken up by the blue arrows, or the outer 
rings, in the panel for 2009 Q3 are relatively large compared to a decade or two 
decades earlier? Despite the massive retrenching during these crisis years, the network 
at this date had not returned to how it was in 2000 and is not that different to its state 
when the sub-prime crisis struck. Abstracting from the question of the average quality 
of investments, that is on cross-sectional grounds alone; the Bank of England 
concludes that financial stress could still be transmitted rapidly around the 
international banking network arguing: 
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If financial stress can be contained within a few countries, it can be more easily dealt with. 
When the network is so interconnected that stress criss-crosses many national borders, it 
becomes truly systemic. In these circumstances, resolution is more complicated, the 


















Figure 4.7236: Bank of England: International Financial Systems. 
The scaling of the arrows and the circles are fixed across all of the diagrams so that 
their respective areas are comparable across time. If at one time a prestigious module 
is absorbing, the circle will be large and within that, the inner circle will dominate and 
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the outer ring will be narrow. If at another moment, the module is as prestigious but 
more contagious, the outer ring will be thicker taking up more of the area of the circle 
of the same size.  
Opportunities for trade mispricing grew and expansion of the global shadow financial 
system – particularly island tax havens – accommodated the increased outflow of 
many nation states‘ illicit capital flight. 
The Tax Justice Network International Secretariat
237
 warns that sophisticated tax 
evasion (through havens) is the biggest problem facing nation-state governments 
around the world, both developing and developed. The losses to national accounts of 
tax from corporate operations undertaken on sovereign territory and secreted to 
havens is a profound problem and one that is highlighted in the current crisis of 
deficits and debt. Australia loses US$20 billion a year. A functioning tax system is the 
foundation of good government and a key to the wealth (or poverty) of nations.  
Corporations, big companies and wealthy individuals benefit from the onshore 
benefits of tax – like infrastructure, education and the rule of law – while using the 
offshore world to escape their responsibilities. Civil society increasingly bears the 
burden. Corporate losses requiring tax payer funds as bailouts seem anathema to the 
notion of equity and transparency in wider financial systems. The entire system lacks 
basic social, moral or economic integrity. Whether bailouts are funded by fiat money 
or taxpayer based real economy resources, the principals of free markets remain 
compromised. 
The Tax Justice Network argues that tax havens offer not only low or zero taxes, but 
something broader. What they do is to provide facilities for people or entities to get 
around the rules, legal systems and regulations of other jurisdictions, using secrecy as 
their prime tool. We therefore often prefer the term ―secrecy jurisdiction‖ instead of 
the more popular ―tax haven‖. International tax haven infrastructure allowing élites to 
escape tax and regulation is also widely used by criminals and terrorists. As a result, 
tax havens are entrenching inequality and poverty, corroding democracy, distorting 
markets, undermining financial and other regulation and curbing economic growth, 
accelerating capital flight from poor countries, and facilitating corruption and crime 
                                                          
237
 Tax Justice Focus. The Tax Justice Network Research Edition Volume 4, Number 2.  
  
Chapter 4 – Financial Systems Analysis 136 
around the world. The offshore system is a blind spot in international economics. No 
models include huge levels of unmitigated tax evasion. The issues are multi-faceted, 
and tax havens are steeped in secrecy and complexity – which helps explain why so 
few people have woken up to the scandal of offshore havens, and why civil society 
has been almost silent on international taxation for so long. The problem of tax havens 
is one of the great challenges of our age.  
Assets held offshore, beyond the reach of effective taxation, are equal to about a third 
of total global assets
238
. Over half of all world trade passes through tax havens. 
Developing countries lose revenues far greater than annual aid flows. The amount of 
funds held offshore by high-net-worth individuals and corporations is about US$20 
trillion (2011)
239
 and this is estimated to be growing by more than US$1.2 every year. 
Offshore finance is not only based in islands and small states, ―offshore‖ has become 
an insidious growth within the entire global system of finance. The largest financial 
centres, such as London (Canary Wharf), New York (Wall Street), and countries like 
Ireland, Switzerland, Singapore and Vanuatu, offer secrecy and other special tax 
advantages to attract foreign capital flows.  
Whilst economists and policy makers grapple with the tensions between free markets 
and undesirable effects on social services, the United States Federal Reserve Board 
argues that:  
The recent decline of asset values both in absolute terms and relative to GDP has been 




In financial markets the institutions that create and market complex financial 
instruments are in effect the house and the house always wins as Satyajit Das 
(2006) and Richard Bookstaber (2007) show. Wall Street institutions manufacture 
risky assets such as securitised subprime mortgages and provide a wide array of 
hedging strategies to shift risk, as well as credit default ―insurance‖ and buy back 
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assurances in case anything goes wrong. Moreover these institutions charge fees 
for all the instruments they are selling, ensuring that pension funds will on average 
net less than a risk free return and be left with massive contemporary risk as the 
hedges, insurance, and assurances go bad.  
4.7 Financial Reform to Counter Market Risk 
Making financial markets accountable is the largest and most vexing social and 
economic policy question of our time and one, which demands urgency. Lord Adair 
Turner,
241
 Chair of the London UK based Financial Services Authority, has argued for 
a tax on financial transactions and that states should have the power to gather 
information on all significant unregulated financial institutions (e.g. hedge funds, 
high-net-worth individuals, and investment schemes) to allow assessment of overall 
system-wide risks. Turner argues that regulators should have the power to extend 
prudential regulation of capital and liquidity or impose other restrictions if any 
institution or group of institutions develops bank-like (such as speculative trading 
platforms) features, which threaten financial system stability or otherwise become 
systemically significant.  
Additionally, Turner argues that offshore financial centres should be covered by 
global agreements, policies, and oversight on regulatory standards. The systemic risks 
highlighted in Figure 4.7 (Bank of England) above suggest that although risk remains 
a major issue, two years have passed without resolution of any high level regulatory 
measures. Whilst bailouts and quantitative easing have been macro responses, there is 
a growing bipartisan recognition that financial transaction taxes would considerably 
lesson risks, particularly systemic risk related to short term speculative trades. 
Financial transaction taxes would make traders recognisable and lift the secrecy 
component of market players; exactly the position players are intent on preventing. 
The systemic architecture is based on lightly regulated trading centres from Wall 
Street to Canary Wharf, Hong Kong to Sydney, and Dubai to Moscow. These 
dynamics changed in 1998 when the United States Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) authorised the formation of technologically sophisticated 
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exchanges for the specific purpose of opening up markets for electronic trades to 
compete with established markets, such as the New York Stock Exchange
242
.  
This effectively created new vastly different trading theatres, and secrecy, to those 
―traditional‖ stock exchanges and financial trading theatres (developed from Wall 
Street‘s first organised stock exchange in 1792), which were based on agreements 
signed by leaders in the markets, and guided by rules, regulatory policy, and 
openness. Former Treasury Secretary in the Clinton Democratic Presidency, Robert 
Reich
243
 argues that (since the late 1970s):  
…a fundamental change has occurred in democratic capitalism in America, and that change 
has rippled outward to the rest of the world. Capitalism has triumphed, and not simply as an 
ideology. The structure of American - and much of the worlds - economy has shifted toward 
the far more competitive markets. Power has shifted to consumers and investors. 
Meanwhile, the democratic aspects of capitalism have declined. The institutions that 
undertook formal and informal negotiations to spread the wealth ….have been eclipsed. The 
real explanation involves the way technologies have empowered consumers and investors to 
get better and better deals – and how these deals in turn, have sucked relative equality and 
stability, as well as other social values, out of the system. 
In contemporary political economies, new systems have evolved to change the entire 
regime. The new system is based solely on speculation in a fast growing derivatives-
based market featuring options and futures contracts, sophisticated technology, and 
this has fundamentally altered the relationships required to produce profits and trade 
globally. The evolution of financial markets has changed significantly, along with 





 argues that that today‘s global financial markets are unlike other current and 
past markets and ―approximate and even enact, key principles of neo-classical market 
theory‖. Further, Sassen states: 
…since 1980 the stock of financial assets has increased three times faster than the aggregate 
gross domestic product (GDP) of the twenty three highly developed Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, and the volume of trading in 
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currencies, stocks and bonds has increased five times faster. Most of this activity is financial 
market activity. For example, the global foreign direct investment stock was US$6 trillion in 
2000, while the worldwide value of internationally traded derivatives was over US$80 
trillion and rose to US$192 trillion in 2002. In 1983, on the largest financial market in terms 
of volume of transactions, the foreign exchange market, transactions were ten times as large 
as world trade (the economic exchange of goods and services), but in 1999 they were 
seventy times larger, even though world trade also grew significantly during this period.  
Sassens argument provides substance to the consistent evidence in this thesis that 
market growth, particularly finance capital market growth is unparalleled at any time 
in history. Speculative capital trades now account for over US$700 trillion
246
 in 
derivatives markets alone. 
This section has dealt with the systemic risk associated with offshore financial centres 
and the concentration of ever increasing amounts of capital into smaller clusters of 
high-net-worth individuals and corporate players, regulated and unregulated. 
Development of these high-risk markets could not have been achieved without highly 
sophisticated high technology advancements. Leading edge technology in this 
scenario also equates with low supervision and oversight of markets. Exactly what 
trading elites aim for. 
4.8 High Frequency, Flash Trading and Dark Pools 
Every 24 hours US$4 trillion plus is traded globally in currency markets. This section 
of the speculative market is minor compared to other derivate trades. 
The development of new ways to transfer transactions has been extraordinary and 
facilitates, within markets, desire to be quicker and more responsive to gain an edge 
on competitors. Smart traders are capturing the vital margins so necessary in trades. 
This is a new system dynamic that has changed political, economic and social 
conditions, detrimentally, into the future. This is a sophisticated and often 
dysfunctional system of trading by high-net-worth individuals with very strong 
political influence. This new system is based on sophisticated trading platforms using 
a combination of proprietary, secret algorithms, and the fastest flash trade computer 
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networks available
247
. High frequency trades account for over two thirds of all global 
trades within systems. Most trades are lightly or not regulated.  
The advent of this super-sophisticated, super-secretive enabling model for capital 
trade convoys has changed the dynamics for those able to access the technological 
science. A summary of these trading mechanisms is useful. Randall Dodd
248
 (2010) 
argues that three innovations in electronic trading of stocks and options have been in 
the headlines recently: high-frequency trading, flash trades, and dark pools. Technical 
improvements such as these are usually assumed to raise efficiency, but these 
innovations challenge such assumptions and may pose some public interest concerns 
because of their effect on financial stability, and the security of nation states.  
Dodd suggests that studying market microstructures illuminates the processes through 
which prices are determined. Markets often appear to be magic black boxes. Supply 
and demand go into the boxes and an invisible hand pulls out the price – much like a 
magician producing a rabbit from a hat. But important things happen inside those 
boxes.  
In the case of electronic trading of securities and derivatives, the microstructures  
inside the box includes the mechanisms for submitting buy and sell orders (that is, bid 
and offer quotes) into a market, viewing of those quotes by market participants, and 
executing trades by matching orders to buy and sell. If this is done in an immediate 
and transparent manner that enables all market participants to see and trade at the 
same prices, then reality approaches the ideal of the efficient-market hypothesis
249
. 
When markets become segmented and informational advantages are built into market 
mechanisms, efficiency is impaired and fairness undermined. This is sought by most 
market traders looking for an edge on competitors, but it is risk prone. 
High frequency trading, flash trading, and dark pools all have their origin in two key 
marketplace innovations – electronic trading and the closely related alternative trading 
systems (ATS). Electronic trading has quickly come to dominate traditional trading, 
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both on exchanges and in over-the-counter markets. Computer systems automatically 
match, buy, and sell orders that were themselves submitted through computers. Floor 
trading at stock and derivatives exchanges has been eliminated in all but the largest 
and most prominent markets, such as the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), and 
even in those markets floor trading coexists with electronic trading. ATS are 
computer-automated order-matching systems that offer exchange-like trading 
opportunities at lower costs but are often subject to lower disclosure requirements and 
different trading rules.  
High-frequency trading (HFT) (also called black box trading), uses high-speed 
computers governed by algorithms (or instructions to the computer) to analyse data, 
identify investment opportunities, and manage order flows to markets. An HFT firm 
can submit a thousand orders a minute to an exchange and just as quickly cancel them 
and submit different ones. An estimated 90 per cent of orders submitted by high-
frequency traders are cancelled. For example, if a share has a $9.90 bid price (to buy) 
and a $10 offer price (to sell), an HFT firm might seek a small but low-risk profit by 
raising the bid to $9.91 and lowering the offer to $9.99 (an 8-cent spread) if the 
algorithm deems that these changes will have a sufficiently high probability of 
triggering immediate trades. If these improved quotes result in immediate trades, the 
HFT firm gains the 8-cent bid-ask spread on each share traded in this manner. The 
risk is that only one leg of the deal will be executed immediately, with a delay in 
fulfilling the other leg after a change in market prices that result in a loss. If the HFT 
firm buys at $9.91 but finds no takers for the offer at $9.99, and the market prices 
drop below $9.91, the HFT firm has a short-term loss. 
Competition for lucrative HFT business is so fierce that firms pay to locate their 
computers as close as possible to those of the exchanges and Alternative Trading 
Systems (ATS)
250
 to minimise ―latency,‖ or delays in communication. Some pay to 
locate at the same place as the order-matching engines, close to existing exchanges. A 
microsecond delay in submitting an order can mean the difference between being at 
the front of the line – and executing the trade – and being back in the queue with an 
unfulfilled executable order. The gain on each trade may be small – Rosenblatt 
Securities estimates that the average revenue for HFT in equities is between $0.001 
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and $0.002 a share – but the volume is enormous, and some exchanges and ATS pay 
rebates to the HFT firm for generating the volume. HFT firms received $3.7 billion in 
such rebates in 2008. Today, HFT generates an estimated 73 per cent of the total 
trading volume on United States stock markets and about 20 per cent at options 
exchanges. Randall Dodd (2012) suggests, ―All the securities and derivatives involved 
in the financial turmoil that began with a 2007 breakdown in the U.S mortgage market 
were traded in [over-the-counter] markets.
251
 
Many calls have been made to ban flash trade orders. Euronext NYSE which operates 
the New York Stock Exchange has been a critic of flash orders as several traders have 
developed trading methods that have gained a higher edge of market share. William 
Donaldson, the former Chairman and chief executive of the New York Stock 
Exchange and now an adviser to a large hedge fund, said that, ―this is where all the 
money is, if an individual investor doesn‘t have the means to keep up they are at a 
huge disadvantage‖. However, market players have raised concern that regulation 
would crimp markets
252
. With more and more trading coming through this speculative 
medium, it is obvious that high-level players deploy lobbyists to persuade politicians 
to allow a ―hands-off‖ approach despite well-documented risks of a systemic nature.  
Dark pools are owned by exchanges, broker-dealers, or independently, and use a more 
efficient electronic trading platform to negotiate large deals and do not require a firm 
to identify, or the prices at which it is willing to trade. Transactions made through 
dark pools are recorded as over-the-counter, not exchange, transactions, and the size, 
price, and time of consummation are not publicly disclosed. Trading in dark pools 
allows firms to make large trades without the risk that their large order will move the 
market price away from their preferred price. In open trading, firms expose their 
orders – that is, they disclose them to the public when they are displayed through 
exchanges. When large orders are exposed, market participants could react by raising 
their offers or lowering their bids. HFT has accelerated the speed at which the market 
price responds to new orders. 
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In respect to the increase in volume, John Lanchester
253
 (2010:55) states that in the 
United States alone the finance tied to credit default swaps (CDS), collateral debt 
obligations (CDO), American Insurance Group (AIG) (the recipient of US$200 billion 
of public funds), and monies paid to Goldman Sachs to bail out the private investment 
banker is in excess of US$173 trillion alone. The inherent risks involved at a 
quantum, political and social level alone should be sufficient to convince political 
leaders and policy makers to regulate and provide oversight. A condensed number of 
elite sophisticated players in this intense trading space continue to record high profits. 
They are intertwined and inter-related to systemic market regimes.  
4.9 Systemic Debt and Leverage 
Systemic sovereign debt problems besetting European countries and the United States 
have been described in an array of theories, which posit blame on a combination of 
events and pre-existing circumstances. Anastasia Nesvetailova
254
 locates the 
associated slide towards a wholesale ―global credit crunch‖ as a crisis in Anglo-Saxon 
capitalism. Nesvetailova argues that theories enquiring into the long-term causes 
suggest trends to overlap the political, social, economic, cultural and ideological 
foundations of market based capitalism: 
Thus emphasising the historical origins of the current crisis, structural theorists view it as a 
specific, but largely predictable result of the operation of a type of economy that had 
replaced the Keynesian welfare state of the 1950s – 1960s with a neo-liberal model of 
capitalism. The financial meltdown of 2007 – 2009 is thus only a reflection of many other 
deep –seated crisis tendencies structured in the brewing of this model – a crisis brought 
about by a combination of short-term policy targets, debt financed consumption, minimal 
savings, deregulated capital markets, the consumer-driven pattern of recovery from previous 
crises and a general hedonistic basis of socio-economic relationships that have come to 
define the culture of American defined capitalism
255
.  
Alongside the new sophisticated algorithm and flash trade growth is a correlated 
social discount. In the United States, over the decade of intensified systems growth, 
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(2001–2011) personal debt jumped from US$55,000 to US$145,000 whilst the ratio 
of debt to disposable income went up from 93.4 per cent to a post-1945 record of 139 




 called this a ―super- bubble, a concoction 
of a housing bubble, an explosion of leveraged buyouts and other financial excesses 
… these in turn were unleashed by a regime of historically cheap and easy credit 
which was made possible in the era of low consumer price inflation and aggressive 
competition among financial institutions for new profits.‖ In the United Kingdom this 
group of middle class ―new poor‖ account for the bulk of personal debt, with over 1.5 
trillion pounds. Total private sector debt rose from 133.5 per cent of GDP to 227.4 per 




Unsustainable as this consumer credit bubble became the ensuing avalanche of crises 
was precipitated by extraordinary levels of banks and investment balance sheet 
leverage which firstly brought down the Northern Rock Bank (UK) in September 
2007, causing a public ―run‖ on funds by small bank account investors; a bank run 
that had not been witnessed in the United Kingdom for over a century. So many 
individuals demanded their savings in cash that nearly AU$2 billion (five per cent of 
the bank‘s total assets) was paid out in one day. Several months later the government 
bailed out the bank (effectively nationalising the bank in a free market economy) for 
AU$50 billion; at that stage the largest amount of money any government in world 
had extended to any private banking corporation, to start an era of socialisation of 
debt. 
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4.10 Systemic Meltdowns: Taxpayers to the Rescue. 
In the United States, massively leveraged and poorly risk-managed banks were 
starting to feel the risk of balance sheets tainted with layers of toxic sub-prime debt in 
the structured tranches of collateralised debt obligations and credit default swaps. The 
global system was reeling from negative speculation over the over-extendedness of 
banks‘ balance sheets, the gravity of sub-prime investment, activities by credit rating 
agencies, and a contagion of housing market dysfunction in the form of default and 
home investment value slides. This system failure led to a crisis in the investment 
banking industry, first in the United States, before spreading to Europe. 
Wall Street investment bank Bear Stearns collapsed in March 2008, and then Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac, the underwriters of a significant section of the whole American 
mortgage industry, became the largest nationalisation in global history on September 
7, 2008. Eight days later the largest invest bank Lehman Brothers became the largest 
bankruptcy in the world as it transitioned into voluntary receivership. The following 
day (8 September) the largest insurer in the world AIG became the biggest bailout of a 
private company in history with the United States Government, taking a 79.9 per cent 
share in the stricken and chronically overleveraged company.  
Merrill Lynch (investment bank) was taken over by the Bank of America on 14 
September 2008. In the United Kingdom‘s, Lloyds of London undertook the largest 
―merger‖ when it acquired the largest United Kingdom home mortgage lender (20 per 
cent of the entire market), HBOS. On 21 September 2008, Goldman Sachs, the 
world‘s largest investment bank, and Morgan Stanley, a flagship of corporate 
America, were forced to convert their legal status from ―investment‖ to ―holding‖ 
banks, allowing them to access taxpayers‘ money in return for high levels of 
government supervision. Across Europe, a wave of banking and investment fright 
culminating in the weekend of 11–12 October 2008 when the entire United 
Kingdom‘s banking system was on the point of collapse.259 
The American insurance giant AIG was the primary holder of market asset class credit 
default swaps (CDS), the insurance vehicle held against collateralised debt obligations 
(CDOs)(containing pools of sub-prime debt tranches) whose price collapse after 
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revelations about their over-rated nature led to the Global Financial Crisis. Had AIG 
been allowed to fall, not only would the entire financial system collapse but AIG held 
global reinsurance lines including aviation insurances which would have immediately 
precipitated the grounding of aircraft around the world, causing social and economic 
chaos of dimensions not witnessed before.  
Conscious of perilous state of the entire asset class structures globally, AIG was 
deemed ―Too Big to Fail‖, even though, post Lehman, AIG was known to have toxic 
assets with values much higher than Lehman. They (AIG) needed to borrow (from the 
United States Government) massive collateral (loans) to cover massive account risk. 
The seeping leeks that began as sub-prime mortgage failure became rivers of system-
leveraged debt, sweeping through homes, gouging great holes through bank balance 
sheets across the world, with most risk held in the CDS market managed by AIG. 
Even in the excess of free market ideology, no one could afford to let AIG go under. 
Following the initial response of the US government to take over 79.9 per cent of AIG 
for an amount of AU$85 billion (effectively allowing the corporation to draw on the 
public account), on 9 October another payment of taxpayer money of US$38 billion 
was transferred from the public to the private account. On 10 November, the United 
States Treasury bought US$40 billion worth of new AIG stock and then on March 1, 
2009, the US Treasury again transferred another US$30 billion to the ailing 
corporation.  
The next day the corporation announced a loss of US$62 billion for the quarter (not 
the year), the worst corporate loss in history. Against these AIG senior executives 
were forced to disclose bonuses received of US$165 million. It was also disclosed by 
AIG that the company had payed out CDS contracts to international banks of over 
US$70 billion for losses incurred in speculative trade markets, effectively with United 
States public funds.  
4.11 Lobbyists and Political Donations 
With the financialisation of the global economy (Chapter 2), huge fortunes have been 
made by executives and employees in the privileged and highly politicised speculative 
market sectors across the globe, but principally in the sophisticated trading hubs of 
Canary Wharf in London and Wall Street. This sector has ―owned capitalism‖. The 
sector has been strongly supported by centre-left and conservative governments. The 
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sector is driven by an army of politically motivated lobbyists (12,000 in Washington 
and New York, and an estimated 5,000 in London). The speculative casino type of 
trades through derivatives (options and futures) drew risk in every sense and to make 
money (60 per cent of an investment banker‘s pay); traders took on more risk with 
high levels of leveraged capital.  
Lobbyists in the United States are at ―Resistance Central‖ when it comes to blocking 
moves to regulate and provide oversight to speculative trades that enable most 
international movements of capital. Lobbyists have been resisting calls for a financial 
transaction tax for four decades. Decisive lobbying has enabled major financial 
inducements to politicians to delay, stall or fundamentally change proposed legislation 
aimed at curbing the excess risk dynamics inherent and embedded in speculative 
trades. Recent banking legislation saw US$600 million offered to politicians and party 
hierarchies to block reform.  
Lobbyists have been central in influence and favour. No modern political party 
structures could survive without them. A report cites 243 government employees have 
turned lobbyists, with 202 having worked in Congress and the remainder in the White 
House. The report estimates that six banks – Goldman Sachs, Bank of America, JP 
Morgan Chase, Citigroup, Morgan Stanley and Wells Fargo – spent US$600 million 
on donations and campaign contributions since the first major federal bailout of Bear 





 suggests that the ―monumental growth of lobbying in Washington 
D.C. undermines effective government and pollutes politics. Kaiser, who monitored 
politics in the United States for the Washington Post for over 50 years, explains how 
Washington became a dysfunctional capital with special interest groups using 
campaign contributions and lobbyists to influence government decisions and money 
being demanded by congressional candidates to pay for expensive campaigns.  
Kaiser says that in 1974 the average winning campaign in the United States Senate 
would cost US$437,000 and that by 2006 the cost had grown to US$7.9 million. 
Lobbyist have created a mutually beneficial, mutually reinforcing relationship 
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between special interest groups and elected representatives, and in doing so have 
created a new class of very wealthy lobbyists in Washington. Kaiser notes that one 
lobbyist Gerald Cassidy amassed a personal fortune of US$100 million in the 
Washington system.  
In addition to campaign contributions to elected officials and candidates, companies, 
unions, and other organisations spend billions of dollars each year to lobby Congress 
and federal agencies. Some special interests retain lobbying firms, many of them 




The following graph evidences growth in the lobbyist and political campaign 
contributions sector. 
1998 <>  $1.44 Billion  
1999 <>  $1.44 Billion  
2000 <>  $1.56 Billion  
2001 <>  $1.64 Billion  
2002 <>  $1.82 Billion  
2003 <>  $2.04 Billion  
2004 <>  $2.17 Billion  
2005 <>  $2.43 Billion  
2006 <>  $2.62 Billion  
2007 <>  $2.85 Billion  
2008 <>  $3.30 Billion  
2009 <>  $3.49 Billion  
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Figure 4.8: Total Washington Lobbying Spending, 1998–2010. 
1998 <>  10,404 
1999 <>  12,943 
2000 <>  12,541 
2001 <>  11,845 
2002 <>  12,131 
2003 <>  12,923 
2004 <>  13,158 
2005 <>  14,070 
2006 <>  14,516 
2007 <>  14,869 
2008 <>  14,216 
2009 <>  13,664 
2010 <>  12,488 
 
Figure 4.9: Total Washington Lobbyists, 1998–2010.263 
In the United Kingdom, the Cameron Conservative Party received more than £10 
million towards their election war chest in just three months –. The flood of cash into 
the Tory Party campaign funds enabled the party to outspend Labour in pre-elections. 
. The Conservative Party reported gifts worth £10,481,949 in the last quarter of 2009, 
compared with £4,962,886 collected by Labour and £1,055,717 received by the 
Liberal Democrats. The figures released by the Electoral Commission also show that 
the Conservatives raised some £26 million in party funds during 2009, while Labour 
received about £16 million over the year. The largest Tory donor was the property 
magnate David Rowland, who handed over £738,000 to the party. Stanley Fink, 
described as the ―godfather‖ of hedge funds, gave £501,640264.  
Many of the most successful names in the Mayfair hedge fund industry are to be 
found among David Cameron‘s backers. They include Michael Hintze, the former 
Goldman Sachs head of equity trading who founded CQS fund in 1999; Stanley Fink, 
former chief executive of listed fund Man Group; Crispin Odey of Odey Asset 
Management; David Harding, who sold his AHL business to Man Group before going 
on to found Winton Capital; Paul Ruddock, of Lansdowne Partners; Alan Howard and 
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Christopher Rokos of currency and bond-focused Brevan Howard; and Michael 
Farmer, founder of metals trading hedge fund Red Kite. 
In its Plan for Sound Banking document issued in July 2011, the Tory party indicated 
it would not rush to clamp down on the alternative investment industry, which will 
come under the auspices of the Bank of England as part of the party‘s radical overhaul 
of regulation. However, they still fired a warning shot across its bows. ―The activities 
of hedge funds and private equity firms were not at the heart of this crisis,‖ said the 
Conservative plan. ―Therefore it would be wrong to assume that dramatically 
curtailing activities in these industries will necessarily increase financial stability ... 
However, it is right to look at the sector and consider whether reform would benefit 
financial stability now and in the future.‖ 
Tory donors from the hedge fund and private equity industry including Stanley Fink 
(£1,961,141 cash, £4,325 non-cash), Michael Farmer (£2,343,750), Michael Hintze 
(£1,125,430 cash, £1,200 non-cash), Paul Ruddock (£435,500 cash, £8,981.30 non-
cash), Ryan Robson (£265,929.45) and various others in the £100,000 cash bracket
265
. 
Coincidentally both the United Kingdom and the United States are the major traders 
of unregulated speculative finance capital and both auspice tax havens from which 
decisions on high-level finance transactions are made by domiciled capital elites. 
Decades of association between elites and political operatives guarantee that very 
little will change despite to obvious anomalies in financial and social systems. Simon 
Johnson (May 2009) explains that this lobbyist support process was a vital part in how 
the US became a ―banana republic‖:  
The financial industry has not always enjoyed such favoured treatment. But for the past 25 
years or so, finance has boomed, becoming ever more powerful. The boom began with the 
Reagan years and it only gained strength with the deregulatory policies of the Clinton and 
George W Bush administrations. Several other factors helped fuel the financial industries 
ascent (Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker‘s monetary policy in the 1980s and the 
increased volatility in interest rates that accompanied it, made bond trading much more 
lucrative. The invention of securitisation, interest rate swaps, and credit default swaps 
greatly increased the volume of transactions that bankers could make money on. And an 
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ageing and increasingly wealthy population invested more and more money in securities, 
helped by the invention of the IRA and the 401k plan. Together these developments vastly 
increased the profit opportunities in financial services. Not surprisingly Wall Street ran with 
these opportunities. From 1973 to 1985, the financial sector never earned more than 16 per 
cent of domestic corporate profits. In 1986 that figure reached 19 per cent. In the 1990s it 
oscillated between 21 per cent and 30 per cent, higher than it ever had been in the post-war 
period. This decade it reached 41 per cent. Pay rose just as dramatically. From 1948 to 1982, 
average compensation in the financial sector ranged between 99 per cent and 108 per cent of 
the average of all domestic private industries. From 1983, it shot upward, reaching 181 per 
cent in 2007. The great wealth that the financial sector created and concentrated gave 
bankers enormous political weight – a weight not seen in the US since the era of J.P. 
Morgan (the man). In that period, the banking panic of 1907 could be stopped only by 
coordination among private-sector bankers: no government entity was able to offer an 
effective response. But that first age of banking oligarchs came to an end with the passage of 
significant banking regulation in response to the Great Depression: the re-emergence of an 




This chapter has explained the political economy of the current regime of free market 
economics. Clearly, a new complex emerging set of circumstances contribute to the 
economic and social crises that have befallen most advanced economies. It is too 
simplistic to attribute these circumstances on structural dynamics in respect to the 
relative balance of economic powers involving the emergence of China, India and 
Southeast Asian economies as they interact with traditional western economies of the 
United States and the United Kingdom.  
What is clear, however, is that unregulated capital markets, legal protection of the 
status of tax havens and tax-exempt zones, political lobbying interests that empower 
capital actors, and representatives on the elite geopolitical stage are disconnecting 
from state-based real economies and concomitantly the capacity of the real economy 
to provide public goods (including functioning and inclusive economic conditions) for 
its citizens. 
Winding back services and austerity campaigns designed to de-link the state from its 
inherent role of service provision to its citizens is not sustainable in political, 
economic and social terms in the long term if capital elites usurp democratic 
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principles. Untouchable elites are contrary to equitable systems of social enterprise. 
Markets could provide integrity and fair equity if they are required to do so by elected 
politicians. They have the capacity but not the regimentation in their organising 
systems.  
The next chapter will argue that a financial transaction tax on global speculative 
capital trades could provide mechanism for oversight of the now unregulated sector 
and allocates funds from a miniscule tax impost on each trade to the real economy of 
public goods provision 
Further, the next chapter argues that protectors of unregulated markets must be 
brought to account before the capital market system causes more public sector pain.  
Financial transaction taxes are seen a progressive public policy response to a real 
problem. Whilst European nation states have initially endorsed an approach to 
investigate a financial transaction tax at a European Union level, a concerted effort by 
opposing forces has reduced the universal enthusiasm for a broad approach. Likewise, 
in Australia, the forces opposing any form of progressive regulatory approach have 
dominated the debate. 
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Chapter 5  
The Case for a Financial Transaction Tax 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The global economic crisis has placed the ideas of taxation over speculative financial 
transactions back on the political agenda with governments faced with crippling budget 
shortfalls and public debt, after financing bailouts and economic stimulus packages. The 
critical issue addressed in this chapter is that financial product engineering, sophisticated IT 
systems, offshore tax havens, institutional betting on currency and interest rates places huge 
and unequal burdens on both the state, and citizens of the state.  
 Governments and politicians are informed by growing public demands that the financial 
sector should pay a proportionate share for the turmoil that has beset markets, and the 
resultant cuts in social spending, services and infrastructure. Nation state economies are the 
actual interface between returns from financial markets and cuts in social policy settings. This 
chapter provides evidence and supports the rationale reasons that an FTT is functional and 
efficient as an instrument to draw revenues to the public sector from markets operating under 
the type of loose scrutiny that is plainly not appropriate in this global political economy. 
On the one hand, this is the time when an international tax on speculative casino type betting 
on the three base financial asset class markets (equity, debt and currencies) could make a 
―world of difference‖. On the other hand, however, politicians are influenced by donations to 
fund electorate campaigns and clearly much of the campaign funds are derived from ―high 
finance‖ or, more specifically, finance capital market players. The civil society should 
demand action on a financial transaction tax for ethical reasons. Groups such as Occupy Wall 
Street have brought public attention to this issue. The collusion between nation state 
governments and high finance urgently needs to be addressed. Polychroniou
267
 argues, ―the 
main problem is the power that finance capitalism exerts over domestic society and the abuse 
it inflicts.‖ 
Chapter 5 provides an argument for a global transaction tax with a local target for achieved 
revenue sources. The recent and continuing sovereign debt crisis (as phase two of the 
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financial crisis) has revealed fundamental weaknesses in the international financial system. 
The period before the sub-prime market imploded in the United States triggered a global 
contagion of toxic debt, was characterised by excessive credit growth and a build-up of 
systemic imbalances. Developments were severe in economic and social terms, and 
facilitated by inadequate oversight of risk management by governments, companies and 
supervisors. Reforms are urgently required to make the financial system accountable and 
transparent. This latter issue of transparency is being highly contested by market players. 
Without transparency, regulation and independent oversight, future shocks are assured. A 
financial transaction tax could achieve effective regulation and provide a response to the 
disruptive short-term trades.  
A major appeal of a financial transaction tax (FTT) is based on its revenue capacities. 
Potential revenues are significant. In Australia (the world‘s eighth ranked international 
financial market player), receipts from a 0.05 per cent tax on inward and outward trades 
could be as much as AU$30 billion a year. In terms of absolute dollar returns and in the 
context of debt repayments on government borrowings to cover the Nation Building and 
Economic Stimulus Package and bank assistance (through public funded guarantees) during 
the immediate aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis, this additional revenue would provide 
a broad fiscal response to loan payment through structural adjustments. The current economic 
and political climate should be a very appealing rationale for political parties of all 
persuasions. An FTT would be most appealing to the Australian Greens, given the influence 
that finance interests have over both other major parties operating in the Australian political 
environment 
This chapter promotes the use of FTT revenue streams within Australia as an effective 
resource mechanism to reduce the gap between rich and poor. This thesis argues for the use 
of FTT resources for the provision of sustainable long-term social housing in Australia, an 
area that has been underfunded and misaligned in the wider provision of social services. 
Specific commitments to fund this sector would be of inestimable benefit not only in the 
provision of assets to assist lower income Australia but to benefit this specific target group 
with all the ancillary benefits that flow from sustainable housing, including better health 
outcomes, opportunities for education, and stronger communities. This social policy 
provision is achievable through this tax mechanism and is described further in the Section 
5.12 (Revenue and Stabilising Effects) of this paper.  
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Chapter 5 focuses on the revenue-raising potential and the likely economic implications of an 
FTT. This section looks first at the specific design and functionality of the models put 
forward over recent years. It describes the potential of additional revenue against the likely 
interruptions to markets that have been unregulated and populated by opaque operations 
based in tax havens (Cayman Islands, Jersey, Guernsey, and Vanuatu) or more importantly 
Wall Street and Canary Wharf, London. Specifically, it is known that a uniform tax rate FTT 
(0.05 per cent) would hamper short-term high frequency trading in derivatives, particularly in 
the intraday highly leveraged markets which are traded both on and off exchanges in the 
highly liquid over-the-counter (OTC) markets
268
. The benefits of a global FTT are that 
market finance capital players will be transparent. 
5.2 Financial Transaction Tax – Rationale 
The rationale put forward in this chapter is not for a tax on financial transactions for a 
specific cause or global event. Whilst the mitigation of the dreadful consequences of climate 
change and global poverty have been raised by interest groups (Occupy Wall Street, Oxfam, 
trade union organisations – local and global – and Greens politicians – local and global), this 
chapter argues that an FTT is needed to ameliorate the loss to Australia, and other nation 
states, of considerable amounts of revenue as a result of the transfer of taxpayers‘ money 
toward state-sponsored fiscal stimulus spending, quantitative easing processes, and private 
sector bailouts. This, in turn, leads to loss of public services, public programs and support 
networks. 
No claim is made for one target group, or reason, against the other; one life saved, one vital 
service maintained or replaced, is an important reason for this socially progressive tax. 
Rather, this dissertation argues a compelling case for a global tax which would provide a fair 
and just return to states for the significant effect of unregulated speculative trades that have 
so disrupted the public account; trades that are transacted by exclusive financial speculators, 
sophisticated, secretive and operating within an opaque arena of margins on financial trades, 
intercontinental in nature, and largely protected by governments influenced by lobbyists. This 
chapter puts the case for a universal tax to provide respectability and stability and system 
integrity.  
                                                          
268
 An effective FTT should recognise the three underlying markets of equity, interest rate and currency trades 
(asset classes), as well as the derivatives that are priced off these ―underlying‖ markets, such as futures and 
options. An FTT should have the broad coverage of ―venues‖ that deal in these trades and all the highly 
sophisticated design mechanisms that are used in trades. Failure to encapsulate all venues and all instruments 
would provide strategic advantages to non-engaging market players or venues.  
  
Chapter 5 – The Case for Financial Transaction Tax 156 
The Global Economic Crisis has put much-berated proposals for taxation on financial 
transactions back on the political agenda. Governments faced with massive budget deficits 
and huge public debts after financing bailouts and economic stimulus packages are in search 
of funding sources. Politicians are also keen to meet public demands that the financial sector 
should pay its fair share, but that cuts in social spending, environment and public goods or 
rising tax burdens on citizens should be minimised. Developing countries are facing 
additional problems of tackling multiple socioeconomic crises with limited resources. In this 
context, financial transaction taxes are seen as a possible innovative mechanism to ensure 
stable and predictable flows of complementary development finance to meet these additional 
needs. In addition, excessive trading in unregulated financial markets and the predominance 
of short-term speculation have contributed to volatile assets prices as well as large 
fluctuations in exchange rates, stock prices and commodity prices, reinforcing the effects of 
the financial crisis.  
There is serious underlying risk in the high quantum value of markets and the failure of 
political leaders to regulate credit default swaps to force accountability of this oversize 
market by putting trade taxes on exchanges. This is a major error over the past two decades. 
It almost guarantees market failure. In order to make markets accountable, political support 
needs to be strong and consistent, with effective arguments based on research modelling.  
5.3 Political support for FTTs 
Financial transaction taxes (FTTs) have been debated widely in the wake of the global 
financial and economic crisis, primarily through an increasing number of political leaders and 
lobby groups who acknowledge the need for a counter measure to disappearing government 
accounts in developed countries. As described in Chapter 4, pressure on public accounts has 
been intense. Policymakers see the benefit of global and local FTT‘s. Politicians are more 
measured by financial interests. New French President Hollande has bravely accepted the 
challenge and as of 1 August 2012 France has a Financial Transaction Tax
269
: 
 The UN General Assembly‘s Commission of Experts on Reforms of the International 
Financial and Monetary System (the ―Stiglitz Commission‖) mentioned a financial 
services tax as a way of providing more stable and sustainable development finance 
that would help to stabilise markets. 
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 The European Parliament and the president of the European Commission, Jose 
Manuel Barroso, have spoken out in favour of taxing financial transactions. 
 A number of European countries including Belgium, Spain and Austria made clear 
political decisions to support currency or financial transaction taxes.  
 The chair of the British Financial Supervisory Authority, Lord Adair Turner supports 
the global tax. British Prime Minister David Cameron has said that he would support 
the idea of a global rather than a local FTT, although considerable financial industry 
backlash has tempered this leader‘s response. 
 G20 leaders tasked the IMF ―to prepare a report for our next meeting with regard to 
the range of options countries have adopted or are considering as to how the financial 
sector could make a fair and substantial contribution toward paying for any burdens 
associated with government interventions to repair the banking system.‖ 
 The Leading Group on Innovative Financing for Development – an intergovernmental 
forum with representation from all continents – recently established a Taskforce on 
International Financial Transactions for Development. 
 The Catholic-Church-based development alliance CIDSE was among the pioneers to 
promote a tax on currency transactions as a response to the Asian crisis in the late 
1990s. CIDSE developed a more comprehensive position on taxation as means to 
finance development for the UN Follow-up International Conference on Financing for 
Development in Doha in December 2010. CIDSE has updated its position, by 
publishing a review in June 2011 estimating that as much as US$635 billion could be 
raised each year from a global FTT at a rate of 0.05 per cent.  
 The Europeans for Financial Reform (EFFR) continue support for a financial 
transaction tax (FTT). Forty thousand emails were sent in response to the European 
Commission‘s consultation on tax in the financial sector.  
 The above response was backed up on 14 April 2011 as the Party of European 
Socialists outlined a declaration specifying five demands. These included a 
commitment to go ahead with an FTT within the European Union; to enact EU 
legislation as soon as possible; to set a clear percentage (0.05 per cent); to use any 
funds raised for a progressive agenda; and to particularly target financial transactions 
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of a short-term nature that are considered to be detrimental to civil society. A 
thousand economists from 53 countries
270
 have written to G20 Finance Ministers met 
in Washington (June 2011) to urge the adoption of a financial transaction tax. The 
Economists wrote: ―The financial crisis has shown us the dangers of unregulated 
finance, and the link between the financial sector and society has been broken. It is 
time to fix this link and for the financial sector to give something back to society.‖ 
Several Australian economists have supported the letter. 
 Professor Geoff Harcourt, Professor Emeritus (Adelaide) and Emeritus Reader in the 
History of Economic Theory (Cambridge) said: ―A financial transaction tax would 
reduce the amount of speculative funds circulating and make people concentrate on 
funds associated with real and beneficial economic activity.‖ 
 The above Australian economists joined professors from many of the world‘s leading 
universities, including Harvard, Oxford, Cambridge, the Sorbonne, Berkeley and 
Kyoto, in signing the letter. Signatories include Jeffrey Sachs, Director of the Earth 
Institute, Colombia University and special advisor to UN Secretary General Ban Ki 
Moon; Dani Rodrik, Professor of Political Economy at Harvard University; Professor 
Ha Joon Chang from Cambridge University; and Christian Fauliau, a former World 
Bank senior economist. 
 Professor Sachs said: ―It is time for the G20 to agree to a tax on financial transactions 
to help poor countries struggling with climate, food, and economic crises they did 
nothing to cause. The tax would also be a fair and efficient way to help close budget 
deficits in our own countries as well.‖ 
 The French Government commissioned global entrepreneur Bill Gates to report on the 
potential sources of revenue from an FTT. The report was presented to G20 leaders in 
November 2011 at the G20 Summit but events in Europe overran debate on FTTs. 
 In 2012, the United Kingdom defied strong support from European countries by 
rejecting FTT proposals and as such blocked the larger FTT European project, which 
required unanimity across all member states.  
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 In June 2012, German Chancellor Merkel, under strong pressure from Socialist 
coalition parties, has stated that she is to begin lobbying for a German FTT. 
 In August 2012 the French Government under newly elected President Hollande, 
announced that it was to introduce a national FTT and to the surprise of many 
supporters Hollande doubled the recommended levy on tansactions and derivatives 
trades to 0.02 per cent and 0.002 per cent respectively. 
 In September as the French FTT was commissioned the European Parliament 
announced a decision that 11 members states would introduce a FTT under the 
Enhanced Cooperation Act. The Parliament had been advocating the FTT for over 
two years. 
 On the 29 October 2012 the Dutch Government announced that the Netherlands 
would support a FTT. The newly elected government of Social Democrats and 
Liberals became the eleventh government in Europe to supports FTT proposals. 
 Increased debate in the United States has seen a Bill lodged formally supporting a 
FTT. 
 In the United Kingdom a renewed effort is being made to investigate FTT‘s. and in 
particular former Financial Services Authority, Lord Adair Turner, is leading the 
renewed interest which has been taken up by more conservative news outlets
271
. 
Algirdas Semeta, European Commissioner for Taxation
272
, spoke about the growing support 
for a tax on speculative financial transactions saying that: 
My visit to Washington this week has prompted requests from many of my U.S. counterparts to 
discuss the financial transactions tax. The interest is clearly still here, even if the debate is more 
tentative than across the Atlantic. In Europe, we will forge ahead in trying to implement a financial 
transactions tax, convinced of its merits. We remain open to cooperating with any country that wants 
to join us, now or in the future. The discussion on the financial transactions tax at the recent Group of 
20 Summit in Cannes, France, gave me cause for optimism. True, there was not the agreement on 
global implementation that we Europeans, and others, had hoped for. Nonetheless, there was a visible 
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shift in attitude among world leaders to the idea of this tax. We saw an unprecedented openness to at 
least discussing the financial transactions tax as a very viable option. This change in approach can be 
seen, perhaps, as true democracy at work. World leaders could not ignore the millions of ordinary 
citizens who are crying out for justice when it comes to the financial sector. By justice, I do not mean 
retribution. The financial sector has an essential role to play in our economies, and punitive tactics to 
make it pay for the financial crisis would be folly. By justice, I simply mean fairness. The days in 
which it was acceptable for the financial sector to be under-taxed compared to all other sectors are 
long gone. In fact, the question resonates as to how it was ever reasonable for financial institutions to 
receive such favourable tax treatment, when every other sector — even the most basic commodities 
— must contribute to public budgets. The time has come for the financial sector to pay its fair share 
to society: no more, no less. On this principle, the participants at the G-20 Summit were very much 
united. 
Clearly, growing support across the globe is evident but the area of hostility is Canary Wharf 
and Wall Street where vested interests have high-level political influence. 
Following a round of statements from G20 leaders (November 2011) in support of a 
European-based FTT, Europe has gone ahead with landmark proposals to tax the financial 
sector, ignoring United States opposition in a move which provoked condemnation in the 
United Kingdom where London fears capital flight from the City. London‘s Canary Wharf is 
the largest capital-trading centre in Europe. The European Union‘s FTT proposal had been on 
the drawing board for more than a year. The plan went before the 27 European Union heads 
of state and government at an October 17–18 summit, and was put to a summit of G20 
leaders in Cannes on November 3–4. The G20 Summit failed to conclude a way forward 
despite strong support. European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso said the tax 
could generate around 55 billion Euros (AU$75.77 billion) a year as he lodged the draft 
legislation with the European Parliament in Strasbourg. ―The tax would be levied on all 
transactions on financial instruments between financial institutions when at least one party to 
the transaction is located in the EU,‖ a commission statement said. ―House mortgages, bank 
loans, insurance contracts and other normal financial activities carried out by individuals or 
small businesses fell outside the scope of the proposal‖273.  
The aim of the European Commission was to ensure that the financial sector ―makes a fair 
contribution‖ after European Union governments ploughed 4.6 trillion Euros into bailouts, 
mainly for banks caught in a US-triggered sub-prime credit meltdown in late 2008, only for 
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taxpayers to suffer as public finances had to be cut as a result of instability and huge 
deleveraging processes. The commission also has another key goal in mind: some of the 
receipts from the tax, which would not be implemented before 2014, would go directly into 
the EU‘s budget, giving Brussels more independently raised resources than under the present 
system of contributions from national governments. 
5.4 Objectives of an International Tax on Financial Transactions 
A global financial transaction tax (FTT) has the potential to contribute to global justice and 
development objectives by fulfilling key functions of taxation: revenue raising and regulation 
as well as redistribution of wealth to contribute to global justice, not only within states but 
also at the international level. Taxing financial transactions is one way in which the fast-
expanding financial sector would contribute towards sharing the social infrastructure, welfare 
programs, and domestic policy burdens of governments. Revenues generated by such taxes 
should be used to support global efforts to achieve internationally agreed development goals. 
At the same time, this type of taxation would play a role in the stabilisation of the fragile 
global economy. Although action at the national level is possible, highly interlinked global 
financial markets on the one hand and the high concentration of activities (flash trades) on the 
other, suggest regional and international cooperation. Joint action through regional and 
international taxes could contribute to the strengthening of representative democratic global 
institutions and a sense of global responsibility. A local FTT at a European level could see 
trades diverted to tax-free zones. 
A uniform FTT would cover all spot and derivate transactions on organised exchanges 
(shares, bonds, securities and derivatives, including trade of futures and options related to 
stocks, interest rate securities, currencies and commodities). In addition, should be extended 
to over-the-counter (OTC) transactions directly related to asset prices, in particular to 
exchange rate and interest rate trading procedures through derivatives. The tax would be 
automatically collected at the exchanges and borne equally by buyers and sellers using the 
electronic settlement systems. Control and regulation could fall to the Bank for International 
Settlements (BIS), or a special agency, as an established and independent supervisor. This 
should be easy to implement in organised markets and involve little administrative costs. It 
would be limited to transactions between financial market actors. Thus, the tax would have 
minimal direct impact on the real economy.  
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A phasing-in approach could be considered as a possible option; that is, the introduction of an 
FTT at a low rate and a gradual increase of the latter in order to augment revenues and 
improve the counter-speculative and market-stabilising effect of the tax. Given the state of 
global nation state sovereign debt, it would appear that an urgent full tax would be of benefit. 
A general FTT is more comprehensive as it covers all types of financial markets. Due to the 
enormous volume of the multitude of financial transactions, the tax could yield significant 
revenues even at a low rate. There has been wide consensus of European nation states toward 
a European-wide tax, although this is not supported by the United Kingdom. Clearly, a global 
tax is preferential to individual nation states approaches. Taxes levied in individual zones 
would have the immediate effect of capital flight to tax-free zones in the same way that Wall 
Street and the City of London dominate through tax advantage. The following section covers 
promotion activities related directly to the FTT. 
5.5 Arguments to Promote a Tax on Financial Transactions 
As a contribution to global justice, a tax on financial transactions is a measure of political 
fairness and social justice as it would ensure contributions by the financial sector (which was 
at the core of the crisis) towards crisis resolution and possible global recovery. It would also 
shift the burden of taxation from wages and consumption to capital, thus making the overall 
tax system more equitable. Using the ensuing revenues for financing development and global 
public goods (affordable housing and homelessness reforms – see the following sections in 
this chapter), would contribute to more just international distribution of wealth and to the 
reduction of inequalities. Possible revenues depend on the rate and scale of introduction. All 
estimates suggest that substantial revenues could be achieved with a low tax rate of 0.05 per 
cent on options and futures trades, and 0.005 per cent on derivatives. Even when assuming a 
reduction of transaction volumes due to taxation in North America and Europe, estimated tax 




At the European level, even a tax at a minimal rate of 0.01 per cent would generate income of 
about €100 billion per year (up to €500 billion for a rate of 0.1 per cent). In Australia, the 
world‘s seventh largest financial transaction trader, an amount of up to AU$10 billion could 
be achieved.  
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5.6 Targeting FTT Resources for Australian Housing and Homelessness Services 
Proposals for expenditure of revenue from an FTT have varied from poverty alleviation, to 
boosting the tax base of nation states feeling the effects of financial instability through the 
continuing recessionary effects of the Global Financial Crisis. Most developed states now 
have strong financial sectors and contrasting social issues related to the inability of nation 
states to fund services adequately to those who miss any benefits of resource growth.  
A Roy Morgan Research survey commissioned by the Australian Salvation Army
275
 revealed 
that over 60 per cent of respondents considered the gap between rich and poor had widened. 
Two million Australians were deemed to live in poverty. An Australian Council of Trade 
Union
276
 commissioned study revealed that the richest 20 per cent of the Australian 
population controlled 60 per cent of the nation‘s wealth (primarily in housing), whilst the 
poorest 20 per cent shared just one per cent of that wealth. The top 20 per cent of income 
earners receive over 50 per cent of total income in Australia, while the bottom 20 per cent 
earns 5 per cent. Further, the report stated that ―9.5 million Australians felt that taking action 
to reduce poverty should be a high priority‖. 
In the United States and the United Kingdom, the concentration of wealth is even more 
pronounced. Australia has, in comparison to the United States and European states, a 
relatively vibrant economy, although it is linked exponentially to the world economy. 
Recently Robert Zoellick
277
, former President of the World Bank, warned that the global 
economy had entered ―a very difficult phase‖ and he warned that the ―world was slipping into 
a new danger zone.‖  
Housing affordability in Australia is amongst the highest in the developed world. 
Concentration of populations in main coastal cities intensifies this dynamic. Very high 
personal debt ratios accentuate the lack of affordable housing and homelessness issues. A 
financial transaction tax (FTT) in Australia would provide a new macro revenue source of 
upwards of AU$10 billion to ameliorate the undesirable social and economic effects of 
market downturns. Taxation revenue from FTTs targeted directly to this sector would provide 
an effective government response to Australians caught in the ―two-speed‖ economy. 
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Given the policy direction of the current Gillard Government toward balanced budgets, there 
is a risk that current social housing funding will not be continued. Whilst the Gillard 
Government has shown no appetite for the progressive social and economic outcomes from 
an FTT, it is clear that a specific social, affordable, and homelessness target could provide a 
resource provision that would otherwise be consumed in the macroeconomic budgetary 
issues. No better rationale could be applied to a tax on elite finance capital players, the high 
earners and manipulators of over-the-counter finance in Australia who presently are radically 
unmoored from the fundamental values otherwise measured in Australia as equality and 
kinship. A FTT in Australia targeted to social housing would be a rational sustainable and 
equitable solution to the social and economic issues that confront the Australian Government.  
5.7 Global Revenues 
Globally an amount of US$800 billion could be generated on a tax rate of 0.05 per cent, with 
the major part stemming from derivate transactions on organised exchanges. According to the 
Austrian Institute for Economic Research (WIFO), a general and uniform financial 
transaction tax (FTT) on all kinds of financial asset transactions would have a stabilising 
effect on financial markets, even if introduced at a low rate. The FTT would increase the cost 
of speculative trading and thus help mitigate fluctuations of asset prices in stock markets, of 
exchange rates and commodity prices. At the same time, it would have minimal effect on the 
real economy, and thereby improve the general macroeconomic performance. Above all, it 
would reinforce a level of integrity into markets as finance capital would be required to 
contribute to revenue bases. 
A global FTT is technically feasible because of the use of standardised electronic settlement 
systems. Circumvention of electronic platforms would be very costly and hence unlikely. The 
FTT could be introduced systematically, in terms of both geographic expansion and coverage 
of types of financial transactions. Regional introduction is possible. Due to high 
concentration of trading, there is a possibility that a two-tier (two-rate) FTT (based on the 
model of Professor Paul-Bernd Spahn) which is a version of the proposal popularised by 
James Tobin in the 1970s could be examined. According to this concept, a low rate tax would 
be applied on ordinary foreign exchange transactions, while a higher ―normalisation‖ duty 
would be levied during periods of high currency volatility resulting from speculation with the 
aim of stabilising the respective exchange rates. Thus, such an FTT would simultaneously 
moderate the effects of rapid speculative runs on currencies, thus contributing to the 
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prevention of major currency crises, and generate substantial revenue for development 
financing. An FTT would provide for much more stability by a tax imposition on flash trades 
(high frequency).  
Paul Bernd Spahn is a Professor of Finance Theory with the University of Frankfurt. He has 
been an advisor to the IMF. In March 2002, the UN ―Finance for Development‖ conference 
was held in Mexico and the German Ministry for Development commissioned Spahn to write 
a paper for presentation at the conference. Spahn produced a study entitled ―On the feasibility 
of a Currency Transaction Tax‖. In that study, Spahn concluded that an FTT made sense from 
an economic point of view and that its implementation was extremely desirable given the 
considerable blowout in currency and other financial trades on a global basis
278
.  
The extent of the global trade had far outweighed what could have been envisioned when 
Tobin first looked at the problem in the early 1970s, and now (2012) far outweighs the 
position and interest that Spahn had taken on the subject throughout the 1990s. Spahn, 
however, continues to argue that the implementation was technically as well as economically 
feasible and that an FTT would allow for stabilisation of exchange rates. Additionally he 
argues that for developing countries the FTT would be complemented by his two-tier model 
which would reduce volatility and have the effect of stopping major in-flows and out-flows 
(runs) of speculative capital. Spahn argued that the only real impediment was to do with the 
will of policymakers. He argued that the impediments should be debated. 
It is clear that lobbyists hold disproportionate weight in contemporary political economy 
systems. This provides capital players with a strong influence in public policy settings. It is 
also clear that social democratic governments with the right balance (between their support 
for business and civil society) can put a charge on all capital and industry players who choose 
to operate within their jurisdictions. Socially progressive political groups have been pleading 
the case for an FTT for the past decade. Polychroniou
279
 (2012) suggest that ―if governments 
continue to be proxies to finance capital, and aspiring political leaders, cheerleaders for their 
financial backers, a catastrophic economic scenario is not really as far-fetched as some might 
like to think. Yet the implications of this crisis (2007–2012) continue to elude us, largely 
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because many people are in the grip of the neo liberal orthodoxy and refuse to acknowledge 
the need for large-scale economic, social and political change‖.  
The German model will cover all financial products including over-the-counter derivatives 
trades. Against a background of outright global opposition and political resistance, 
Germany‘s brave new move is a significant watershed in global political economy. 
Germany‘s Chancellor Merkel has taken a lead but the history of support is poor. It may be 
reflected in the vast wealth that unregulated markets and individuals have to influence 
political leaders. Had it not been for the depth of debt crippling nations, FTTs would remain 
in the background. 
5.8 A Brief History of the Financial Transaction Tax (FTT) 
One of the most significant breakthroughs for proponents of FTT‘s came with the recent 
introduction of the French FTT in August 2012. Against strong opposition from the finance 
sector newly elected President Hollande stood by his election commitment to legislate this 
tax. Opposition to the FTT has been very effective during the past decade as financial trades 
and finance capital has been expansive, especially between London and Wall Street. It is 
useful to look at the immediate history. 
The first financial transaction tax was effectively a stamp duty on legal documents covering 
the purchase of shares through the London Stock Exchange. It is the oldest tax in existence in 
the United Kingdom
280
. The meaning of the term financial transaction tax relates to a tax 
placed on a specific type of financial transaction and not a tax placed on a financial 
institution. It is therefore payable only when a trade is actually transacted. If a firm or 
individual only undertakes one trade, it would be subject to a tax if the country of origination 
had a law in place to tax transactions. This principle was first explained by Rodney Schmidt, 
Researcher, in 2010, at a conference in Canada
281
. It is not a bank or an activities tax. The 
rationale is to provide equitable distribution of revenues received across wider tax systems. It 
is ethically based. 
The case for an ―international tax‖ to be applied to financial transactions has been 
controversial since the subject was first proposed by John Maynard Keynes in 1936. Keynes‘ 
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proposal
282
 was to apply a tax to discourage excessive speculation without discouraging any 
other activity; an important rationale to consider in the contemporary circumstances given the 
opposition from stakeholders in the present socioeconomic climate. Keynes considered the 
tax as a way to provide stability to the Wall Street financial sector at the time, saying 
―Speculators may do no harm as bubbles on a steady stream of enterprise. But the situation is 
serious when enterprise becomes a bubble on a whirlpool of speculation‖. In 1936, Keynes 
had raised the spectre of speculative bubbles, which in the modern context have the most 
obvious association with speculative and socially disruptive financial market activities. 
Nobel Laureate Economist James Tobin followed this theme in 1972 when he proposed a tax 
on currency transactions (originally as a tax on spot conversions of one currency into another) 
primarily to dampen down (throw sand in the wheels) of short-term (round trip) transaction 
between countries. The Tobin Tax concept was introduced at the Janeway Lectures at 
Princeton University in 1972 as a currency transaction tax to deal with the stabilisation of 
currencies on a ―larger, global scale‖283. In 2001 as James Tobin reflected on the 1994 
economic crisis in Mexico, the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis and the 1998 Russian Crisis when 
he said: 
My proposed tax on foreign exchange transactions dissuades speculators as many investors invest 
their money in foreign exchange on a very short-term basis. If this money is suddenly withdrawn, 
countries have to drastically increase interest rates for their currencies still to be attractive. But high 
interest is often disastrous for a national economy as the nineties crises in Mexico, South East Asia, 
and Russia have proven
284
  
In 1994 Belgian economist Paul Bernd Spahn re-examined the Tobin Tax and described a 
number of discrepancies in its original form, further proposing his own version on June 1995, 
saying that ―most difficulties of the Tobin Tax could be resolved, possibly with a two-tier rate 
structure consisting of a low-rate financial transactions tax and an exchange surcharge at 
prohibitive rates‖. This new form of the ―Spahn Tax‖ was approved by the Belgium Federal 
Parliament in 2004.
285
 Consideration to the Tobin and Spahn models along with other 
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research is covered in a Master of Arts (Political Economy) Research thesis by Willans 
(2006).
286
 The proposals by James Tobin and Paul Bernd Spahn were in response to the 
growing volumes of currency rate speculation that appeared because of the Bretton Woods 
decision to free international currencies from the constraints of the Gold Standard in 1971. 
In 1971, the United States suspended the convertibility of the dollar to gold at US$35 an 
ounce, thus formalising the devaluation of its currency. This allowed major international 
currencies to ―float‖ on the strengths and weaknesses, or supply and demand, of nation states 
economies. Responses to currency crises started during this period and have continued. The 
foreign currency markets, not central banks, determined the value of each currency but 
central banks often intervened to influence exchange rates. As described in previous chapters, 
more than US$4.5 trillion is traded daily in currency markets. This is approximately five 
times the cumulative amount of foreign exchange reserves held by Eurozone countries and 25 
times that of the United States Federal Reserve Bank. Less than five per cent of all daily 
transactions can be traced to commercial operations. Ninety-five per cent are speculative 
capital movements
287
. It is these speculative trades that attract casino type bets, which in turn 





 (2012) argues that ―before the crisis (2008) the rise of sophisticated 
modern finance was thought to render redundant the role of central banks as guardians of 
financial stability. It has long been believed that their role as financiers of government 
brought only inflation‖. Prices in most markets are influenced by speculation not underlying 
values. It is betting in a pure sense. Mauldin
290
 (2012) adds that ―for the better part of 100 
years, and especially in the past five, we have socialised the risks of high finance. All too 
often, the bankers who take risks do not bear them themselves. By all means let the capitalist 
keep the upside. But let them bear their full share of the downside‖.  
Following the Global Financial Crisis, many economists and governments have re-examined 
the concepts and potential of an FTT, which would identify traders and provide funds to 
restructure economies. The appeal of an FTT is to create a fairer, broader based tax system 
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structure inclusive of the speculative financial sector. Policymakers have provided exclusive 
mechanisms for capital players, which involve the setting up of tax-free or tax light offshore 
centres from where capital firms have traded. As discussed in previous chapters on 
financialisation, Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan provided legislation for free trading 
through Canary Wharf, London, and Wall Street, New York, and markets expanded 
exponentially.  
Fraser Reilly-King of the Canadian-based Halifax Initiative proposed an FTT as a means of 
bringing balance to all parts of the economy globally and locally.
291
Joseph Stiglitz, the 
former Senior Vice President and Chief Economist of the World Bank has been a strong 
campaigner for an FTT along with world leaders Merkel (Germany), Hollande (France), and 
importantly Lord Adair Turner of London-based Financial Services Authority (FSA). Larry 
Summers, previously Director of the National Economic Council in the Obama 
Administration, has also written extensively of the perceived benefits of a global FTT. 
Stiglitz claimed that the new direction of an FTT would be ―much more feasible today than 
when Tobin first introduced his modelling‖ 292.  
The nature of trades has also substantially changed. The philosophies of traders and, of 
politicians, has also substantially changed, perhaps depending on the individual benefits one 
or other is likely to accrue. Banzinger
293
 argues that because of financial systems integration 
―the financial industry is today the biggest spender on IT and the majority of data pumped 
around the globe is relates to finance‖.  
Economist Rodney Schmidt of the North–South Institute in Canada recently concurred that 
an FTT was more technically feasible than the ―bank tax‖ which has been proposed in many 
quarters. Popular news and articles in influential press journals such as the Atlantic and 
Financial Times have maintained coverage of progress toward a tax in recent times. French 
President Sarkozy vowed to introduce a tax to the current session of the Group of 20 (G20). 
Following the G20 November 2011 Summit, and its inability to agree on FTTs, Sarkozy, in 
comments, said a financial transaction tax would remain one of his top priorities as leader of 
the Group of 20.  
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In late 2009, United States Democratic Congressman Peter DeFazio proposed the Let Wall 
Street Pay for the Restoration of Wall Street Bill
294
, which included a domestic (United States 
only) financial trade‘s tax. Information is more publicly available in broadsheets that provide 
news and developments on issues related to the limited means available for governments to 
not only cope with diminished funds for social programs but also a restless public desperate 
for initiatives that might be in some way positive. A recent example of this public 
information approach was the Boston Globe article
295
, which put forward a reason to consider 
an FTT as: 
President Obama and Congress wrangle over how to close a yawning federal deficit, an obvious 
place to look is the financial-services industry that precipitated the recent recession. A tax on 
financial transactions — on the order of a fraction of 1 per cent — could cool speculative fevers on 
Wall Street even as it helps refresh a federal treasury depleted by unemployment benefits and aid to 
reeling states. When the commission studying the 2008 financial collapse at last reported back to 
Congress this week, its six Democratic members placed the blame on excessive borrowing, poor 
federal regulation, and a ―systematic breakdown in accountability and ethics.‘‘ The panel‘s four 
Republican members dissented, and most signed onto a separate explanation that noted, among other 
things, an international credit bubble and flaws in the securitization and credit-rating process. Yet in 
some ways, both accounts add up to the same thing — regulators aren‘t omniscient; traders look out 
for quick profits; a lot of so-called financial innovation makes markets less transparent and more 
volatile. A trading tax would discourage churn in the markets without having regulators looking over 
every trader‘s shoulder. If, as generally expected, a tax on the buying and selling of stocks, bonds, 
derivatives, and credit-default swaps were to reduce short-term trading in favour (sic) of longer-term 
investment, the overall effect on the US economy would be beneficial. Such a tax could also raise 
revenue; low estimates run to about $100 billion a year, but anticipated revenues could run much 
higher. 
The Invade Wall Street movements have caught the public sentiment in respect to campaign 
slogans critical of the wealth accumulated by the top one per cent of society. This protest 
movement has been visited by Jeffrey Sachs, Joseph Stiglitz and FTT campaigners across the 
globe. The pressure is now on to convince politicians and leaders. One clear message from 
the recent social movements criticising global finance and speculation is the lack of 
galvanising specific outcomes that may be forthcoming from FTT, s or more equitable tax 
distribution proposals.  An FTT would replenish sorely depleted public accounts. It would 
provide revenue to replace public funds politically redistributed to bailout the private sector. 
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Clarity on the use of FTT revenue provided an effective campaign tool for President Hollande 
of France. The social benefits from a redistributive social and economic policy linked to a 
FTT provided the linkages that FTT proponents had failed to gain traction on in recent times. 
Articulating the social scope of FTT, s is difficult in an environment dominated by 
conservative press moguls, and political leaders often funded by the financial sector. The 
social scoping of FTT‘s is the most difficult to project. 
5.9 Social Scope of a Financial Transaction Tax 
Recently, in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis and the attendant disruption to the 
economic order questioning the economic viability of nation states, increased interest and 
support for such a financial transaction tax (FTT) proposal has been forthcoming from 
leaders
296
 of developing economies, leaders of community groups, and political economist 
around the world. Against any form of regulation of financial markets has been a growing 
number of capital interest players including hedge funds, offshore financial centres, and more 
importantly an army of lobbyists based in the United States (see Chapter 4) and the United 
Kingdom, both states which dominate the corridors through which financial trade convoys of 
unregulated, secretive trades pass. A line has been drawn in the sand. Two entrenched 
positions have presented.  
Public unrest about the disruptive nature of financial trades, excessive growth in derivatives 
and global financial speculation instruments such as options and futures, has prompted 
responses from conservative based news syndicates including CNN Money; a news outlet not 
noted for its support of issues normally the domain of the left. CNN argued
297
: 
We‘re headed into the deficit debate, and one attractive idea has been left on the sidelines – the 
notion of a financial transactions tax. Most of our stock transactions these days come out of a 
computer. They offer nothing of value to the public, enhance risk and feed a desire for more 
dangerous bets that could (and often do) cause financial crashes. As a society, even if we had no need 
for more revenue, we would do well to limit this growing financialisation in the economy, and that 
goes hand-in-hand with limiting stock transactions. And one great way to use market forces to reach 
that goal is through a small tax on each transaction.  
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The Centre for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR) stated that a tax on trades of stocks, 
options, futures and other financial instruments could generate US$150 billion a year (or over 
one per cent of US gross domestic product). The CEPR study looked at a 0.25 per cent tax on 
stock trades in the United Kingdom and estimates that an equivalent tax in the United States 
could raise an additional $40 billion a year for the Treasury. ―This is not hypothetical,‖ said 
Dean Baker, co-director at CEPR and author of the report. ―The UK has used a Finance 
Services Tax (FST) to collect large amounts of revenue,‖ adding that the International 
Monetary Fund, ―is currently advocating the tax in recognition of the enormous amount of 
waste and rents in the financial sector.‖ As Baker298 states, this United Kingdom tax is 
already in place in Britain, and as a result, the City of London still stands, and mass exodus 
from the stock markets in the United Kingdom has not transpired.  
The common rebuttal from the business communities to an FTT is that business will transfer 
to other less tax or no-tax countries. Baker argues, ―first of all, given the harm which the 
financial industry has caused the US economy, my first response would be ‗Do you need help 
finding a ticket?‘‖ Second, Baker shows that the non-hypothetical example indicates that a 
financial transaction tax does not lead to business flight. As a result, ―individual investors 
who make a low number of trades a year will not even feel a tax like this, but hedge funds 
and investment banks who use algorithms and the like will feel it enough to potentially limit 
their risky trades. And if not, they‘ll provide the government with a healthy source of revenue 
to cover the damage to individuals in the event their risk leads to another crash‖. On the 
subject of volatility of asset prices, Economist Baker
299
 asserts that it is possible that FTTs 
will reduce the volatility of financial markets, although the evidence on the relationship 
between volatility and transactions taxes is quite mixed
300
. As noted above, an FTT will raise 
transactions costs and therefore reduce the volume of trading. Further, Baker contends: 
. There is an extensive literature on this theory of ―noise trading‖ which dates back to Keynes. More 
recently it has been developed in a series of papers that included Lawrence Summers, the former U.S. 
Treasury Secretary and current head of the National Economic Council, as a co-author
301
. Other 
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scholars have continued to follow in this framework
302
. Efforts to measure the impact of FTTs, 
transactions costs, and trading volume on volatility have produced mixed results. Several studies 
have found that higher transactions costs are associated with higher volatility
303
. However, other 
studies have found no significant relationship between volatility and transactions taxes
304
. In an 
interesting study, Roll (1989) found that markets with transactions taxes had no greater volatility in 
the period around 1987 stock market crash than markets without a tax
305
. 
Previously in this thesis (Chapter 2) I have outlined the financialisation of global economic 
markets over two decades (see Figure 5.1 below on futures contract trading), the social 
consequences that have flowed from market dysfunction, and the contemporary systems of 
political economy that enable the advent of sophisticated trading models that are supported 
by the political model of free market fundamentalism that is neoliberalism. The era of the 
current global crisis has many of these symptoms.  
Specifically, states receive little or no revenue return from trades taking place in, and from, 
their legal territories. In contrast, hedge fund managers make fortunes
306
. States have 
absorbed the consequences of dysfunction in global markets, which has transferred negatively 
on their public accounts. This equates to services cuts to citizens. States also continually push 
up infrastructure (water, power, health charges to offset already depleted budgets), and find 
ways to push up charges on taxes levied on civil society. Debt levels unequalled in modern 
society represent enormous burdens to civil society, and policymakers, charged with 
counteracting the negative forces of global gambling on unregulated markets.  
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) released data that suggests that the public debt of the 
10 leading rich countries of the OECD will increase from 78 per cent of GDP in 2007, to 114 
per cent by 2014. Governments of these states will then owe the equivalent of US$50,000 for 
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every one of their citizens. The IMF estimates that the present value of the fiscal cost of 
population aging is 10 times the average of the Global Financial Crisis. If unchecked, the 
combined public debt of wealthy economies will increase to 200 per cent of GDP by 2030
307
.  
Proposed measures to reverse regressive taxes on middle-income workers throughout the 
developed world, recover capital from offshore tax havens and introduce a financial 
transaction tax would gradually reverse the income inequality of the past decades
308
. 
Meanwhile, the shadow economy has not changed its growth pace, although there has been a 
strong concentration of funds away from agriculture and other infrastructure sectors to purely 
speculation financial sector futures trading (see Figure 5.1 below).  
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Figure 5.1: OECD Projections of Budget Deficits, 2011–2017309. 
5.10 Global Capacities  
The socialisation of debt (transferring corporate debt to the public account) has not been a 
local phenomenon confined to the United States, as evidenced in the extraordinary amount of 
credit issued to sub-prime markets through the mid 2003–2007 period. The result of this 
failure of fiscal and social policy has left public funds diminished to unprecedented levels. 
The OECD chart in Figure 5.1 above clearly shows that for developed countries in Europe 
and the United States, budget deficits are severe and lasting. The erosion of public accounts is 
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in those countries that have been the recipients of the free trade paradigms of easy money and 
unregulated financial flows. These are the countries suffering most hardship and 
paradoxically the countries that will benefit most from an FTT that skims revenue from every 
trade in and out of their borders. Spain, in considerable debt, has been a strong proponent of 
an FTT to place funds back into public accounts and to place integrity into the balance 
between the negative effects on its civil society by shadow economy traders. There is no 
other conceivable way other than further borrowing to stimulate the economy. That means 
higher debt repayments over a long period. If indeed, that is now possible. These states are 
effectively bankrupt. Recently (December 2011) European Central banks pledged further 
taxpayer funds to support ailing corporations. The debt cycle seems unstoppable. Shadow 
economies are buoyant. Real economies are increasingly depressed. 
The exponential market expansion of financial transactions is therefore one of the most 
typical characteristics of the latest phase in a ―finance-capital‖ development (together with 
the rising instability of those asset prices which are most important for the ―real economy‖ 
like exchange rates, commodity prices and stock prices). Financial transactions continue 
apace, despite the now US$14 trillion deficit in the real economy in the United States.  
  
Figure 5.2310: Financial Transactions in the World Economy, 1990–2010. 
In contrast to struggling civil society communities Wall Street compensation and benefits at 
publicly traded banks and securities firms hit a record US$135 billion in 2010, up 5.7 per cent 
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from 2009.
311
 An increase in revenue was recorded at 25 large financial firms that have 
reported full year figures for 2010. Revenue has risen by US$417 billion, and Wall Street 
firms are beginning to pay executives the bonuses and deferred payments that have been the 
source of considerable public angst in this continuing period of financial instability (2008–
2012).  
Coincidentally, one of the largest recipients of the taxpayer bailouts, Goldman Sachs received 
US$2.9 billion for its own account from a US$3.4 billion credit default swaps (CDSs) 
payment made by the giant corporation American International Group Inc. (AIG). These 
payments were made immediately after the Federal Reserves‘ US$9 trillion payout. 
According to a report by the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC) in the United 
States, the US$2.9 billion ―was for proprietary trades‖ (that is trades made entirely for 
Goldman Sachs‘ benefit rather than on behalf of a client). The money (US$3.4 billion), from 
AIG to Goldman Sachs, was not included in a United States Government bailout specifically 
for AIG that retired US$62 billion in contracts by fully reimbursing banks, including 
Goldman Sachs and the French corporation Societe Generale the Federal Reserve Special 
Investment Vehicle called Maiden Lane. 
312
 Financial markets require an urgent oversight to 
find a level of integrity to underpin a framework of equality. 
One of the most important facts in the present era (2011-2012) of political economy is that 
apart from high profits for select elite, the world economy is slowing. Bankers and finance 
elites in the regulated sectors continue to enjoy unprecedented profits whilst businesses 
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Figure 5.3313 The World is Slowing: according to the Purchasing Managers Index (PMI). 
An examination of corporate problems as demonstrated in the PMI chart, against the nature 
of financial instability should inform politicians of the urgent need for accountability in 
global markets. An international FTT is both a vehicle for accountability and oversight and 
mechanism to raise revenues. It will have a stabilising effect across markets. 
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5.11 Financial Transaction Tax Proposals  
Many early proponents of a Financial Transaction Tax (FTT) have provided modelling based 
primarily on data from the 1980s and 1990s. Although equations of revenue available were 
significant, this earlier work missed the huge growth in financial and speculative trading in 
asset classes, both in the underlying cash and derivative markets parallel to the rise in the 
financialisation of political economies over the past two decades
314
 (see Chapter 2). It also 
missed the massive injection of funds into the banking sector immediately after the demise of 
Goldman Sachs in September 2008, which injected a minimum of US$10 trillion dollars into 
the United States financial system from state-based taxpayer funds, the largest socialisation 
of debt in history. Since that time the regime of quantitative easing (QE) (governments 
printing money) has become politically acceptable as a ―natural‖ model of delivering 
injections of funds to dry fiscal wells. Recently the European Union Tax Commissioner
315
 
advised the United Kingdom‘s House of Lords Committee that an FTT would not affect 
market growth. Darvas and von Weizsacker
316
 argue that financial transaction trading 
volumes have increased dramatically in recent years. They say that annual turnover for the 
main ―spot‖ and derivatives markets represented 70 times the world‘s GDP in 2007. Eighty-
eight per cent of this figure constitutes derivatives trades.  
Unsurprisingly, asset prices, including exchange rates, stock prices, and commodity prices 
(especially for crude oil) have undergone wide value fluctuations lasting several years. 
Fluctuations are the key dynamic that provide market-betting spreads.  However, economic 
policy has not attempted to mitigate these price swings; for example, by investigating the 
range of proposals and models for currency and broader financial transaction taxes (as 
proposed by Keynes 1(936)
317
, for stock trading, and by Tobin  (1978)
318
, for currency 
trading).  
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Keynes argued that a tax should be levied on dealings on Wall Street where he saw excessive 
speculation had increased volatility in markets. In fact, many similar taxes have been 
abolished over the past 20 years. The earliest known tax of this nature was implemented by 
the London Stock Exchange in 1694
319
 as a tax payable (covering official stamp on the legal 
document) by the buyer of shares. It is still in existence in the United Kingdom on these 
products). 
Volatility and instability of financial markets together with their global interdependence and 
related crises in the 1990s through to the current global recession starting in 2007–08 have re-
ignited the debate over the pros and cons of a currency transaction tax
320
 Many economists 
including Ul Haq, Kau and Grunberg cite the issue of volatility being a key finance capital 
dynamic as an enabler of trades
321
. Global markets that are stable and lack volatility in fact do 
not provide optimum trading environments as positions are placed (as bets) on the inherent 
fluctuation of unregulated pricing mechanisms. This gives the market its position mechanism 
on trades, either up or down the various scales. The ensuing discussion led to new and more 
elaborate proposals on how to implement a Tobin Tax in practice
322
. Asset prices motivated 
the Austrian Institute of Economic Research (WIFO) to consider the pros and cons of a 
general and uniform FTT. Such a tax would be imposed on transactions of all kinds of 
financial assets and, hence, would not be restricted to specific markets like the original 
proposal by Keynes (stock market), the Tobin Tax (foreign exchange market) or securities 
taxes implemented in the past (stamp duties, stock exchange transaction taxes). 
Recent papers summarise the results of a study by Schulmeister et al, Darvas and von 
Weizsacker 
323
, which contribute to the debate with the intention of drawing attention to a 
more fair, and equitable tax model that includes those income earners at the top end of the 
spectrum.  
Whilst proposals for financial accountability have resulted in legislation in Australia to locate 
finance secreted to offshore tax-free destinations, the main institutional players have well 
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established income secretion models in politically supported tax havens such as Guernsey, 
Jersey, the Isle of Man, the Cayman Islands and Vanuatu close to Australia. It should be 
noted that the upsurge in trading volume, innovation in financial engineering, and vastly 
improved electronic transfer models make supervision of trades and oversight difficult. 
Conceptually, a general FTT seems, ―prima facie,‖ more attractive than a specific transaction 
tax for at least three reasons. First, a general tax does not discriminate against specific types 
of markets, and it prevents tax avoidance by substituting taxed by untaxed transactions. 
Second, due to the enormous volume of the tax base, the tax rate could be very small and yet 
the tax receipts might be considerable. Third, such a tax could be implemented in a stepwise 
fashion so that (a group of) countries willing to impose it would start with domestic markets, 
which can be taxed at almost no administrative costs (e.g., it is easier to levy a rather 
miniscule tax of 0.01 per cent on spot and derivatives transactions on organised exchanges as 
compared to transactions in a dealership market like the global foreign exchange market).  
Recently (October 2010) Stephan Schulmeister
324
 concluded that evidence presented in his 
report to the Austrian Institute of Economic Research did not prove the efficacy of 
introducing a financial transaction tax; however the report showed that: 
 Long swings in asset prices in either direction result from the accumulation of 
persistent upward (and downward) mini runs lasting longer than counter-movements 
over an extended period of time. 
 The most popular banking practices; for example, technical analysis, focus on the 
exploitation of such price trends. 
 The widespread use of technical trading systems reinforces the boom and bust pattern 
of asset price dynamics as a sequence of persistent price movements interrupted by 
―whipsaws‘. 
 Technical models, including ―automated trading systems‖ are used at ever-increasing 
data frequencies. This development has strongly contributed to the tremendous rise in 
transaction volumes in asset markets, particularly in derivatives markets. 
Further, Schulmeister argues that: 
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These observations provide ―circumstantial evidence‖ for the view that the increasingly short-term 
oriented, non-fundamental speculation contributes strongly to the overshooting of asset prices. A 
small FTT would then dampen the volatility of asset prices over the short run as well as the 
magnitude of the swings over the longer run. The implementation of an FTT would not constitute a 
great technical problem. Reaching a political consensus will be more difficult because the idea of 
taxing transactions in the ―freest‖ markets calls implicitly into question ―Weltanschauung‖325 which 
has become mainstream in economics and politics over the past decades. 
In the United States, two proposals were put forward in an economics report ―A Budget 
Blueprint for Economic Recovery and Fiscal Responsibility‖ delivered to Congress326. One 
proposal is the concept of a financial crisis responsibility fee, which recommends the 
adoption of President Obama‘s proposal to impose a ―financial crisis responsibility fee‖ 
designed to recoup taxpayer losses associated with the Troubled Asset Relief Program 
(TARP), which primarily benefitted major financial institutions. The fee would apply only to 
financial institutions with over $50 billion in assets (estimated at 60 institutions) and would 
be equal to 15 basis points (0.15 per cent) of a financial institution‘s covered liabilities.  
The fee proposed in the president‘s budget is projected to raise $9 billion in 2015 and $90 
billion over 2011–20, and it will continue until all of the costs associated with TARP are 
repaid. The Congressional Budget Office estimates that the fee would have a negligible effect 
on economic growth. These proposals signal the willingness of Obama to look at revenue 
options however, the Presidents early willingness to examine FTT‘s appears to have been 
retracted through lobbying by Lawrence Summers
327
 and others linked to finance capital. 
Many policy specialists believe that it is not too late for the president to revisit some of his 
earlier positions in support of progressive economic policies, including financial transactions 
taxes. 
In a sign that the Obama Administration is ready to face the critical macro responses required 
to arrest the dramatic decline in the United States‘ deficits, now US$14 trillion, the 
administration appears to be considering a financial transaction tax to provide budget relief. 
The New York Times
328
 reported: 
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Here are two numbers to keep in mind when thinking about the House Republicans‘ budget plan: 
They want to cut spending on government programs over the next decade by $4.3 trillion. And they 
want to cut tax revenues over the same period by $4.2 trillion. As a matter of fairness, raising income 
taxes must start with requiring the richest Americans — who have been the biggest beneficiaries of 
Bush-era tax cuts — to pay more. But even that won‘t dig the country out of its hole. The middle 
class is also going to have to pay higher taxes. That is the only way to pay for needed reform. That 
means higher income taxes further down the income scale than Mr Obama has previously called for, 
and new sources of tax revenue, like energy taxes or a financial-transactions tax. Government 
spending needs to be brought under control. But slashing vital services just to pay for more tax cuts is 
bad public policy and bad economics.  
As part of proposed reforms, the United States has investigated a financial speculation tax. 
While a speculations tax would not eliminate speculation or necessarily stave off financial 
crises, instituting disincentives to short-term speculating would be a step toward building a 
more resilient financial sector. The tax could generate revenue to fund investments to 
strengthen the economy in the wake of the financial-crisis-induced recession. In 2004, the 
Congressional Research Service estimated that a 0.5 per cent tax on stock transactions would 
raise roughly US$65.6 billion a year, assuming no reduction in trading volume. Adjusting for 
nominal GDP growth and assuming a 25 per cent reduction in transactions, it is estimated that 
a financial transactions tax would raise US$77.4 billion in the United States by 2015. 
Expanding the tax to derivative financial products would generate significantly more revenue.  
The ―Let Wall Street Pay for Wall Street‘s Bailout Act (H.R. 1068)‖ financial transaction tax 
bill – which would tax stock, options, futures, and swap transactions – was estimated to raise 
roughly US$150 billion a year. The United States used to have a financial transactions tax, 
and many advanced economies, including the United Kingdom, collect revenue from 
financial transactions without any noticeable harm to economic performance. This policy 
would complement the ―financial crisis responsibility fee‖, discussed above, and revenue 
from the tax could be used to invest in jumpstarting the broader economy. 
5.12 Revenue and Stabilising Effects 
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The following transactions could/should be subject to a general financial transaction tax 
(FTT): 
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 All spot and derivatives transactions on organised exchanges, e.g., trades of stocks 
and interest rate securities, as well as trades of futures and options related to 
stocks, interest rate securities, currencies and commodities. 
 Those over-the-counter (OTC) transactions, which are directly related to asset 
prices, in particular to exchange rates and interest rates. The first group of 
transactions is clearly defined. The second group covers all transactions reported 
by the ―Triennial Central Bank Survey‖ plus OTC spot transactions of interest rate 
securities and stocks  
An FTT would specifically dampen very short-term oriented trading in derivatives markets. 
There are two reasons for that. First, an FTT makes trading the more costly the shorter its 
time horizon is (e.g. technical trading based on intraday data). Second, an FTT would dampen  
derivatives trading since the tax rate refers to contract value (e. g. the effective tax on the 
margin ―invested‖ is, by the leverage factor, higher than the tax relative to the notional 
value).  
Since long-term asset price trends (―bulls/bears‖) are brought about through the accumulation 
of (very) short-term runs, an FTT would also dampen the ―long swings‖ of exchange rates, 
commodity prices and stock prices. Hedging, as well as ―real-world-transactions‖ (this would 
only concern foreign exchange transactions stemming from international trade), would hardly 
be affected by a low FTT between 0.1 per cent and 0.01 per cent.  
The size of this reduction effect depends on the tax rate, the pre-tax transaction costs and the 
leverage in the case of derivatives instruments. For each tax rate and type of instrument, a 
low, medium and high ―transactions reduction scenario‖ (TRS) is specified. In the case of the 
medium TRS, it is assumed that transactions would decline by roughly 75 per cent at a tax 
rate of 0.1 per cent, at 65 per cent at a rate of 0.05 per cent and by roughly 25 per cent at a tax 
rate of 0.01 per cent. Table 5.2 represents the estimated FTT revenues at a tax rate of 0.05 per 
cent under the assumptions of the medium TRS (based on 2007 transactions data – based on 
2010 data, revenue estimates will be by roughly 30 per cent higher). Overall revenues would 
amount to 1.21 per cent of world GDP or US$661.1 billion. More than half of the revenues 
would stem from derivatives transactions on exchanges. Taxes on spot transactions would 
amount to only 0.11 per cent of global GDP. 
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This study estimates the potential revenues of a general FTT for three tax rates, namely, 0.1, 
0.05 and 0.01 per cent (see Tables 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3 below).. The calculation assumes that the 
tax base is the notional value of the respective transaction. This design implies that the tax 
burden, relative to the cash invested to acquire a certain instrument, grows as transaction 
costs fall and the leverage effect rises. Such an FTT would hamper specifically those 
transactions that involve high leverage and, hence, a high risk (chance) of great losses (of 
profits). The revenue estimates are based on the assumption that transaction volumes will be 
reduced by the introduction of an FTT. The size of this reduction effect depends on the tax 
rate, the pre-tax transaction costs and the leverage in the case of derivatives instruments. For 
each tax rate and type of instrument, a low, medium and high transactions-reduction scenario 
(TRS) is specified. 
Tables 5.1 and 5 2 present the estimated revenues of a general FTT for the world economy as 
a whole as well as for the main regions. In the case of the medium TRS, overall tax revenues 
would amount to 1.52 per cent of world GDP at a tax rate of 0.1 per cent, and to 0.49 per cent 
at a tax rate of 0.01 per cent. In North America and Europe, tax revenues would be similar in 
size (relative to nominal GDP); in the Asian-pacific region FTT revenues would be lower by 
roughly one third than in North America and Europe. In the rest of the world, revenues would 
be negligible. It is interesting to note that the estimated revenues of a general FTT at the low 
rate of 0.01 per cent come close to the hypothetical revenues from a VAT on financial 
services.  
In Europe, FTT revenues at a rate of 0.01 per cent are estimated to lie between 0.59 per cent 
and 0.78 per cent of GDP (Tables 5.1 and 5 2). If financial services were not exempt from 
VAT, the latter would yield roughly 0.7 per cent of GDP (this estimate implies a share of the 
financial sector in overall value added of 3.5 per cent and an average VAT rate of 20 per 
cent
330
. Hence, the introduction of a general FTT would roughly compensate for the 
(distorting) exemption of financial services from VAT. In addition, a general FTT would 
affect the (relative) profitability of different types of activities within the financial sector. 
Financing, insurance and risk transformation would practically remain unaffected by an FTT, 
whereas short-term trading would become more costly (in particular derivatives transactions). 
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The following tables 5.1 (Hypothetical Transaction Tax Receipts), 5.2 Currency and 
Derivatives Potential Revenues from a FTT) and 5.3 Cash, Spot and Futures Markets 
Potential Revenues provide evidence of substantial resources that could be available to nation 
states that are prepared to embrace the potential for market equality. 
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Table 5.1: Hypothetical Transaction Tax Receipts in the Global Economy 2009. 
Tax rate: 0.05% 
 
Table 5.2: Currency and Currency Derivative Trading: Potential FTT Revenues. 
2007 (BIS) Data Daily Traded Value as 
at 2007 
Financial Transaction 
Tax (FTT) Proposed 
Rate 
Revenue (estimated) per 
Year 
Currency Traded Value 
(US share =25%) 
$800 billion (US) 0.01%/side US$40 billion 
Currency Derivative 
Traded Value (US Share 
= 50%) 
US$4 Trillion 0.01%/side US$200 billion 
Total    US$240 billion 
Dollar Derivative Traded 
Value (US share = 90%)  
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Table 5.3: Cash, Spot and Futures Markets: Revenue Estimates.  
Product  2007 Traded Value 
(USD trillions) 
2008 Traded Value 
(USD trillions) 
FTT Rate 







Cash Equity $52.30 $64.10 0.0025 $130.75 $160.25 
Index 
Futures 
$50.00 $54.60 0.00125 $62.40 $68.30 
Index 
Options 
$36.00 $32.25 0.00125 $44.80 $40.25 
Total (one 
side) 
   $236.95 $268.80 
Total (both 
sides)  
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Figure 5.4331: Size of Exchange and Over-the-Counter Derivatives: Markets and Taxes. 
                                                          
331
 Stephan Schulmeister. 2011. Figures and tables 5.1 to 5.4. Trade Union Advisory Committee to the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. (OECD) 2011. Size of Foreign Exchange, Exchange 
Traded, and OTC Derivatives Markets and Parameters of Tobin, Jetin, Schulmeister and Baker. Sourcing data 
from the Bank for International Settlements 2011.   
  
Chapter 5 – The Case for Financial Transaction Tax 190 
An international financial tax on all trades would ameliorate some of the gross structural 
losses as governments grapple to explain recovery theories to constituents that are seeing 
public funds being used to pay government debt. A minimal tax applied to trades at the top-
end of the market would not only increase market transparency and accountability but would 
for the first time allow states and global citizens an opportunity to share the massive and 
disproportionate monetary gains taken by a relatively small group of the population who have 
politically engineered the global political economy to benefit their goals of short-term 
accumulation of wealth, aided and abetted, by state compliance. It is no coincidence that the 
accumulated speculatively derived wealth models across developed countries are anathema to 
the orderly wellbeing of the global citizen. 
. In France, –past President Sarkozy332 had been a long-term campaigner of an FTT (albeit 
without supportive traction from opposition parties in the run up to the election). The past 
French President told an anti-poverty summit in New York that state funding will not be 
sufficient to meet ambitious global development goals by the deadline of 2015. ―I want to 
share with you my conviction that we won‘t get there with just public funds and that we will 
have to associate ourselves with the private sector,‖ he told the UN general assembly at the 
start of a three-day summit. Newly elected President campaigned on a platform of financial 
accountability in France. His first task was to legislate the FTT into law. 
Recently the head of the United Kingdom based Financial Services Authority, Lord Adair 
Turner
333
, stated that it would be wrong to exclude policies related to the introduction of 
financial transaction taxes saying that regulatory arrangements to ensure larger capital 
requirement are held at bank levels against risk: 
However, even with higher capital requirements, financial trading activity may continue to grow both 
within the banking system and outside it, and those high levels of trading activity may continue to 
support unnecessary rent extraction by the financial sector, and may generate economic instability. If 
that is the case, and if society is worried about the consequences, either for financial instability or for 
the size and remuneration of the financial sector, then it should not exclude consideration of taxes on 
financial transactions. Anyone who thinks such taxes would prevent all or even most rent extraction 
in the financial sector, or that they could be designed to tune, the liquidity of markets to precisely its 
optimal level – neither too liquid nor insufficiently liquid – is fooling themselves. But in the real 
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world of imperfect instruments with which we seek results at least a bit better than those we see 
today, they should not be excluded from consideration.  
The following section (5.6) describes the macroeconomic effects that would flow from an 
FTT introduced globally. Often described as dysfunctional in times of crisis, financial trades 
after the introduction of an FTT would be dampened during the times of high volatility 
(international runs on currencies and capital flight). Short-term speculation would draw a 
cost, with each cross-border transaction, (resultant of the accumulation of extremely short-
term runs (based on intra-day data) and likewise high volume transactions would be taxed 
strongly. Whilst large speculators may not feel the charges, it is sure to be factored in by the 
vast numbers of private traders operating from homes around the world. This system provides 
ethics and integrity to the markets. Dampening volatility is a positive potential outcome, 
which would tend to steady ―herd effects‖ of trading ―runs‖. 
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5.13 Excessive Liquidity and Price Volatility in Financial Markets  
The main observations about transactions volumes and price dynamics in financial markets 
can be summarised as follows: 
 There is a remarkable discrepancy between the levels of financial transactions and 
the levels of the ―underlying‖ transactions in the ―real world‖. For example, the 
volume of foreign exchange transactions is almost 70 times higher than world trade 
of goods and services. In Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States, the 
volume of stock trading is almost 100 times bigger than business investment, while 
the trading volume of interest rate securities is even several 100 times greater than 
overall investment. 
 For all types of assets, these discrepancies have risen since the late 1990s. In other 
words, finance capital transactions have expanded several times faster than 
transactions in the ―underlying‖ markets for goods and services (real-world 
economic transactions).  
 Trading in OTC derivatives markets has expanded significantly stronger than 
trading in spot markets; this holds true for any kind of asset/instrument. In the 
world economy, derivatives trading volume is roughly 50 times higher than world 
GDP, whereas spot trading amounts to ―only‖ 7.5 times world GDP. 
 Asset prices like exchange rates, stock prices or crude oil prices fluctuate in a 
sequence of long-term upward trends (bull markets) and downward trends (bear 
markets) around its fundamental equilibrium.  
 These trends are the result of the accumulation of extremely short-term runs (based 
on intra-day data) which last longer in one direction than the counter-movements. 
When the market is ―bullish‖, upward runs last longer than downward runs, when 
the market is ―bearish‖, the opposite is the case. 
These observations suggest that financial markets are characterised by excessive liquidity and 
by excessive long-run volatility of prices (i.e., strong and persistent deviations from their 
fundamental equilibrium). This can be concluded from the empirical evidence for the 
following reasons: 
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 Price expectations of market participants must be (very) heterogeneous and must 
have become progressively more so (otherwise trading opportunities would not 
have raised so much faster than transactions in the ―underlying‖ goods markets) 
(real economy).  
 The spectacular rise of derivatives trading cannot be caused primarily by hedging 
activities because the volume of derivatives transactions is just much too big to be 
accounted for by hedging. 
 Therefore, the greatest part of derivatives transactions has to be attributed to 
speculative trades between actors with heterogeneous price expectations. 
 The pattern of asset price dynamics as a sequence of very short-term runs which 
accumulate to ―bull markets‖ or ―bear markets‖ and, hence to long swings around 
the fundamental equilibrium, suggests that the cumulative effects of increasingly 
short-term transactions are destabilising rather than stabilising. 
 This evaluation of the empirical evidence suggests that asset markets are 
characterised by excessive liquidity and excessive price volatility leading to large 
and persistent deviations from their fundamental equilibrium.  
 The growing importance of technically sophisticated trading systems in financial 
markets contributes significantly to the volume and volatility of asset prices over 
the short run as well as over the long run. 
 Speculative financial markets are prone to the effects of ―herd mentality‖ amongst 
traders and runs on currencies, for example, are magnified by investor sentiment 
rather than accrued and informed opinion.  
 The effects on nation states from active speculators in ―herd mentality‖ have been 
documented through all recent currency crises including the spectacular run on the 
British Pound by hedge fund ―herd leader‖ George Soros.  
A global FTT would render such transactions more costly the shorter their time horizon. 
Hence, it would tend to dampen technical trading, which is increasingly based on intraday 
price data. At the same time, technical trading strengthens price runs, which in turn 
accumulate to medium-term trends that involve growing departures from long-run 
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fundamental levels. Therefore, an FTT would be expected to reduce excessive liquidity 
stemming from transactions, which are very short-term oriented and that can be destabilising 
at the same time.  
Since an FTT would increase transaction costs, the lower they are (before tax), it would 
generally hamper derivatives (options and futures) trading largely than spot trading. Since 
spot transactions are more long-term oriented and, hence, based to a larger extent on market 
fundamentals than (speculative) derivatives transactions (such an assumption seems plausible 
at least with respect to stocks and interest rate securities), it is assumed that an FTT would 
hamper primarily short-term, non-fundamental transactions. At the same time, derivatives 
transactions for hedging purposes would not be affected by a low FTT (between 0.1 and 0.05 
per cent) since a trade usually needs just one transaction for hedging an open position 
stemming from ―real-world-transactions‖ (e.g. future export earnings in foreign currency). 
5.14 An FTT Will Reduce High Frequency Trades 
High frequency trades (see Chapter 4 section 4.8) create market irregularities/instability and 
the dominant trend in market capacity. Whilst sophisticated trading systems have changed 
market growth in terms of volume and trade numbers in and out of trading ports, it is the light 
speed flexibility of traders who have determined the clinical frameworks within which trades 
are undertaken.  
Flash trades take just milliseconds, read buy/sell prices, and enable trades to take place only 
if the price range is within a pre-set model. Flash or high frequency trades are market leaders 
and are engineered and financed at a cost factor determinant well outside the affordability 
range of ordinary traders. High frequency traders have also concentrated their interests. 
Instability in financial markets has a destabilising effect on local and global markets. A recent 
occurrence within the Wall Street high technology flash trading theatre created instant chaos 
in global trading markets when shares of Accenture Plc, a technology-consulting firm, sold 
for US$40 on the afternoon of 6 May 2010. Then, without precedent, the stock and the 
system, suddenly seized up. For 22 seconds there were no recorded trades. The next 
occurrence came in the form of a new transaction below US$10. In the next eight seconds, 
Accenture Plc free floated in cyber land, its price changing more than 80 times before flat 
lining at one cent. Then just as abruptly, the share price rebounded to US$40 and stayed 
there. The super-low trades have since been reversed by the exchanges, but the record of 
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them lives on as a reminder that markets have an innate capacity for rapid change with or 
without the intervention of humans. Similar incidents have been recorded in Australia. 
Accenture was just one of the many companies whose shares were wracked by the 6 May 
2010 market crash, which briefly reduced the value of US stocks by more than US$800 
billion. The vast liquidity that automated trading systems supposedly provide the stock 
market vanished instantly that day, as computer programs shut down in confusion. It is 
becoming clear that 6 May 2010 was not a one-time convulsion. Fifteen United States 
companies have had their trading halted after wide swings in their price since June 2010, 
including Citigroup Inc. and Progress Energy Inc., according to Bloomberg
334
 data.  
These specific trading events represent a microcosm of the larger instability of markets. In 
macro market terms, banks on Wall Street and Main Street over-lent, leading to the worst 
economic downturn since the Great Depression. Following the collapse of Bear Stearns and 
Lehman Brothers, investment banks were bailed out using public funds. Nation state public 
funds are now severely depleted and require ongoing rounds of quantitative easing.  
Once bailed out, the banks resumed speculative trading and paying huge trading bonuses at 
pre-crisis levels. Freeland 
335
 suggests that some of the biggest winners in the post-2008 
Federal Reserve intervention have been individuals, not institutions. Freeland argues that the 
hedge fund manager John Paulson, for instance, singlehandedly profited as much from the 
crisis of 2008 as Goldman Sachs. Now corporations are cranking up their trading operations 
in a way that imperils the financial system once again. Gary Gensler, a former Goldman 
Sachs Group Inc. executive who heads the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, 
compared one firm is trading strategy in the crash to driving on ―autopilot into a ravine.‖ 
With governments seemingly willing to accept risk, firms are fearless. 
System reform and oversight of these issues is not a matter of patching up the current system, 
as the United States‘ Securities and Exchange Commission is attempting to do. It is time to 
step back and consider the proper role of finance in the global economy and the regime of 
globalisation of  finance that has delivered considerable benefits in the opening up of global 
economies, but has created a major intersect between financial traders and the real world. 
Such is the calibre of this problem that it effectively threatens the sovereignty of nation states 
                                                          
334
Peter Coy. ―Financial Taxes May Solve U.S. High-Frequency Trading Mess.‖ Bloomberg. 12 November 
2010. 
335Chrystia Freeland. ―The Rise of the New Global Elite.‖ The Atlantic Monthly. February 2011,  
  
Chapter 5 – The Case for Financial Transaction Tax 196 
already reeling in debt. Systemic unregulated financialisation has created major problems in 
global markets.  
Harvard University economist Benjamin M. Friedman asks the right question – ―Is our 
financial system serving us well?‖336 Friedman points out that from the 1950s through the 
1980s, profits earned by financial firms excluding insurance and real estate accounted for 10 
per cent of total US GDP profits. Their share of profits grew to 22 per cent in the 1990s and 
to an astonishing 34 per cent from 2001 to 2008. Asking ―why is this system not serving us.‖  
Friedman argues that ―fantastically high salaries and bonuses have attracted more than a 
quarter of Harvard‘s graduating job seekers to investment banks, hedge funds, private equity 
firms and the like‖. That, Friedman notes, was just before the surge in borrowing; 
securitisation and derivatives finance began to transform itself into a ―world-class crisis‖ 
effectively creating the socialisation of credit across developed nation states. Friedman argues 
that the bigger the financial industry gets, the more dangerous it becomes. High-frequency 
traders are engaged in a costly technological ―arms race‖ to decrease the latency of their 
trades so they can exploit fleeting arbitrage opportunities before their rivals do.  
5.15 Conclusion 
I have argued that to make finance safer and ethical, especially through the introduction of 
financial taxes, will be vociferously opposed by Wall Street and The City, London, whose 
profits are sustained and amplified by leverage.  
The Financial Transaction Tax offers a fair and equitable way forward whilst allowing the 
continuation of the vast speculative and risk laden finance industry. Of course, the financial 
industry has powerful allies in Washington, exemplified by a Bloomberg News report on 9 
November 2010 that high-frequency trading firms such as Getco LLC, Hard Eight Futures 
LLC, and Quantlab Financial LLC have more than quadrupled their political contributions 
over the last four years.  
Lobbyists have influenced the negative political narrative outlining the effects on the finance 
industry. However, with the severity of the Global Financial Crisis and its second wave of 
defaults and sovereign debt crises across most developed countries, a new wave of support 
appears to be forthcoming from conservative politicians, joining the continuing informed 
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discussion from progressive leaders. Half of the nation states in the European Union support 
an FTT in Europe. The United Kingdom supports a global FTT. 
This chapter outlined the objectives and rationale for global and local tax models, and 
revenues available. The wave of public support has never been stronger. Political lines are 
drawn between provision of public goods and services through FTT revenues or the 
continued dominance of the global political economy by an elitist politically supported 
financial sector, and the concomitant risk inherent in speculative financial markets. 
This chapter argues for an accountability of financial markets, specifically for accountability 
of finance capital, the market dynamic that involves speculative trades. To enable markets to 
operate without their inherent instability requires of policymakers a degree of separation from 
vested market interests. Whilst this may not be possible, it is important to identify the risks in 
the market in terms of global finance and to examine evidence of macro issues that create the 
possibilities for change. 
The following chapter looks at these risks and possibilities for the introduction of an FTT. 
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Chapter 6 
Financial Transaction Taxes: Risks and Possibilities 
6.1 Introduction 
Chapter 5 posited the case for a financial transaction tax and examined the current modelling 
by leading proponents. Whilst the case is clear in terms of the socially progressive nature of a 
financial transaction tax (FTT), it is not clear how the entrenched obstacles in its path could 
be removed. Political deficits across most advanced developed countries provide considerable 
obstacles   to the rationale for logical debate. In Australia, a country with a defined two-speed 
economy
337
, Treasurer Wayne Swan has emerged as a leading protagonist on the FTTs. 
Openly opposed to debate on FTTs, Swan is now at odds with a growing and enthusiastic 
chorus of support for either introduction of FTTs or debate on the merits of such a proposal 
across Europe. Australia‘s Treasurer led the FTT opposition lobby heading in to the critical 
decisions at the G20 conference in November 2011. Chapter 6 draws evidence of a 
deteriorating global macroeconomic climate and places the FTT as the central policy lever to 
ameliorate the detrimental effects of dysfunctional global financial markets.  
Whilst an FTT would enable a stream of funds to participating nation states (territorial 
transaction hubs), there is little or no support other than tacit platitudes from leaders of the 
United States and the United Kingdom, the two largest financial trading centres. Despite the 
growing public anger and populist rise (Occupy Wall Street), President Obama appears 
unable or unwilling to counter the revolving door of lobbyist pressure from financial 
interests. With an election looming and an opponent in Mitt Romney with high-level finance 
interests Obama is sensitive to adverse publicity, which would offend finance interests. The 
President depends on campaign funds from the business sector. 
Global financial markets have been built over three decades through the support of left and 
right, centre-left, and  conservative leaders including George Bush Senior and George W 
Bush (United States), John Howard (Australia) and Margaret Thatcher and Tony Blair 
(United Kingdom), all of whom adhered to the era of ―Washington Consensus ―style free 
markets‖ (neoliberalist) , concomitant vast amounts of cheap credit (consumer debt) to their 
populace, and a concentration of enormous asset wealth that has been generated by free 
market regimes.  
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The accumulation of wealth within concentrated asset class elites is a feature of capital 
modernity – an elite finance capital grouping located disproportionately above a widening 
social morass of disadvantaged, unemployed, homeless and increasingly angry middle class 
of citizens, across most developed nation states. Globally, the actions of elite financial market 
players are displacing millions of people through a concomitant contraction of employment, 
housing, education, and opportunities. Ironically, early signs of ―de-globalisation,‖ because 
of the sovereign debt crises have caused a contraction in global commercial banks with 
widespread retrenchments. Commercial banks are closing overseas interests
338
.  
This decade could be the downside to three decades of capital expansion. Free markets have 
distinct winners and losers, and this decade (2012-2022) is likely to introduce further 
significant social change. Within nation states in Europe, there has been immense change in 
the local economies of Spain, Italy, Ireland and Greece. High-level unemployment is a 
feature of developed states in transition from growth to decline. There are macro-economic 
forces at play including the economic power transition from the West to emerging Eastern 
economies. Unprecedented unemployment levels are resultant of the socialisation of debt, in 
turn leading states to cut services. This is the result of financial instability of global nature. 
Satyajit Das
339
 argues that:  
French philosopher Michel Foucault identified a carceral continuum, the system of cruelty, power, 
supervision, surveillance, and enforcement of acceptable behaviour affecting workers and their 
domestic lives. Banking has its equivalent.  
Sociologist Zygmunt Bauman‘s metaphor of liquid and solid modernity captures the shift 
from a society of producers to a society of consumers. Security gives way to increased 
freedom to purchase, to consume and to enjoy life. In liquid modernity, individuals have to be 
flexible and adaptable, pursuing available opportunities, and calculating likely gains and 
losses from actions under endemic uncertainty. It is a metaphor for the rise of financiers and 
the financialisation of everyday life in a volatile world where risk taking and speculation is an 
essential survival strategy.  
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Capital markets have been accountable only to a relatively small number of high-net-worth 
individuals in a distinct concentration of wealth and geo-political power structures. A 
financial transaction tax will present only a small impost to these elite market players. It will 
have the benefit of considerable positive fiscal revenue streams for participating states that 
already have a tacit economic relationship with capital players particularly in respect to 
offshore structures and entities, which provide low tax and no tax bases.  
Chapter 6 provides an argument to press for major social, political and economic reform 
before financial markets cause a meltdown with indescribable outcomes for millions of global 
citizens. Chapter 6 emphasises the implementation of an FTT against a background of 
deteriorating social and economic circumstances engulfing most developed global nation 
states. This chapter builds on the previous argument (Chapter 5) which demonstrated that 
models are available for immediate implementation.  
Many leaders are behind the growing FTT movement. Ironically, only the leaders of two 
leading host nations, the United States and the United Kingdom, have prevented high-level 
debate at global forums. The political leverage of newly elected French President Hollande 
substantially strengthens the arguments for FTTs. This chapter provides a template for 
potential changes in support of an FTT to ameliorate the harmful nature of speculative 
finance capital. 
6.2 Black Ice Economics 
The era of globalisation has introduced a heavily biased tax system adjusted to favour the 
already well placed. In Australia over AU$20 billion in revenue
340
 is secreted to tax shelters 
every year
341
, and lost to the broader economy. Treasurer Swan, President Obama, and 
United Kingdom Prime Minister Cameron each recognise the threat to democracy of market 
instability and continuing social unrest but refuse to unshackle their thinking from neoliberal 
market pressure. By contrast, leading hedge fund player George Soros argues ―financial 
markets are driving the world towards another Great Depression with incalculable political 
consequences. The authorities, particularly in Europe, have lost control of the situation. They 
need to regain control and they need to do it now‖342. 
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There is no reason, particularly in these dire times of ―The Great Correction‖343, to treat one 
section of society, with vested structures of tax minimisation, over that of other citizens in 
societies. Continuing unrest and civil society disease over uneven political economy 
imbalances will eventually come to haunt the political and economic elite. Finding a solution 
that benefits many without major disruption to the finance capital elite is sensible and 
achievable politics. It requires a resolve to create mechanisms that more equitably distribute 
revenues. An FTT is designed for this space. 
Whilst international financial markets deleverage in spectacular fashion during the market 
turmoils of 2008–2012, there is a clear indication that politicians, and government leaders are 
becoming nervous of the encroaching scenarios delivered by socioeconomic events in 
Europe. Spectacular rises and falls in speculative global trades in 2011–2012, have affected 
investment firms, many of which cover the retirement and superannuation investment of 
Middle Europe, Middle America, and Middle Australia. AUS$100 billion was wiped off 
Australian shares in one month and AUS$8000 of household assets in Australia
344
. 
An example is hedge fund leverage, as measured by margin debt on the New York Stock 
Exchange, which declined in August 2011 by the most in a single month since the market 
meltdowns of November 2008, as managers cut their exposure to the markets amidst a 
backdrop of global market sell-offs and risk aversion, according to Bank of America Merrill 
Lynch‘s weekly hedge fund trade monitor (see Figure 6.1). Sovereign debt circumstances 
have caused widespread drops in Australian markets in May 2012. Fears of bank-runs in 
Europe are causing distinct financial market instability. 
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Figure 6.1: New York Stock Exchange Margin Debt, September 2000 to August 2011. 345 
Higher margin debt levels are regarded as a sign of increased speculative trading, as those 
trading on margins take on a risk by exposing themselves to margin calls during a sharp 
decline in stock prices. This requires traders to put up additional collateral to avoid their 
brokers selling their securities to cover the debt. Hedge funds entered August 2011with their 
highest exposure to equities since 2007, according to figures from the Bank of America 
released earlier this month.  
A proposal for the global introduction of an FTT had strong lobbying support and credibility 
although the Economist warned that the likelihood of a global FTT would be difficult to 
introduce given uncompromising opposition by US Treasury Secretary Timothy Geitner
346
. 
By contrast, the possibility of introducing a local FTT across the 27 Euro countries appears to 
be possible after Germany and France consolidated support for a tax to be imposed by the 
European Union alone.  By June 2012, Germany has issued the most positive signs of a 
stand-alone FTT. The European Commission supports the idea. Michel Barnier
347
, the 
Commissioner for a Single Market, said his proposals would be ―technically simple, 
economically bearable by the financial sector, financially productive and politically just‖.  
Many FTT supporters say the way to make the transaction tax workable and cost-effective is 
to incentivise the reporting of transactions and the payment of tax. The way to do this is to 
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legislate that transactions themselves will only be legally enforceable if there is a record that 
the FTT had been paid. Capital players might choose not to pay the tax, but if they want to 
enforce a trade, or debt obligation, they are on their own. If they want recourse to the courts, 
rights to exercise on margin/collateral or a valid claim in insolvency, then they pay the tax as 
their ticket to rely on the legal system. Finance capital players thus rely on state-based legal 
systems in the same way as citizens, and businesses, of the state. They lose their elitism. 
Positive efficiencies demonstrated by FTTs provide an integrated equalising of resource 
distribution across societies as definitive social economic and political determinates. Many 
political economists and economic strategists argue that the era of neoliberalism has had 
profound and distinct influences on modern developed economies. Ulricht Beck
348
 argues: 
What is blocking Europe? The neoliberal self-delusion: the assumption that the economic integration 
of Europe is sufficient. Not only is more extensive social and political integration superfluous, 
according to this conception; it is even harmful. Europe should be nothing more than a huge 
supermarket—though a supermarket with a halo. European neoliberalism ultimately claims to be the 
better socialism, because overcoming national and global poverty and creating a more just world is 
possible only by means of free markets. That we are dealing here with a self-delusion of the 
European elites is shown by two contemporary developments. The first of these is neo-liberalization, 
and the second is neo-nationalization. The interdependence of these two is mostly ignored by these 
elites. A process of modernization has been unleashed under the banner of ―market integration,‖ 
obliterating borders and principles and challenging the national foundations of parliamentary 
democracy, the welfare state, and the class compromise. The result is widespread fear. 
Beck and a growing number of social commentators now openly question the free market 
philosophies that have created vast undercurrents of distrust in market philosophies that affect 
global citizens. Continuous use of taxpayers‘ money to bail out ailing financial entities would 
seem reason enough to warrant an FTT to replenish a rapidly deteriorating national account. 
Becks assertion of a challenge to democracy in Europe alone is being drawn by the growing 
distrust of political leaders and institutions have recently been illustrated in articles
349
 in the 
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press in the United Kingdom and Australia. Both alert to elements of democratic decline and 
the changing nature of political relevance to constituents
350
.  
Three distinct strategic circumstances provide a scenario to the most dangerous global 
economic conditions in recent times. The political economies of developed nation states have 
reached crisis point and there may be no going back in what could be described as black ice 
economic events across continents.  
The first strategic circumstance is an authority and economic contest between Western 
developed nation states and the emerging dynamic Eastern economies of Japan, South Korea, 
China, India, and Russia. Emerging South American economies are also located in the latter 
grouping of nation states playing a more dominant role in the global affairs of global political 
economy. The contest pits philosophical, social and economic forces at high levels.  
China‘s savings, manufacturing and industrial production is diametrically opposed to the 
United States‘ model of essentially a consumer of manufactured goods and structured credit 
with successive United States governments acceding to the hollowing out of industrial and 
manufacturing heartlands in the United States whilst off-shoring jobs and technology to 
China and other Eastern hubs. Whilst this dynamic is hardly new, or unnoticed, it is 
becoming a critical issue in the United States‘ desperate attempt to re-employ, re-stimulate a 
stalled economy, and provide a semblance of growth amongst a background of national 
unsustainable debt.  
Peter Coy wrote in Bloomberg Businessweek
351
 ―An honest assessment of the country‘s 
projected revenue and expenses over the next generation would show a reality different from 
the apocalyptic visions conjured up by both Democrats and Republicans during the (recent 
August 2011) debt ceiling debate, it would be much worse‖. On this theme, David 
Rosenberg
352
 argues that ―this is a country (US) with a US$15 trillion national income 
stream, a US$50 trillion capital stock and US$80 trillion net worth in its household and 
business sector. The ability is there (to pay our debts) including the off-balance sheet 
liabilities. This is not some banana republic; it is not Greece, Argentina or Mexico‖. 
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However, Rosenberg goes on to point out the heart of the problem as ―a political deficit right 
now that is blowing the fiscal issue out of proportion‖.  
Many argue that there is a profound political deficit, apparent not only in the United States, 
but in Europe, and Australia. Following the defeat of French President Sarkozy by Francois 
Hollande there has been a growing list of politicians in Europe 
353
who are at risk of losing 
office because of rising public anger over austerity measures and economic crisis
354
. 
The recent Australian Tax Summit (4–5 October 2011) revealed high-level negativity to any 
change of macro prudential issues (including a complete rejection of FTT proposals). The 
power of financial markets, and their political sponsors, appears to have a tight grip on 
economic and social conditions in Australia and global developed nation states. Political 
leaders have failed abysmally to protect civil society against the known detrimental effects of 
unregulated financial markets. Financial market players, in contrast, have become stronger. 
Derivatives
355
 markets continue to grow at significant pace.  
The second strategic consequence emerges from the current global sovereign–debt crises 
(being experienced across Europe, and the United States) is the recent transfer of debt from 
private banking and finance entities to nation states‘ public account, and how that debt 
transfer has radically altered the ability of nation states to provide an immediate and 
sustainable public goods and services supply. High levels of debt have cause for concern for 
most developed nation states (see Table 6.1 below).  
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Table 6.1: Global Financial Stability Report – Indebtedness and Leverage in Selected Advanced Economies356. 
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National corporate rescue packages in the United States (QE1 and QE2), Australia (Nation 
Building Economic Stimulus Package), and similar in the United Kingdom and Europe, have 
been government responses enabled with public funds. The consequential ability to provide 
public goods and services is diminished accordingly. In the United States taxpayers 
effectively funded struggling banks located across the globe with national based taxpayer 
funds; funds that would be most appropriate at this time to fund desperately needed services 
and programs for an ailing civil society. These sovereign debt crises are not limited to any 
nation state. They are recognisable in most developed nation states. A simple economic 
equation posits diminishing public accounts to a drawback in services available to civil 
society.  
Meanwhile, economic instability and fiscal dysfunction within the European and United 
States economies is worsening. In June 2011, the United States‘ Federal Reserve released 
statistical data quantifying the credit market debt liability outstanding in all sectors of credit 
market instruments as US$52.6 trillion. Standard and Poors estimates that the total amount of 
re-financing and new money requirements (Credit Overhang) for incremental financing and 
corporate debt restructuring over the next five years (2012 to 2016) at between US43 and 
US$46 trillion., saying these factors plus the Eurozone crisis, a sift US economy and slowing 
Chinese growth ―raise the downside risk of a perfect storm for credit markets357‖. 
Global market international credit default swaps (CDS) outstanding positions are currently 
US$707 trillion (see footnote 300 above) A third of all European debt is speculative capital 
market instruments (collateral debt obligations and CDS), most originating from the United 
States. Thus, the risk of European default contagion or the default of any of the European 
countries could see a call on United States (CDS) issuers of proportions hitherto unseen.  
The potential for a major economic and social collapse is real. Financial market inability to 
fund defaults could trigger the next phase of the continuing global financial crisis. At an 
international level, the stakes are high. To emphasise this point (about market exposure to 
speculative financial instruments at play in Europe), the scenario of default is dire. If Greece 
were to default, approximately 94 per cent of the direct losses would fall on European 
creditors. United States banks and insurance companies have high-level exposure covering 
debt in Europe through issuance of credit default swaps.  
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United States banks would have to make 56 per cent of all default insurance payouts for a 
Greek default and 28 per cent and 44 per cent in the case of defaults in Ireland and Portugal 
respectively
358
. These figures demonstrate the eagerness of United States banks and finance 
entities to sell default insurance (CDS) and increase the international exposures and risks 
undertaken by financial institutions.  
At a national level, the stakes are even higher in both social and political economy terms as 
developed nation states wrestle with the intractable problems of public debt, fiscal policy 
settings within depleted reserve scenarios, and the growing inability to provide services to 
citizens. Debt structures in the UK, Germany, and Italy are dire (see Figure 6.2 below).  
 
Figure 6.2: McKinsey Global Institute359 – Composition of Mature Economy Debt. 
The transfer of private debt to nation states‘ public accounts is a monumental political policy 
disaster made worse by the fact that it has benefitted private firms, corporations, and capital 
elites that should never have been considered as worthy recipients of rescue packages. The 
crisis in service provision is likely to impact severely on those most vulnerable members of 
civil society who played no role in the global dysfunction, which is concentrated in the upper 
echelons of high finance. The problem is exacerbated by the rapid growth and political 
influence of elites. 
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Thus, ―two-speed economies‖ (shadow finance systems as opposed to real local economies) 
are evident across most developed nation sates. The ―shadow‖ banking sector is back to its 
pre Lehman Brothers glory years with daily speculative trades of over US$3 trillion in 
currency markets bets alone. Dangers also lay in the nature and concentration of high-level 
derivatives markets. A mere five entities account for more than 95 per cent of American 
financial firms‘ derivatives holdings360. Of these, Morgan Stanley has the least cause for 
worry, since its swaps already sit in a non-bank subsidiary (see Figure 6.3 below). For the 
others, moving the business would be costly, because bank-holding companies generally have 
a higher cost of funding than bank subsidiaries. Estimates of the extra capital required vary 
from $20 billion to several times that. A recent article in Australia brought to light some 
astounding figures in respect to debt funding: 
The big concern if this were to prove a wider liquidity problem is the limited firepower available to 
monetary and fiscal authorities today compared with the onset of the last crisis. Ratings agencies 
Standard and Poor‘s made that point this week when considering the looming funding challenge 
facing the non-financial corporate debt market
361
. It estimated that the total refinancing and new 
money needs of the US, Europe, China and Japan over the next five years at US$43 to US$46 
trillion. Not surprisingly S&P worries with all the problems facing Europe, the slow pace of the US 
recovery and a potential winding back of Chinese growth that there is a downside risk of a perfect 
storm for credit markets. The bigger danger now is that governments and central banks have less 
fiscal and monetary flexibility to prevent serious problems emanating from future market 
disturbances.‖ The European corporate bond market looks likely to face the biggest strains given the 
extent of deleveraging expected among banks. S&P estimates up to 50 per cent of new funding may 
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Standard and Poor‘s is stating through research the issues that have been argued 
consistently through this thesis. That is, nation states have substantially reduced capacity 
to effectively deal with emerging social or economic difficulties because of the depletion 
of their public accounts. Because public accounts have been used to bail out the corporate 
sector. Only over the coming decade will the ramifications of this draw-down on public 
accounts be played out. The problem only gets worse as derivatives and speculative 
capital markets are given free rein to trade at truly massive levels. The following Figure 
(Figure 6:3) demonstrates the level of Over the Counter (OTC) derivatives traded by the 
top five banks in the United States. (JP Morgan has positions of nearly US$80 trillion). 
 
Figure 6.3363: Moody’s – Banks OTC Derivatives Notional Amounts. 
Information technology is becoming highly advanced to match and enable high-speed trades. 
A recent announcement by a leading global hedge fund service indicated that globally hedge 
funds were estimated to spend US$2 billion on technology to enable trades in 2011
364
. This 
news was balanced by a further bulletin from the industry, which focused on high levels of 
instability in the industry similar to that, which is causing great concern to investors in stock 
markets globally. The world‘s largest listed fund manager Man Group PLC provided fear of 
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another industry meltdown when it revealed a net US$2.6 billion was redeemed between June 
30 and July 26 triggering a sale of the company‘s shares, which dropped 25 per cent365.  
Derivatives dealing has become one of the most profitable activities for Wall Street‘s giants. 
The business is thought to have generated revenue of around $22.6 billion in 2009. JP 
Morgan Chase has said that fully one-third of its investment-banking profits came from OTC 
derivatives in 2006–2008. 
Mark Mobius
366
 who manages Templeton Asset Management‘s emerging markets group 
suggested, ―There is definitely going to be another financial crisis around the corner because 
we haven‘t solved any of the things that caused the previous crisis.‖ Mobius argues that the 
global derivatives market is where a new crisis is brewing. The notional value of the over-
the-counter (OTC) global derivatives market is more than $700 trillion, according to the 
International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA). That is more than 10 times global 
GDP of $50 trillion.
367
Evidence from successive quantitative easing programs (QE1 and 
QE2) indicate that the shadow economy has been enriched by direct access to new funds, 
whilst the majority of citizens, in the broader real economy, have been unaffected and remain 
in the same dire circumstances (post 2008), as the economy oscillates under the extremes of 
turbulent market pressure.  
With stock markets in turmoil around the world, there have been unprecedented falls and 
corresponding high points in corporate profits over the past 12 months. Shilling
368
 argues that 
the leaps in stocks and commodities were reversed in the last quarter of 2010, reporting that 
markets were entering a downward cycle that may be self-perpetuating. (Figure 6.4 below) 
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Figure 6.4369: Bureau of Economic Analysis – Pre-Tax Corporate Profits. 
Domestic economies are squeezed of funds in the ―real‖ economies. Real economies are now 
substantially weakened through socialisation of debt from public funds to the opaque shadow 
systems. Players in the shadow systems are deriving huge profits in a greedy display of profit 
levels never before seen in the Western world. Hedge fund managers in the United States for 
example often take home a billion dollars in yearly pay, whilst services for the poor and 
underprivileged are continually rolled back. The top 10 hedge fund managers are rewarded 
with more than half a billion a year, some even more. This divide is unsustainable and will 
have an end point. 
The third and perhaps the most important strategic circumstance are located with the political 
challenge to leaders in the developed nations to influence balanced long-term fiscal 
strategies. Leaders fail to acknowledge the disruptive and divisive layers of social 
disorientations being wrought on nation states and their citizens by secretive and 
dysfunctional international capital market elites, their representatives (lobbyists), and the 
growing conservative social orientation of wealth and power, emanating directly from the 
socialisation of debt. This socialisation of debt has been overseen by conservative politicians 
during the post terrorist 9/11 disasters in the United States in 2001.  
Political lobbyists representing economic elites have a disproportionate influence on the 
governance of fiscal policy in the United States and Europe, including the United Kingdom 
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where the alliance of political and corporate favour was recently clearly demonstrated by 
Prime Minister David Cameron‘s close personal relationship with Rupert Murdoch and his 
operatives. The vast divide between politicians and electorate base is identified by Younge
370
 
who argues that in Britain: 
Class privilege, and the power it confers, is often conveniently misunderstood by its beneficiaries as 
the product of their own genius rather than generations of advantage, stoutly defended and faithfully 
bequeathed. Evidence of such advantages is not freely available. It is not in the powerful‘ s interest 
for the rest of us to know how their interest is attained or exercised. But every now and then a dam 
bursts and the facts coming forth. Such is the incestuous nature of the British ruling class and the 
gene puddle from which it draws its stock. Such is their brazen venality, complicity, contempt and 
mendacity. Eton, Oxford, Bullington, Westminster, – if you‘re looking for a tiny minority who are 
struggling to integrate, look no further than the Cabinet. Two things make this a matter if import as 
well as intrigue. The first is the lie it gives to the insistence on meritocracy at a time of acute 
economic crisis when benefits are slashed, the poor hammered. Cameron and his cabinet insist that 
the poor pull themselves up by the bootstraps, even as they, themselves, swan around in their parents 
expensive pairs of loafers. Today 40 per cent of MP‘s went to private schools (in 1997 it was 30 per 
cent. In terms of social mobility we are going backwards. 
Downing Street and Fleet Street collude in much the same way as the revolving door between 
elite money market players and politicians operate between Wall Street and Washington. The 
United States will require immediate and strong solutions to avoid rapid deterioration similar 
to the fate of European countries that have permitted the power of economic and political 
elites to dominate policy, and economic direction and sovereignty. This last point (loss of 
sovereignty) is an emerging critical issue as economic paralysis threatens the entire European 
banking system. The central issue and one which appears to be the main driver for the 
willingness of European countries to at least investigate the merit of FTTs are both economic 
and sovereign.  
Unveiling the European Union‘s proposal for a financial transaction tax in his State of the 
Union address, Jose Manuel Barroso, the European Commission President said the tax would 
provide approximately US$75 billion a year to steady the depleted union coffers. ―It is a 
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question of fairness,‖ he said, arguing that the public sector (taxpayers) had contributed more 
than US$6 trillion in guarantees to the banking sector
371
.  
In Australia, the amount expected from the introduction of a global FTT would net 
approximately AU$8 billion and would ameliorate the use of AU$20 billion of taxpayers‘ 
funds to stimulate the economy post 2008. If a 0.05 per cent FTT had been collected on 
Australian OTC (over-the-counter) and exchange traded financial market transactions 
between 2005 and 2008–09, an expected revenue return would have been AU$48 billion372.   
Another critical issue in Europe is related to the sovereign risk of accepting other countries‘ 
(Greece, Spain, Ireland, Iceland, Italy, perhaps France, and Portugal‘s) internal debt 
structures, which will have to be absorbed by the European Union. Germany and the United 
Kingdom as leading financial market players would have a considerable amount to gain from 
a financial transaction tax, although as most counties in the European Union are investigating 
the FTT, the United Kingdom‘s Prime Minister David Cameron has indicated he would only 
be supportive if the FTT is global in implementation status; this is something that appears 
unlikely given the depth of lobbyist sector opposition in the United Kingdom. Reports that 
the European Parliament was planning to introduce the FTT as a value added tax (VAT) 
could circumvent the United Kingdom‘s right to veto373. 
The position of the United States appears weakened by the intransience of the Obama 
Administration to distance its policy settings from the intense influence of lobbyists in Wall 
Street, and in Washington. Politicians and lobbyists (8,500 in Washington) seem increasingly 
focused on their close elite clients who continue their concentration of wealth regimes, to the 
detriment of the nation. Open collusion between policymakers and capital playmakers in 
financial markets is obvious and rarely questioned. All this spells continuing troubled times 
ahead for Western developed economies, which have depleted political and economic 
mechanisms to provide basic services.  
A review of donations to the conservative political parties in Europe and the United States 
clearly defines why politicians remain fearful of questioning the power, influence and 
relevance of high-level financial market elites. The relationships are enshrined in the legal 
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nature and status of tax havens. In Australia the Henry Report: Australia‘s Future Tax System 
suggested that at least AU$20 billion in tax revenue was lost to the national account each year 
by Australian citizens holding capital and avoiding tax by using tax shelters
374
. The 
Australian tax system was said to ―poorly target tax shelters‖, a point that did not seem to 
make the agenda at the recent Australian Tax Forum.  
Three strategic circumstances or contests have dominated the global political economy with 
varying social consequences over three decades. Two contests have been won. The first 
contest has been won by the new breed of capital elites, their dominance of the political 
economies of western (developed) societies with consequential diminished governance over 
speculative financial market players, and their interests (which caused the Global Financial 
Crisis).  
The second, highly contentious, but lightly queried contest is the transfer of public funds to 
bail out private firms (banking entities) (which now translates to weakened public accounts). 
This international socialisation of debt has been approved and sanctioned by politicians of all 
persuasions. Global citizens have accumulated layers of debt and reduced circumstances, as 
they become disenfranchised and anxious about personal outcomes in the new global 
economy. 
A new global economy is distinguished increasingly by cheap debt-accelerated bubbles, the 
power growth of the financial services sector at the expense of the manufacturing sector, and 
a savings glut in emerging markets. Developing countries are transferring their savings to 
debt-addicted developed economies 
375
 at a cost, which is only just being realised. The latter 
contest engulfs the former two.  
6.3 Alternatives to the Efficient Market Hypothesis  
European markets are about to embark on a financial market socialisation process that will 
see governments bail out nation states and financial entities. Systemic market breakdowns 
has been evident, and continues as a correction/recession in the United States, first through 
the sub-prime market bubble of high leveraged loans at the base level and then default/toxic 
debt inherent in the financial engineered shadow economy system of collateral debt 
obligations, credit default swaps and the concomitant use of sophisticated trading market 
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systems through algorithm and flash trading feeding a global betting frenzy which effectively 
remains unaltered to this day.  
What is different this time is the detachment of the shadow unregulated economy from that of 
the real day-to-day economies of nation states. Levered investment lending, bank executive 
compensation, bonuses out of kilter with any benchmarks, and trading secrecy, are as real as 
they were in 2008 and just as opaque as the transfer of money through tax havens, by hedge 
funds.  
In reality, then, can the promotion of an FTT make a difference and if so what can be 
conceivably be achieved given the political systems in place? The emergence of continual 
disruption within unregulated financial markets leads to the question of what form of new 
governance models are available to protect civil society from conditions outside real 
economies.  
Clearly, the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH)
376
 has failed as prices generated by financial 
markets no longer represent the best possible estimate of the values of the underlying assets, 
as the underpinning philosophy of model
377
. Raj Patel argues that the EMH just doesn‘t work, 
saying that markets do behave irrationally, investors can herd behind a stock and push up its 
price in a way that is unrelated to the stock being traded.
378
  Further Patel argued that 
governments enabled the finance sector‘s binge by promising to be there to pick the pieces, 
and they were as good as their word. When the financiers‘ bets broke the system, the profit 
they made from the bad debts remained untouchable. The profit was privatised but the risk 
was socialised. 
Despite ample economic evidence to suggest it was false, the idea of efficient markets ran riot 
through governments. Alan Greenspan was not the only person to find the hypothesis a 
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convenient untruth. By pushing regulators to behave as if the hypothesis were true, traders 
could make their titanic bets. For a while, the money rolled in. In mid 1990, the Financial 
Times felt able to launch a monthly supplement entitled ―How to spend it‖; to help it‘s more 
affluent readers unburden themselves. The magic of the past decade‘s boom also touched the 
middle class, who were sucked into the bubble through houses that were turned from places 
of shelter into financial assets, and into grist for the mill of the financial sector. . 
Rapidly changing market conditions in the shadow economy and particularly in international 
―betting‖ on currency trades and commodity markets are influenced dynamically by a variety 
of market instruments and procedures that intervene to challenge the value of underlying 
assets.  
6.4 Unorthodox or Heterodox? Perspectives on Market Dynamics 
The relationship between orthodox efficient market hypothesis and the reality of current 
sophistication in money markets are poles apart. Global markets are completely dominated by 
market sentiment, a highly improbable connection with the actual real time trade dynamic of 
gambling mechanisms that capture markets in millisecond swings and gyrations. Nigel 
Dodd
379
 argues that monetary markets, as described by Susan Strange, encompass a 
distinction between a financial system that is global and an international monetary system 
that remains largely territorial. This is, in sociological terms, the financialisation system that I 
have argued exist in previous chapters. The financial system is the so-called shadow economy 
and the monetary system is based on the so-called real economies of nation sates with a 
variety of currency bases and in the case of Europe a joint currency with the context of a 
group of nations. 
Drawing on the work of Strange, Dodd concludes: 
Viewed in light of the present crisis Strange makes powerful use of the casino metaphor. Whether or 
not we choose to enter the casino she (Strange) remarks ―all of us are involuntarily engaged in the 
days play. The financial casino has everyone playing the game of snakes and ladders (Strange
380
 
1986:2). Few may gain, everyone can lose. Bad luck tends to be unevenly distributed, not just the 
tables, she implies, but the entire casino is rigged, affecting households, firms and entire countries 
unevenly. The global financial system links various forms of economic instability, inflation, the price 
of credit, and energy costs. It is the rootstock of disorder in international political economy. 
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Further Dodd suggests: 
this is the pathological stage of capitalism, characterised by volatility and excess, seemingly driven 
by a financial distension that overwhelms the real economy and threatens the integrity of money as a 
secure store of value.  
In terms of governance and reporting structures, the efficiencies to be expected from an FTT 
in both the local context (Australia being one player in a global FTT) or an FTT in European 
countries only, would be expected to operate within the current market structures and models. 
This current structure is contentious as it has been designed and engineered to accommodate 
a vast number of trading mechanisms only available for elite capital market players. For 
example, the super sophisticated flash trades maintain platforms designed around stealth, 
speed and secrecy and the very nature of their sophistication places their operation within the 
grasp of an elite group of individuals and entities. They dominate markets and are likely to 
find a way around any regulatory process.  
In fact, it could be argued that hedge funds manipulate markets through procedures such as 
shorting which can bear no direct relevance to the actual price or value of commodities or 
currencies, which layer the markets. Consequently, the new market variety of specific 
engineered financial products provide the machinery to enable highly geared sophisticated 
operators to manipulate prices and advantage trades through algorithm and flash trades which 
benefit only those players with high level resources to outplay competitors. These types of 
advantages are held in place and condoned by political economies whose actors draw favour 
from capital elites. From New York to Sydney, politicians have been and will continue to be 
swayed and influenced by market elites.  
6.5 Lobbying and Revolving Doors 
Running parallel to the strongest pro-unregulated financial market lobbying influence in 
government history, neo-liberal promoters of a ―light handed government influence‖ would 
be encouraged that financial market oversight has been substantially weakened by the Obama 
Administration‘s tacit support to continuing lax governance, and weak regulatory policy. In a 
period where much financial market revision was vaunted very little has been delivered. 
Many observers have noted that the Obama Administration has shown a distinct lack of 
judgement at a critical time. When direct oversight of regulatory approaches was needed by 
in a number of government areas the reverse has been the case. The Obama Administration 
  
Chapter 6 – Financial Transaction Taxes: Risks and Possibilities 219 
appears to have been ―leaned on‖ by forces opposing the tightening of market scrutiny.  In an 
unprecedented era of global sovereign debt crises Eisinger
381
 (2011) notes that:  
After the worst crisis since the Great Depression, President Obama has unleashed an unusual force to 
regulate the financial system: a bunch of empty seats. With Sheila Bair soon to leave her post at the 
Federal Deposit Regulatory Office, the Obama administration will have five major banks regulatory 
positions either unfilled or staffed with acting directors. The administration has inexplicably left open 
the vice chairman for banking supervision; a new position at the Federal Reserve created by the 
Dodd-Frank Act, despite having a candidate that many people think is an obvious choice Danielle 
Tarullo. The new Consumer Financial Products Board chairman is unnamed. There are some lower-
level positions that don‘t have candidates, including the head of the Treasury‘s Office of Financial 
Research and Compliance. Perhaps most important, the Office of the Comptroller of Currency, is 
being headed by an acting comptroller, John Walsh, who took over the agency last August. Nine 
months have passed without a leader who might better reflect the Obama administration‘s views on 
banking regulation, a time lag made worse by the office‘s coddling the banks even as they have 
acknowledged rampant abuse and negligence in the foreclosure process. The vacancies come at a 
time that calls for stiffer regulatory examination. The financial regulatory system was remade under 
Dodd-Frank and requires strong leaders to put the changes into effect. Though the acting heads insist 
they feel empowered to make serious decisions, they have roughly the same authority as substitute 
high school teachers. 
Barbara A. Rehm
382
 of American Banker noted that the administration was working on a 
package of nominations to send to Capitol Hill, suggesting ―in a vacuum of leadership, 
conspiracy theories arise‖. One is that Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner is making a 
power grab and doesn‘t mind that these roles aren‘t filled. The idea is that he is asserting his 
influence over the Dodd–Frank rule-making process.  
With the Geithner appointment, President Obama chose a path of continuity over regulation. 
Immediately, the Treasury Secretary became the personification of every Obama financial 
policy. Geithner remains the most politically costly appointment Mr Obama has made, 
saddling him with all the Bush presidency‘s financial crisis, and financial market decisions. 
Geithner, as head of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, was intimately involved in the 
emergency actions of September 2008. Republicans made great political capital tying 
Democrats to the Wall Street bailouts in the 2010 mid-term elections. Now with a dramatic 
change of political support from centre left to centre right, the Republican resurgence in the 
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United States (and the Liberal resurgence in Australia), Republican parties are benefiting 
from Wall Street donations to maintain pressure against a FTT and to discredit the Obama 
Administration for its drawn-out half-hearted attempts at reform
383
. At an international 
finance meeting in the Polish city of Wroclaw, Treasury Secretary Geithner ―repeated to 
European Finance Ministers in a less-than-cordial encounter‖ that the United States opposes 
the FTT on the grounds that it would raise the cost of capital and weaken the already fragile 
economic recovery‖384.  
6.6 Collusion and Corruption  
Former Clinton White House economic advisor and now independent economist Robert 
Riech
385
 has written extensively about the collusion between ex-politicians and high-level 
capital traders in Washington and Wall Street. He takes a particular focus on inevitable 
corruption within the largest centre of market influence and trade in the world. What mainly 
influences Reich‘s approach to this matter is the lack of oversight at a federal level in respect 
to profits taken at the public expense; profits made by financial market players with 
significant insight and knowledge of unregulated markets offering considerable opportunity 
to smart and insightful players. Reich observed as an insight to an authoritative expose by 
writers Morgenson and Rosner
386
 into cross-over collusion at high levels, saying:  
It‘s hardly news that the near meltdown of America‘s financial system enriched a few at the expense 
of the rest of us. Who‘s responsible? The recent report of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 
blamed all the usual suspects — Wall Street banks, financial regulators, the mortgage giants Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac, and subprime lenders — which is tantamount to blaming no one.  
Gretchen Morgenson, a Pulitzer Prize-winning business reporter and columnist at the New 
York Times, and Joshua Rosner, an expert on housing finance, concentrate on particular 
individuals who play key political and economic roles, and deftly trace the beginnings of the 
current sovereign debt crisis sweeping the globe to a point in mid 1990s, when the Clinton 
Administration called for a partnership between the private sector and Fannie and Freddie to 
encourage home buying.  
The authors suggest that:  
                                                          
383 
 Robin Hahnel, Professor Emeritus at American University in Washington. 
384
 ―Shooting the bankers or themselves‖ The Economist 17 September 2011. 
385
 Robert Reich. ―Washington and Wall Street: The Revolving Door.‖ The New York Times. 27 May, 2011 
386




Chapter 6 – Financial Transaction Taxes: Risks and Possibilities 221 
the mortgage agencies‘ government backing was, in effect, a valuable subsidy, which was used by 
Fannie‘s C.E.O., James A. Johnson, to increase home ownership while enriching him and other 
executives. A 1996 study by the Congressional Budget Office found that Fannie Mae pocketed about 
a third of the subsidy rather than passing it on to homeowners. Over his nine years heading Fannie 
Mae, Johnson personally took home roughly $100 million. His successor, Franklin D. Raines, was 
treated no less lavishly. To entrench Fannie Mae‘s privileged position, Johnson and Raines 
channelled some of the profits to members of Congress — contributing to campaigns and handing 
out patronage positions to relatives and former staff members. Fannie paid academics to do research 
showing the benefits of its activities and playing down the risks, and shrewdly organized bankers, 
real estate brokers and housing advocacy groups to lobby on its behalf. Essentially, taxpayers were 
unknowingly handing the quasi-government entity billions of dollars a year to finance a campaign of 
self-promotion and self-protection.  
Morgenson and Rosner provide telling details, such as when they describe how Lawrence 
Summers, then Deputy Treasury Secretary, ―buried‖ a department report recommending that 
Fannie (Mae) and Freddie (Mac) be privatised. A few years later, Fannie Mae hired Kenneth 
Starr, the former Solicitor General and Whitewater investigator, who intimidated a member 
of Congress who had the temerity to ask how much the company was paying its top 
executives. 
All this gave Fannie Mae‘s executives free rein to underwrite far more loans, further 
enriching themselves and their shareholders, but at increasing risk to taxpayers as lending 
standards declined. A company called Countrywide Financial became Fannie Mae‘s single 
largest provider of home loans and the nation‘s largest mortgage lender. Countrywide 
abandoned standards altogether, even ―doctoring loans‖ to make applicants look 
creditworthy, while generating a fortune for its co-founder, Angelo R. Mozilla.  
Meanwhile, Wall Street banks received fees for underwriting securities issued by Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac, and even more money providing lender Countrywide with lines of credit to 
expand their risky lending, and then bundling the mortgages into securities to their clients. 
Morgenson and Rosner (see reference above) say, Wall Street knew lending standards were 
declining but maintained and sustained arrangements because it was highly profitable.  
Goldman Sachs used its own money to bet against its own collateral debt obligations making 
huge profits off the losses of its clients on the very securities Goldman Sachs had marketed to 
them. Eventually everything came crashing down in the major deleveraging of global 
financial crisis.  
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In a further revelation of potential conflict of interest between the White House and capital 
market elites, Richard Teitelbaum and Bloomberg Markets Magazine reported: 
that in July 2008 Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson shared some confidential musings with a group 
of plugged-in New York hedge-fund executives at the offices of Eton Park Capital Management LP‖ 
According to the report, ―Paulson mapped out for the assembled honchos -- many of whom had ties, 
like Paulson, to Goldman Sachs Group Inc., a scenario to put the government- sponsored entities 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac into conservatorship. Seven weeks later, the government did exactly 
that, an action that wiped out the companies‘ shareholders‖. Was it nothing more than ―crony 
capitalism‖? -- the idea that the rich always seem to get better information about the markets before 
anyone else -- as Janet Tavakoli, a former Goldman trader turned Chicago-based consultant, put it. 
Based on the evidence, Paulson did not divulge inside information on July 21 to the hedge-fund 
managers in New York. He shared with them one possible idea for solving the Fannie and Freddie 
problems. Since that was the solution that was eventually selected -- a month later -- in retrospect his 
conversation looks damning. But it wasn‘t and it isn‘t. Which isn‘t the same thing as saying we 
shouldn‘t be upset about it? The whole episode should be seen as further confirmation that hedge-
fund managers, private-equity moguls and the top executives of large banks have long received 
special access to government leaders at the highest levels to plead their cases, or just to get a whiff of 
whatever might be on their minds. When it comes to getting access to powerful people, it‘s not what 
illegal that‘s the crime is, but rather what‘s legal. 387 
Morgenson and Rosner suggest that the revolving door between Wall Street and Washington 
facilitated the charade, arguing that as Treasury Secretary, Robert Rubin, formerly the head 
of Goldman Sachs, pushed for repeal of the Depression-era Glass-Steagall Act that had 
separated commercial from investment banking – a move that Sanford Weill, the chief 
executive of Travellers Group had long sought, so that Travellers could merge with Citibank.  
After leaving the Treasury, Rubin became Citigroup‘s Vice Chairman, and ―over the 
following decade pocketed more than US$100,000,000 as the bank sank deeper and deeper 
into a risky morass of its own design
388.‖ With Rubin‘s protégé Geithner as its head, the New 
York Federal Reserve Bank reduced its oversight of Wall Street
389
. Geithner is now the most 
influential of politicians in the United States and many critics argue his background in diverse 
secretive and unregulated financial spheres is severely compromising his current position as 
Treasury head. Whilst the dangerous crossovers of high level political economy players is an 
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ever increasing dynamic in most global market spheres, this is a most critical phase in global 
economics and the boundaries are indistinguishable.  
Political and economic relationships consistently connect Fannie Mae, Goldman Sachs, 
Citigroup, the New York Federal Reserve, the US Federal Reserve and the Treasury. 
Concomitantly federal, state and local politicians are embedded in this mire of loyalty, 
disloyalty, and immense consumer distrust grossly engineered through decades of free-
ranging at high levels. Reich
390
 states: 
In 1996, Fannie (Mae) added Stephen Friedman, the former chairman of Goldman Sachs, to its 
board. In 1999, Johnson joined Goldman‘s board. That same year Henry M. Paulson Jr. became the 
head of Goldman (Sachs) and was in charge when the firm created many of its most disastrous 
securities — while Geithner‘s New York Fed looked the other way. As the Treasury Secretary under 
George W. Bush, Paulson would oversee the taxpayer bailout of Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, 
Goldman, Citigroup, other banks and the giant insurer American International Group (A.I.G), on 
which Goldman had relied. As head of the New York Fed, and then as the Treasury secretary, 
Geithner would also oversee the bailout. 
Jennifer Shotts suggests that Stephen Friedman ―just could not outlast the waiver that was 
keeping him from illegally holding his New York Federal Reserve Chairman post while still 
remaining a Director and shareholder of the beloved Goldman Sachs Group Inc,‖391arguing 
that 
He cracked under the pressure of too many questions being raised about his controversial dual role 
and the $3 million he just made on his recent Goldman stock purchase in December‖. Friedman 
should have stepped down last fall when Goldman Sachs converted to a regulated bank from an 
investment bank. Since Bloody October (2008)investor confidence went out the window, it should be 
up to our government officials to begin to instil confidence again by not doing anything that raises 
more eyebrows. After all, we are still reeling from the lack of performance on the part of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission and Mr Christopher Cox. The smartest thing that man ever did 
was to resign in January as the Bush Administration was closing up shop. It is no secret that the SEC 
turned a blind eye to numerous heinous acts against investors from allowing hedge funds to continue 
naked short selling to Bernie Madoff's atrocious thievery. Who is policing these people, these 
government officials? Remember when Cox promised before Congress last fall that "several 
investigations were ongoing" regarding the activities that brought down Bear Stearns and Lehmann, 
whatever happened with that? It still remains curious to me that Lehmann was allowed to fail, but 
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Goldman and AIG were propped up. It‘s nice to be friends with the right people‖. Meanwhile, 
Congress is currently considering a bill called the Federal Reserve Transparency Act of 2009. It 
hopes to reform the manner in which the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve is audited by the 
Comptroller General of the United States. This may be a first step in shedding some long lacking 
light in the shadows of how the Fed works beneath the tables and in the dark corners of Wall Street 
itself.  
American taxpayers have so far paid out US$153 billion to keep Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac afloat and are still owed tens of billions from bailing out other financial institutions. Yet 
today James Johnson is a rich and respected member of Washington‘s political establishment 
(although he was forced to resign from President-elect Obama‘s advisory team after the press 
got wind of his cut-rate personal loans from Countrywide). Franklin Raines retired from 
Fannie with a generous bonus. Henry Paulson became a fellow at Johns Hopkins. Robert 
Rubin is affiliated with the Brookings Institution and Timothy Geithner remains Treasury 
Secretary in the Obama Administration. 
Morgenson and Rosner
392
 further argue that: ―The failure to hold central figures accountable 
for their actions sets a dangerous precedent‖ and ―a system where perpetrators of such a 




that the real problem, is that Washington and the financial sector have become so tightly intertwined 
that public accountability has all but vanished. The revolving door is but one symptom. The 
extraordinary wealth of America‘s financial class (see Chapter Two) also elicits boundless 
cooperation from politicians who depend on it for campaign contributions and from a fawning 
business press, as well as a stream of honors (sic) from universities, prestigious charities and think 
tanks eager to reward their generosity. In this symbiotic world, conflicts of interest are easily hidden, 
appearances of conflicts taken for granted and abuses of public trust for personal gain readily 
dismissed. All told, the nation appears to have learned remarkably little from the near meltdown. 
Fannie and Freddie, now wards of the state, currently back more than half of all new mortgages, and 
their executives are still pocketing fortunes. Wall Street‘s biggest banks are a fifth larger than they 
were when they got into trouble, and the pay packages of their top guns as generous. Although the 
rest of America has paid dearly, we seem more recklessly endangered than ever. 
The United States‘ economy is lagging the world because of systemic distortions in the 
financial system. Banks are exercising a tax on the real economy that is impeding global 
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recovery. As recently noted in London‘s Financial Times394 regarding the structural 
imbalances in the financial system: ―.as long as they are not addressed, the banks will make 
profits – or more accurately, extract rents – out of all proportion to any contribution they 
make to the wider economy.‖ The United States‘ economy is failing, despite some weak signs 
of recovery and is going in absolutely the wrong direction, lessening competition and 
strengthening the grip of its financial oligarchy through its policy of focusing relief efforts on 
a small group of Too Big to Fail Banks, at the expense of the broad economy. Despite 
assurances to the contrary, this is the policy being administered by Washington.
395
 
This institutionalisation of distortion was easier to understand under the Bush Administration 
with Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson guiding policy, and the Clinton Administration under 
banking insider Robert Rubin. Analysts question why the financial and institutional distortion 
was knowingly allowed to continue. It would seem that the answer is centred on three men: 
Larry Summers, Tim Geithner, and Ben Bernanke. None of the three has practical experience 
in wider business experience. All three are creatures of the highly exclusive and secretive 
banking system, and are heavily indebted to the status quo. All three are entwined in the 
intensive collusion between the state and high level corporate players. All three have very 
high level capital finance experience. 
Change is required. But while corruption hangs over the political process in Washington, 
where Big Money readily buys influence and control over legislation and regulation, there 
will be no significant changes, and no economic recovery. Recovery will be in appearance 
only whilst an ever increasing number of incredulous citizens remain horrified at the level of 
debt in the United States. As suggested in section 6.2, there are systemic strategic 
circumstances that provide an overlay to where likely changes can be made and foremost 
amongst these circumstances is the change in power in the political and economic axis 
between West and East. Power structures have already changed despite the vision of 
President Obama to reinvigorate the manufacturing and non-farm production sectors. This 
could not put 10 million people back to work, surely not when the policy settings of the last 
two decades at least has favoured sending manufacturing jobs offshore. 
The United States Federal Government‘s financial condition deteriorated rapidly last year, far 
beyond the $1.5 trillion in new debt taken on to finance the budget deficit, an analysis shows 
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The United States Government added $5.3 trillion in new financial obligations in 2010, 
largely for retirement programs such as Medicare and Social Security.
396
 That brings to a 
record $61.6 trillion the total of financial promises not paid for. This gap between spending 
commitments and revenue last year equals more than one third of the nation‘s gross domestic 
product.  
Medicare alone took on $1.8 trillion in new liabilities (more than the record deficit), 
prompting heated debate between Congress and the White House over lifting the debt ceiling. 
Social Security added $1.4 trillion in obligations, partly reflecting longer life expectancies. 
Federal and military retirement programs added more to the financial deficit too. .The $61.6 
trillion in unfunded obligations amounts to $527,000 per household. That‘s more than five 
times what Americans have borrowed for everything else – mortgages, car loans and other 
debt. It reflects the challenge as the number of retirees soars over the next 20 years and 
seniors try to collect on those spending promises. Debt in Europe spirals from US$14 trillion 
to over US$21 trillion.  
The political/financial sector collusion also has the added trauma of keeping elected members 
on both sides of the United States‘ political system unresponsive to change. Ironically, the 
financial transaction tax is fast becoming the arch enemy of politicians and advisors of all 
persuasions. Just at a time when politicians know that financial markets are a source of 
unprecedented revenue to financial traders and the reality is that this dynamic is likely to be 
stable, there is no political will to investigate an FTT, despite a clear call from academics and 
concerned citizens.  
Against this, a new regime of cross-pollination of political and market players substantially 
alters the way that political and market players interact amongst the largest unregulated 
political economy. The London/New York hedge fund James Caird Asset Management has 
appointed Mary Goodman, former Specialist Assistant to the President for Financial Markets 
at the National Economic Council, and Senior Advisor to the Treasury, as its Managing 
Director
397. Goodman will ―provide strategic council on the global macroeconomic outlook 
and on monetary fiscal, financial regulatory and other policy as part of the firm‘s deliberation 
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on investment decisions‖. James Caird Asset Management has approximately US$2.65 
billion in portfolio investments as a major market player. 
The SkyBridge Alternatives (SALT) Conference which convened in Bellagio Resort and 
Casino, Las Vegas, in May 2011, had 1500 participants according to the US$7.8 billion 
global alternative hedge fund. Keynote speakers at the conference were former US President 
George W. Bush and former Prime Minister of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Gordon 
Brown. Also present were leaders in the hedge fund industry and David Axelrod, Senior 
Adviser to President Barak Obama (2009–2011). Other keynote speakers included 
Christopher Dodd, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban 
Affairs. In his introductory speech Victor Oviedo, senior partner of SkyBridge stated:  
We are excited to gather some of the world‘s most influential public policy makers with top thought 
leaders of the investment community to share experiences, ideas and takeaway solutions for navigating 
the ever-evolving regulatory and economic environment
398
. 
In conclusion there has been growing support for a FTT in Europe in the latter months of 
2012, with eleven European countries agreeing in implementation. There is growing 
interest in the United States and the United Kingdom which has Stamp Duty on financial 
instruments. Collusion amongst political and financial players is likely to stall a global 
FTT which would be the optimal goal. Leyshon and French argue that the failure to 
challenge the rhetoric of financial markets is a result of the power of the ―distributive 
coalition
399‖ and interests, suggesting that: 
.(I)n light of the ascendant power of financiers and the near hegemony of neoliberal ideas over the last 
three decades, the mainstream political left has increasingly sought to court rather than oppose financial 
capital, and as such has in large measure itself become part of the ―distributive coalition‖ of 
financialised capitalism. In the US
400
. 
Evidence suggests that there is a strengthening resolve amongst social democrats to draw 
attention to the social consequences of unregulated financial markets and the benefits that 
could flow from progressive global and local reforms. Leyshon and French identify the 
most influential form of opposition. The collusion between capital and political interests. 
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6.7 Global Hedge Funds and Dominant Centres 
The growing authority and re-emergence of hedge fund influence in international markets and 
local and global politics is likely to be the major blocking device to stall financial transaction 
tax (FTT) proposals in the immediate future. Consistent inter-location of players is likely to 
increase with the growth of markets as shown in the following figures describing hedge fund 
quantum returning to pre Global Financial Crisis levels of US$2.1 trillion. It is estimated that 
2011 figures will reach US$2 trillion. Figure 6.5 provides evidence of capital held in global 
hedge funds and the number of funds during the period 2000 – 2010.This Figure shows that 
at the peak of hedge fund activity in the period immediately prior to the Baer Stearns 
precipitated GFC there were nearly ten thousand hedge funds holding capital of US$2.2 
trillion. This figure is close to present (mid-2012 levels). Figure 6.6 shows the dominance of 
the United States markets against those in the United Kingdom. This figure  also shows that 
17 per cent of market share originate from Massachusetts and Connecticut (states of the 
United States) and 24 per cent originate from offshore tax centres associated predominantly 
with the United States and the United Kingdom (Isle of Man, Cayman Islands).  
 
Figure 6.5401: Global Hedge Funds: Numbers and Assets. The City UK. 
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Figure 6.6402: Top Hedge Fund Global Cities. 
Whilst considerable interplays of government officials and elected members of both houses 
of politics into private enterprise banking and high level portfolios has been ―par for the 
course‖ in the United States, Europe, Australia and Great Britain, the political and economic 
landscape has altered considerably post 2008. Voters are highly sceptical of the partisan 
interests of politicians, particularly in Australia, as neither party appears able to persuade the 
electorate that bigger issues (climate change, taxes on mining conglomerates, or taxes on 
purely speculative financial trades) are in the interest of the wider populace continually 
disadvantaged by higher services costs in a two-speed economy.  
As is evident in the United States, the dividing lines between shadow and real economies of 
nation states have never been so evident. Quantitative easing in the United States has placed 
over 10 trillion dollars into the wider economy through banks and financial institutions. Very 
little ―trickles through‖ to the real economy whilst hedge funds and financial corporations 
have never had such a bonanza of taxpayers‘ funds to trade. Elected governments unable to 
provide leadership and independent fearless statesmanship against the persuasive power of 
the financial sector spell doom for the economy for decades. 
6.8 Financial Reform Gains Global Political Momentum 
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Deficits in the political system encourage finance capital players to maintain status quo 
trading, to press ahead with refinement of algorithm and flash trades whilst continually 
improving the electronic sophistication of financial engineering of products and programs. 
Lobbyists counter calls for reform. Despite dire warnings of the impending slip into recession 
of economies across developed countries, little has changed other than the quite remarkable 
inability of politicians to investigate, on behalf of constituents, how systems can be reformed 
to halt the continuous transfer of public funds to ailing banks and institutions. Popular 
protests in the United States and Europe are demonstrating public outrage. One protestor at 
the Occupy Wall Street rally said ―we are not saving beached whales or the environment; we 
are trying to save the world.‖403 Decisions to reform global financial systems obviously out of 
control and out of fundamental governance are not just urgent, they are imperative, and 
require urgent intervention. Investment has been socialised. Society‘s investments need 
protection by elected representatives.  
The Europeans for Financial Reform (EFFR) continue to build on the growing calls for 
financial reform through a financial transaction tax (FTT). In April 2011, nearly 400,000 
emails were sent in response to the European Commission‘s consultation on tax in the 
financial sector. This response was backed up on 14 April 2011 as the Party of European 
Socialists outlined a declaration specifying five demands. They included a commitment to go 
ahead with an FTT within the European Union; to enact EU legislation as soon as possible; to 
set a clear percentage (0.05 per cent); to use any funds raised for a progressive social agenda; 
and to particularly target financial transactions of a short-term nature that are considered to be 
detrimental to civil society.  
A thousand economists from 53 countries wrote to G20 Finance Ministers who were meeting 
in Washington to urge the adoption of a financial transaction tax. The economists wrote: 
―The financial crisis has shown us the dangers of unregulated finance, and the link between 
the financial sector and society has been broken. It is time to fix this link and for the financial 
sector to give something back to society.‖ Many Australian economists have supported the 
letter. University of Queensland Professor John Quiggin said, ―The global financial crisis is 
evidence that self-managing markets do not ensure stability or reduce volatility. Governments 
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must intervene to manage risks including the implementation of a financial transaction 
tax
404.‖ 
Economist, Professor Jeffrey Sachs is among the 1,000 economists calling on the G20 to tax 
financial transactions. These economists have written to G20 finance ministers urging them 
to tax financial speculators to help the world‘s poor, and to provide a continuous source of 
income for states reeling through waves of detrimental financial effects metered by 
dysfunctional activities in dysfunctional speculative markets. Professor Sachs said, ―It is time 
for the G20 to agree to a tax on financial transactions to help poor countries struggling with 
climate, food, and economic crises they did nothing to cause. The tax would also be a fair and 
efficient way to help close budget deficits in our own countries as well.‖  
Bill Gates, philanthropist and founder of Microsoft has been asked by the G20 to examine 
innovative options to raise money for development and climate change. Gates has produced 
draft proposals for the Cannes G20 that indicate that although a global tax would be 
preferential, a tax would be feasible for a ―like-minded group of countries that decided to go 
it alone‖. Gates is said to be ―won over‖ to the idea of an FTT which at least in the United 
Kingdom has strong public approval but is highly opposed within the City financial 
district
405
. The Guardian quoted Bill Gates‘ note to the G20 which said, ―If G20 members or 
some other set of countries (e.g. within the EU) can agree on the outlines of a financial 
transaction tax, it would generate substantial revenues. For example some modelling suggests 
that even a small tax of 10 basis points on equities and two basis points on bonds would yield 
US$48 billion on a G20 wide basis, and substantially more if derivatives were included‖. The 
massive growth in derivatives markets indicates global open trade positions reached in excess 
of US$700
406
 trillion.  
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Figure 6.7407: Global and OTC Derivatives Markets 2004–2011. 
In the United States, social, environmental and economic activist of long standing Ralph 
Nader has entered the cause pushing for the immediate introduction of an FTT. Nader has 
long been a campaigner for a tax on speculative traders and has advocated on behalf of 
citizens in New York State where he alleged the misuse of funds from a longstanding 
financial tax on Wall Street speculative trades. 
A new FTT has been endorsed by a group of White House Democrats around Congressman 
DeFazio of Oregon. Green Party candidates from Laura Wells in California and Howie 
Hawkins in New York State have also called for a Wall Street transaction tax. Ralph Nader 
has recently contributed an article in the Counterpunch, in which he points out that New York 
state already has a type of Tobin Tax capable of yielding between $US15 and US $20 billion 
per year for the state, but that corrupt politicians have actually refunded the money to the 
speculators year after year since 1978, something which is obviously blatantly illegal and a 
huge political scandal. Among economists, Robert Kuttner of the American Prospect is also 
an FTT supporter. Nader
408
 argued (January 2011) in a letter to Andrew Cuomo, Governor of 
New York State, that:  
Greed, power, reckless speculation and theft of other peoples‘ money by Wall Street bankers 
collapsed the U.S. economy into a deep recession that started in 2007-08. These super-rich Wall 
Street bankers looted and drained trillions of worker pensions and mutual fund savings while 
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nationwide eight million jobs were lost. Panicked that their overwhelming avarice was pushing their 
companies over the cliff, the bankers rushed to Washington, terrified members of Congress with the 
help of ex-Goldman Sachs CEO turned Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson and propelled the Bush 
White House into a series of massive taxpayer bailouts and guarantees amounting to trillions of 
dollars during the last quarter of 2006. By the end of 2009, the Wall Street welfarists (sic) were 
recording once again record profits and sky-high bonuses. Month after month it became clear that the 
banks were not lending to small and larger businesses to get the economy moving again—a major 
reason given for the bailouts. A good slice of the money went to bonuses, mergers and other empire 
building by the remaining five giant conglomerate banks. Today these banks are sitting on mountains 
of cash. Never before has Wall Street made so much money from doing so little for economic and job 
growth. 
Criticism of the United States financial sector elites is recorded in the Fiscal Policy 
Institute
409
 who stated in April 2010:  
Essential services like fire departments and schools, recession-buffering social safety net programs 
like homeless prevention and senior services, and critical infrastructure systems like hospitals, roads 
and mass transit all face severe cutbacks. The conditions where many regular New Yorkers live are 
grim. Poverty, unemployment, home foreclosures, and small business bankruptcies keep growing. 
But Wall Street is not suffering from the budget catastrophe or from the crash. …The financial 
industry rang up $61.4 billion in profits for 2009 alone—that is nearly triple Wall Street‘s previous 
record. These are truly windfall profits—they are courtesy of the taxpayer-funded bailout [and 
federal policies uniquely privileging the big banks with virtually free money] and not because the big 
banks made money from financing the recovery of American businesses.  
 
6.9 Proponents of FTTs Meet Strong Resistance 
Hedge funds have made a quick rebound on the backs of American taxpayers and privileged 
tax policies. Low-to-moderate and middle-income workers for example in New York already 
pay a higher percentage of family income in state and local taxes than do the richest one per 
cent of New Yorkers located in the finance and investment sector. The power and influence 
of financial players, however, transcends that of the proletariat and hedge funds have little or 
no regulation or taxation requirements. The City of New York provides a sample of the larger 
market tax aversion across international borders. 
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There is a method available to eliminate the New York state deficit and prevent tens of 
thousands of layoffs and large service cutbacks. What most New Yorkers do not know is that 
for about a century there has been a state stock transfer tax on purchases of securities.  
Last year (2011) this tax, similar to ones imposed in 30 other countries, will amount to about 
US$16 billion. Since 1979, this tax has been instantly rebated by New York State back to the 
financial brokers or clearinghouses that paid it. That is a 100 per cent rebate every year for 
the bailed out financial industry that caused the recession and its immense human damage. 
One citizen, Howie Hawkins from Syracuse, New York, is challenging both the big boys on 
Wall Street and the duopolists‘ candidates. Hawkins is behind the October 2011 Wall Street 
demonstrations and is the Green Party candidate for Governor of New York. The ex-marine, 
author, long-time citizen advocate, working blue collar worker and public interest thinker, 
challenged New York Mayor Cuomo asking
410
: 
Why is Mr Cuomo, the anointed front runner, hiding the Stock Transfer Tax from the public when it 
is an obvious way to bridge the state budget deficit? Why does he rule out higher taxes on the rich 
when they have more money than ever, why won‘t he make them pay their fair share, when they‘ll 
still be rich after paying their fair share?‖ All the politicians in Albany act like we‘re out of money 
and debate over what services to cut, all the while refusing to tell New Yorkers about the $16 billion 
they hand back to Wall Street speculators,‖ adding that  ‗Mr Cuomo is a recipient of campaign 
contributions from hedge fund managers. 
Figure 6.7 above shows the dominance of hedge funds in the United States with New York 
hosting fully 45 per cent of all global hedge funds and Massachusetts 6 per cent and 
neighbouring US state Connecticut 11 per cent. Sixty two per cent of the world‘s hedge funds 
are in this concentrated American location. One of the most interesting correlations is 
extrapolated between these states which host high concentrations of high-net-worth 
individuals and the very high level of public debt held against all citizens in the three states. 
In New York, per capita public state debt is US$3,315 per person; Massachusetts is 
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6.10 Summary 
This chapter has examined a number of key issues related to global financial markets.  
Section 6:2 argued that a number of macro-economic issues overlay the debate on the risks 
and possibilities of establishing Financial Transaction Taxes as a means of market 
accountability and more importantly as a resource to nation states for the replenishment of 
public accounts. Foremost is the balance of economic power between the East and West. This 
issue has very high level consequences given China‘s role as effective financier of the US 
debt. The second strategic issue is related to the transfer of state funds to bail out financial 
entities including banks. This socialisation of debt has weakened nation states abilities to 
fund social services. The third issue which has been discussed in this chapter is the collusion 
between policymakers and capital interests. Each of the three issues is serious. Each 
diminishes the role of governments to provide equitable responses to social needs. 
This chapter acknowledges that social and economic circumstances are increasingly raising 
emotive responses. Emotions do run high with discussions and theoretical approaches to the 
equitable distribution of wealth to fund public goods and services. When public goods 
including taxpayers‘ funds in nation state public accounts, were used by policy makers to 
rescue corporate failures and stimulate economies, there was barely a whimper. Returning the 
favour creates negative emotions from capital elites. Capital elites and politicians, many 
elected with financial assistance from finance capital elites, have designed a sophisticated 
money machine that they are passionate about preserving. Many policymakers, unsupported 
by capital infusions, reflect the emotional pleas of civil society that the system is unequitable, 
divisive, lacks trust, and is unsustainable. Emotionally and economically bereft European 
nations struggle for relevance. 
Values in this debate are complex and secretive. Values can focus on the macro issues of 
market place trades through today-traders and investors, and on the other side of the economy 
the relative savings and superannuation portfolios of middle Europe, Middle America or 
middle Australia. Apart from the real losses, in terms of individual wealth there is now an 
overriding pressure on governments to plan for additional shortfalls in support to self-funded 
retirees whose retirement funding is no longer adequate for sustaining retirement. 
Sociologically, and economically, values in this debate are complex, real, and in many cases 
unsolvable. Further, state intervention based on social and market equity is required. 
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Rationale for reform involves the high level conceptual modes of introducing a more 
equitable financial system, globally. These models could support market speculative trades, 
provide support for all modes of free market activities, whilst introducing, urgently, the types 
of reforms that introduce accountability and equitable tax arrangements commensurate to risk 
and sustainability of market practice. A global financial tax would be just the vehicle to 
reform grossly dysfunctional trading systems that are inherently destabilising and risk prone.  
This chapter has also reiterated the case for such a tax as a progressive reform. There is a 
capacity to introduce this tax but there is also a strong political blocking mechanism on 
behalf of capital interests. Events in the European summer of 2012 may well set the stage for 
a political compromise. There appears to be a political imperative to deal with growing anger 
and social discontent with austerity measures which apply the pressure on social groupings 
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Chapter 7 
Conclusion 
This thesis, drawing upon recent literature and analysis, considered the underlying social and 
economic implications directly related to the introduction of a tax on international financial 
transactions (FTT). The thesis supports known FTT architecture, and describes potential 
outcomes that will be of benefit to participating nation states.  
Newly elected French President Hollande has introduced a French Financial Transaction Tax 
into law. South Korea has decided to introduce a FTT on all derivatives and financial trades. 
Fifteen European nation states have indicated their support for a FTT. Against this 
breakthrough of progressive reform and support for similar taxes in Europe there has been an 
intensive lobbying effort to deride and discredit the foresight and social morale galvanised by 
those who believe that an FTT could ameliorate the negative effects of largely unregulated 
finance capital players. 
This thesis evidences capital market growth and volatility. It provides evidence that growth in 
shadow economies has been responsible for detrimental social outcomes producing 
inequalities within real economies of developed states. This thesis argues that unstable and 
unaccountable finance capital markets have led to the weakening of developed states resource 
base to fund social services.  
Recent references by political economists strengthen arguments that incompetence, greed and 
self-fulfilling ideologies amongst capital players have created a lasting legacy of social cost 
across the developed world. Austerity measures in Europe, rising unemployment, high level 
debt ratios to gross domestic product indices, and real economies in recession, are indicators 
of the changing nature of socio-economic structures across continents. Economies of the 
developed and developing world are slowing down. The fragility of global finance has 
significant overflow effects to developing states such as India and China with potentially 
lasting effects.  
A global FTT would provide a regulatory base, market player accountability, and a financial 
resource of significance to participating states. It would provide a degree of integrity to an 
otherwise opaque and secretive section within participating economies.  
This thesis has examined the socialisation of debt and the rise of political, monetary, and 
fiscal policy that has supported the regime of financialisation. As part of this examination, 
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Chapter 2. (The Financialisation of Global Markets), details the rise of unregulated finance 
capital as the dominant politically endorsed economic structure, over three decades. Chapter 
2. provides evidence of the concentration of capital markets, ―Shadow‖ economies and 
―Real‖ economies, and the history underpinning these events. Chapter 2. evidences the 
growth in financialisation and the integration of global markets over the past three decades. 
Integration in markets places direct control of markets into a concentration where 20 financial 
entities in the United Kingdom account for 99 per cent of speculative market turnover, and in 
the United States the largest 10 financial entities accounted for 95 per cent of turnover.  
Thesis Chapter 3. (The Consequences of Financial Markets) raises the case for reform in 
financial markets by examining the systems that underpin global financialisation, global 
policy responses, and specifically the social policy implications of nation state public 
accounts being used to bail out corporate private debt.  The seemingly incongruous issues of 
public funded corporate bailouts and economic stimulus packages is examined against the 
notion of a global concentration of wealth including evidence that $US$21 trillion is held in 
offshore tax havens around the world . Chapter 3. evidences the rise of social ―precariats‖, a 
new grouping of global citizens who are increasingly marginalised by the unaccountable and 
uneven influence of global finance. From the social fallout from sub-prime markets in the 
United States to the continuing global recession the rise in the number of citizens affected by 
politically protected finance and tax systems, provide very unequal outcomes across 
continents.  
Chapter4. Financial Systems Analysis provides evidence of new highly sophisticated high 
frequency global trade networks are enabled by implicit and tacit support from political 
leaders. High frequency trades are the new engine room of shadow economies. They trade at 
record levels. Chapter 4. argues that excessive risk is inherent in markets and provides 
evidence of the changing nature of risk on a locational basis. This chapter looks closely at 
risks associated with systemic meltdowns and public sector funding to the banking sector. 
Following this theme evidence is presented to support the theory that political lobbyists 
underpin decisions to enable unaccountable financial systems and tax havens, whilst 
influencing government decisions on bailouts in times of market crisis. 
Chapter 5. (The Case for Financial Transaction Taxes) puts forward a series of options, and 
models that are immediately available to underpin FTT policy and proposals.  Foremost being 
a tax on cross border financial transactions, using the same or slightly modified version of the 
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French FTT,  as a new progressive social and economic reform with wide ranging benefits for 
real economies and a concomitant opportunity for removing the inherent secrecy of opaque 
forms of capital accumulation in the global political economy. Chapter 5. provides evidence 
of alternatives to the Efficient Market Theory that emphasises the inherent corrective 
capabilities of ―free markets‖.  This chapter argues that heterodox economics provides an 
alternative framework that takes into account the variations inherent in new global finance, 
untied and unaccountable in its nature. Heterodox economics provides linkages and themes to 
social economics with variants that support market interventions in the form of FTT‘s. It 
responds to collusion and corruption in markets. 
The final chapter, Chapter 6. (Financial Transaction Taxes: Risks and Possibilities) examines 
the potential revenue raising opportunities of a FTT against growing evidence of collusion 
between politicians and capital market players. Chapter 6.concludes that a progressive social 
reform would provide market oversight and scrutiny , an element that is missed at this time, 
as well as bringing accountability to the wider global financial sector. Chapter 6.articulates 
the overarching issues of balance of power between East and West as the critical interface in 
a dislocated world order. Further, this chapter argues that financial reform is a growing and 
pressing issue for elected politicians searching for relevance in a rapidly changing world.  
This chapter evidences the pressing need for financial market accountability. 
In summary, this thesis evidences the disconnect between shadow and real economies. It 
argues that growing indebtedness of developed nation states is an effect of the change in 
global economic power from West to East. It examines the recent phenomena of the 
socialisation of debt across developed countries and argues in favour of a FTT to ameliorate 
the significant public investment that has been transferred to bail out the private sector 
corporations and entities. The socialisation of debt has paralysed European economies and 
has the potential to spread globally. This thesis argues for the immediate introduction of a 
global financial transaction tax to make speculative financial markets accountable.  
Civil society and capital market players have a commonality in respect to nation states‘ legal 
systems. This commonality underpins a legal system that provides the framework for 
financial trades from and into sovereign nation states. Other direct foreign trades in goods 
and services are required to operate under specific legal jurisdictions. Civil society is required 
to accept that elected governments can use taxpayer funds to bail out ailing corporations.  
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Governments could deny financial entities access to legal business frameworks. A solution to 
make finance capital accountable needs political nerve. A nerve that has not been evident in 
political debates in recent times. A financial transaction tax would bring accountability and 
oversight to grossly uneven markets.  
Globally the interest in FTT‘s has increased considerably but gaps do appear in the 
knowledge currently available in FTT modelling and affects current markets. The European 
Commission has released a proposal for a Council Directive on a common system of financial 
transaction tax with technical information on the tax introduced in France in August 2012 by 
President Hollande. It includes macroeconomic assessments and impact statements. This 
information will fill the gaps presently missing in knowledge. The new French Tax will 
provide opportunities to further study the impact of a working model.  
Implementation of taxes on financial transactions should be global. A broad base covering all 
trading arenas is the preferred equitable solution to making global trades accountable. Whilst 
France has introduced a new FTT there is recognition that up to ninety per cent of speculative 
derivatives trades will transfer to non-tax domains. This may have benefits for France 
because the instability in Credit Default Swap markets is intense, and risky, to host countries. 
On the other hand, France may lose some liquidity benefits. France has defied staunch 
political opposition by introducing an FTT at double the rate recognised as being acceptable. 
France now imposes 0.2 per cent on shares speculative trades, and 0.02 per cent on 
derivatives. This is a bold policy position by a new President. 
The European Union have been studying implementation proposals and have identified a 
―Common System‖ for the implementation of FTTs. They have identified a number of 
impacts. The Commission estimates revenues of EU55 billion annually, depending on market 
reactions and effectiveness of tax collection. The Commission estimates that (in European 
countries) the turnover in securities markets is assumed to decline by up to 20 per cent. The 
European Commission suggests there will be a decline in turnovers but a small impact on 
employment. Further, there will be no impact on monetary policy positions, whilst the 
revenue and effectiveness of financial markets will be positive
412
 . Algirdas Semeta, the 
European Union Commissioner for taxation, suggested that he was ready to draw legislation 
to cover European countries wishing to adopt a tax. Nine European countries have shown 
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interest. They are France, Germany, Austria, Belgium, Estonia, Greece, Portugal, and 
Slovakia. Italy has yet to commit to the European proposal. 
United States Democrat  Representative Keith Ellison and six other House Democrats have 
introduced legislation, (the Inclusive Prosperity Act (H.R. 6411), that would impose a 
transaction tax on all stock, bond and derivatives trades made by Wall Street firms, which 
Ellison said would raise "billions" to pay for infrastructure and jobs programs. ―The 
American public provided hundreds of billions to bailout Wall Street during the global fiscal 
crisis yet bore the brunt of the crisis with lost jobs and reduced household wealth," Ellison 
argued, "This is a phenomenally wealthy nation, yet our tax and regulatory system allowed 
the financial titans to amass great riches while impoverishing the systems that enable 
inclusive prosperity‖.  
Under Ellison's Inclusive Prosperity Act, stock trades would face a transaction fee of 0.5 per 
cent, bond trades would be charged 0.1 per cent, and derivatives trades would be assessed a 
fee of 0.005 per cent. Ellison said it would be easy to charge these fees because these trades 
are all computerized. He also said it would make high-frequency trading "unprofitable" but 
suggested this would have the positive effect of reducing speculation on commodities
413
. 
Ellison suggested that fourty countries currently have a transactions tax. 
Growing instability in financial markets is not confined to the dynamics of speculative trades 
alone. Traders in the form of central and investment banks have been undergoing rigorous 
internal problems associated to the LIBOR and other banking scandals in 2012. As a result, 
banks have been shedding positions and markets are under threat. Whilst a FTT remains 
anathema to bankers and traders who have been politically protected for decades there are 
signs on dysfunction from within their own enclaves
414
. 
In conclusion, this thesis has provided arguments on the positive benefits of a global financial 
transaction tax as base to ameliorate the most detrimental effects of a continuing global 
financial correction. Whilst acknowledging the challenges that arise for nation states seeking 
to implement a global FTT, the proposals as articulated in this thesis offer the best hope for 
averting another financial crisis in the years to come, through restoring market stability. 
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